Propatheia: Origen and Didymus on the origin of the passions

Vigiliae Christianae

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 262-282

  Layton, Richard A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 80054152906     PISSN: 00426032     EISSN: 15700720     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157007200X00161     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. The Latin scholar, Jerome, appropriated the concept from Ongen and Didymus, and through him, the concept propassio endured throughout the early medieval period to become a fixture in discussions of sin in the school of Laon. For Jerome, see, e.g., Comm. Matt. 1.5.28 (CCL 77.30-31), ep. 79.9 (CSEL 55.98-99), Tract. in Ps. 15 (CCL 78.377), In Ezek. 18:2 (CCL 75.228).
2. e Siècles, vol. 2 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948), pp. 493-589.
3. Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12.1141-1144A) provides the earliest example of the term's use as a psychological concept. While the precise origins of the concept of a propatheia remain disputed, there is general consensus that it owes its development to the Stoies.
4. For various theories, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), pp. 175-181;
5. J. Fillion-Lahille, Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophic stoïcienne des passions (Paris, 1984)) pp. 163-169;
6. K. Abel, "Das Propatheia-Theorem. Ein Beitrag zur stoischen Affektenlehre", Hermes 111(1983):78-97;
7. B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism", in J. Brunschwig and M. C. Nussbaum, Passions & Perceptions: Studies in the Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993), pp. 150-183.
8. SVF III.3777 378, 386. See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Actions, pp. 127-132.
9. I can refer here to only a few of the many valuable discussions of the oft-misunderstood Stoic theory of passions as rational judgments: M. Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul", in M. Schofield and G. Striker, eds., The Norms of Mature (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1986), pp. 93-110;
10. M. C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 366-386;
11. J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1992), pp. 103-120;
12. J. M. Cooper, "Posidonius on Emotions", in idem, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ., 1999), pp. 449-484.
13. A. Glibert-Thirry, "La théorie de la passion chez Chrysippe et chez Posidonius", Revue Philosophique de Louvain 75(1977):393-435, esp. 402-418.
14. Seneca, ep. 57.3-6; Aulus Gellius, Notes Atticae XIX. 1.4-8 (cf. Augustine, civ. dei. IX.4).
15. For discussion of this initial question, see Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, p. 411 n. 18.
16. B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism", p. 177 and n. 51, notes that as the argument progresses Seneca avoids characterizing the initial presentation as an impetus.
17. On the role of phantasia in the production of passions, see A. Glibert-Thirry, "La théorie stoïcienne de la passion", pp. 416-417.
18. This definition of anger was common in antiquity, and presumed in most Christian writing on the subject. See, e.g., SVF III.395-398; Clement, Stmmateis IV. 23.152;
19. Lactantius, de ira 17;
20. Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (discussed below) and 36:8 (PG 12.1317A);
21. Basil, Homilia adversus eos qui irascunlur (PG 31.356C);
22. Gregory of Nazianzus, adv. iram (PG 37. 816);
23. Nemesius, de nat. horn. 21 (PG 40.692AB);
24. Gregory of Nyssa, de an. et res. (PG 46.56A).
25. See also, R. Renehan, "Aristotle's Definition of Anger", Philologus 107(1963):61-76;
26. J. Fillion-Lahille, Le De ira de Sénèque, pp. 173-176.
27. B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism";
28. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, pp. 410-413.
29. Cf. B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism", pp. 178-179.
30. I am indebted to B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism" for the phrase "psychological inertia" in Seneca's argument.
31. Aulus Gellius, N. A. XIX. 1.18-20 distinguishes the "fool" from the "sage" in terms of the management of these initial impulses.
32. See, e.g., Origen's discussion of different principles of motion in irrational and rational beings, de prin. III.1-.2-3 (= SVF 11.988) and de mat. 6.1 (= SVF III.989).
33. In Cels. I. 64, V.57, VIII.51, Origen mentions having read Chrysippus, and includes two extracts from his treatise on the passions.
34. For the general contribution of the Stoics to Origen's thought, see H. Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa", JTS 48(1947):34-49, who notes that both Origen and Clement show their closest affinities with the Stoics in adapting their ethical ideals.
35. Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG l2.1141D-1144B).
36. Origen, Sell Ps. 4:5 (PG 12.1141D):.
37. Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12.1144A):
38. Origen, Comm. Eph. Fr. XIX. 68-75
39. (JTS 3 [1902], p. 420) (reading with the manuscript against the unnecessary emendation of the editor to).
40. Origen, In Ps. 4:5 (PG 12.1141D) (quoted above). Origen perhaps recalls Posidonius's position that an "emotional pull" can influence a reason that has been distorted by false suppositions.
41. See the discussions of I. G. Kidd, "Posidonius on Emotions", in A. A. Long, Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone Press, 1971 [repr. 1996]), pp. 200-215, esp. pp. 206-207
42. Coopcr, "Posidonius on Emotions", pp. 470-472.
43. Origen, Comm. Matt. Ser. 92 (GCS 38.205f.): et considera, quia non dixit: tristabatur et taediabatur, sed: coepit tristari et taediari. multum enim interest inter tristari et incipere tristari. si ergo aliquis defendens passiones humanas profert nobis etiam ipsum tristatum fuisse Iesum, audiat quoniam, qui "temptatus est per omnia secundum similitudinem praeter peccatum", hic non est tristatus tristitia passionis ipsius, sed factus est secundum humanam naturum tantum in ipso principio tristitiae et pavoris, ut ostendat discipulis suis praesentibus (maxime Petro magna de se existimanti) rebus ipsis, quod et postea eis dixit, qui "spiritus promptus est, caro autem infirma", et non est aliquando confidendum in ea sed semper timendum de ea; quoniam incauta confidentia ad iactantiam ducit, timor autcm infirmitatis ad auxilium dei confugere adhortatur, sicut et dominum ipsum paululum progredi et cadcrc in faciem et orare. ergo coepit quidem tristari secundum humanam naturam, quae talibus passionibus subdita est, non autem secundum divinam virtutem, quae ab huiusmodi passione longe remota est.
44. Origen, Io. XXXII. 4.51-52.
45. Cf. Bauer, Arndt, Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, 2 β.
46. On Origen's appeal to, see B. Neuschäfer, Origenen als Philologe, SBA 18. 1-2 (Basel: 1987), pp. 143-145, with examples p. 401, n. 36.
47. Stobaeus, Ecl. 2. 88.8-89.3 (= SVF III.378), citing the summary of Arius Didymus.
48. I have followed the translation of J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, p. 104.
49. See also the valuable collection of texts and translations provided by A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1987), § 65.
50. See, e.g., Ps.-Andronicus, On Passions, 1 (= SVF III.391)
51. Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 4. 2.1 (= SVF III.463), and 47.12-17 (= SVF III.466), on the mitigation of. All these texts are also compiled by Long and Sedley.
52. Five previously lost commentaries of Didymus were discovered in the middle of the twentieth century in Tura, Egypt, and have now been published by French and German editors. I cite these editions by abbreviating the biblical book, in combination with the designation "T" and the page and line of the papyrus. In addition, I make use of the copious fragments to Didymus's Commentary on Psalms edited by E. Mühlenberg, Psalmen-kommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung, 3 vols, (Patristische Texte und Studien; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), cited as "Mühlenberg" with the fragment number.
53. On the Tura commentaries to Psalms and Ecclesiastes as school products, see G. Binder and L. Liescnborghs, "Einleitung", Didymos der Blinde: Kommenlar zum Ecclesiastes (Tura-Papyrus). Ted 1.1 (PrA, 25; Bonn: Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1979), pp. x-xiii;
54. A. B. Nelson, "The Classroom of Didymus the Blind", Ph. D. dissertation (University of Michigan, 1995).
55. The question of Didymus's knowledge of Stoic writings merits further consideration. A. B. Nelson, "The Classroom of Didymus the Blind", pp. 97-101, identifies passages in the Tura commentaries where Didymus directly addresses Stoic positions. She does not discuss, however, how Didymus gained knowledge of these teachings.
56. In a careful investigation of in Origen and Didymus, B. J. Bennett, "Didymus the Blind's Contra Manichaeos and its Debt to Origen's Theology and Exegesis", (Ph. D. dissertation, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto, 1997), pp. 205-213, notes that significant affinity exists between the function of the concept in Didymus with that of the Stoic teacher, Epictetus. Bennett further observes, however, that these points of agreement are also present in Origen (cf. pp. 195-205), and concludes that Didymus's treatment of "most nearly resembles that of Origen" (p. 213).
57. Didymus associates propatheia with each of the four cardinal passions: grief (Ps. T. 222.8-12, 293.3-12); fear (Ps. T. 43.20, 221.32-33, In ft. 76-5 [Mühlenberg, fr. 793]);
58. desire (Ps. T. 76.14-17, 252.33-35, 263.10-11);
59. anger (Ps. T. 222.12-14, Eccl. T. 206. 23);
60. Didymus, Ps. T. 8. 20-9. 16, affirms that the soul has a "desiring component" to pursue the good and strive for the useful.
61. See also Ps. T. 101. 9;
62. In Ps. 102:5 (Muhlenberg, fr. 978), JobT. 60.2f:.
63. The condition of the soul in propatheia as: Ps. T. 33. 28-29;221.34;222.12-14;
64. In Ps. 76:5 (Mühlenberg, fr. 793a. 11-19);
65. JobT. 33. 33-36 (without the term propatheia); as: Ps. T. 222.9; as:
66. JobT. 50. 8-51.7 (without the term propatheia).
67. Origen, Sel. Ps. 4:5 (PG 12 1144B) had previously identified the occurrence of propatheia as an "agitation and shaking of the soul."
68. For corporeal distress causing of the soul, JobT. 50. 8-51.7.
69. Didymus, Ps. T. 274. 4;
70. JobT. 306. 16-308. 15.
71. Even saints will suffer propatheias, Ps. T. 274. 4-12.
72. Didymus, Ps. T. 277. 1-5: If humanity had retained its created image, there would be no disturbance:.
73. Didymus, Ps. T. 221. 32-33.
74. See B. Krebber, Exkurs 1 zu 221, 2-222, 6:
75. Die Lehre von der im Kampf gegen Apollinarios, Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ecclesiastes, IV (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1972), pp. 157-158.
76. Didymus, Ps. T. 43. 16-20
77. cf. Ps. T. 33. 28-29
78. In Ps. 87:17b (Mühlcnberg, Fr. 878).
79. For discussion, A. Gesché, La Christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes" découvert à Toura (Gembloux: Editions J. Duculot, S. A., 1962) pp. 152, 156.
80. Didymus, Ps. T. 43. 20-22.
81. Didymus, Ps. T. 43. 23-25, concluding the above-cited discussion: "We have often differentiated four steps: the propatheia alone is free of blamc does not suffer guilt; but the passion a moderate blame, the diathesis is already evil how much more the completed action!".
82. Ps. T 76. 10-13
83. cf. Ps. T. 293. 4-6: the souls of saints "can be said" to sin when they come into a condition of propatheia, employing the same illustration.
84. Didymus, Ps. T. 252. 33-35:.
85. Cf. Ps. T. 76. 15-17.
86. Didymus, Ps. T. 41. 26-42.6, 263.4-12
87. in Ps. 58:2-3 (Mühlenbcrg, fr. 608).
88. Didymus, Ps. T. 41. 26-42.6, 252.33, 266.5, 267.1, 273.4;
89. Zach. T. 43. 6-13;
90. JobT. 4. 20, 245.8-12
91. Eccl. T. 81.5
92. in Ps. 40:7-9 (Mühlenberg, fr. 418)
93. in Ps. 108:6-8 (Mühlenberg, fr.1033)
94. de spiritu sancto, ed. L. Doutreleau, Didyme L'Aveugle: Traité du Saint-Esprit (SC 386; Paris: Cerf 1992), sects. 262-264.
95. For discussion, see R. A. Layton, "Judas Yields a Place to the Devil: The Use of Origen's Commentary on Ephesians by Didymus of Alexandria", in W. Bienert, ed., Origenes in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahrhunderts: Colloquium Origenianum Septimum (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), pp. 525-535.
96. Didymus, Eccl. T. 294. 15-20:.
97. Didymus, In Ps. 58:2-3 (Muhlenbcrg, Fr. 608);
98. cf' Ps. T. 267. 22-28
99. In Ps. 40:7-9 (Mühlenberg, Fr. 418): Satan cast "love of money" into Judas.
100. In de spiritu sancto, 263, Didymus declares that Satan prompted Judas with the insidiis avaritiae. As early as Plato, greed was recognized as a peculiarly human emotional state that depended on calculative faculties and was directed toward attaining a desired object (see W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, [New York: Harper and Row, 1975], pp. 33, 38-39).
101. A. Gesché, La christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes", pp. 118-221.
102. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), pp. 329-341.
103. Didymus, Ps. T. 290. 14-15;292.15-16.
104. Didymus, Ps. T. 293. 6-12:.
105. Didymus, Ps. T. 42. 8-28;282.2-7 rejects similar distinctions of speaker made by Apollinarian exegetes.
106. A. Gesché, La christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes", pp. 158-168, provides an excellent discussion of the Christotogical aspects of this passage.
107. Didymus, Ps. T. 43. 16-20, commenting on the use of the term "only-begotten" in Ps. 21:21b.
108. See also Didymus' remarks on the designation of Christ as "only-begotten" in Ps. T. 86. 16-87.16, 221.3f.
109. Didymus, Ps. T. 220. 25-26:.
110. Didymus, Ps. T., 221. 28-33:.
111. The stenographer habitually records only a paraphrase of the questions to indicate the subject matter under discussion. See A. Kehl, der Psalmenkommentar von Tura. Quaternio IX (Pap. Colon. Theol. 1) (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), pp. 25-28;
112. Binder and Liesenborghs, Einleitung, Didymos der Blinde: Kommenlar zum Ecclesiastes, pp. xxii-xxiii. The actual questions are not always preserved, and in the following translations are placed in brackets to indicate the reliance on editorial reconstruction.
113. Didymus, Ps. T. 221. 34-222.6:.
114. B. Inwood, "Seneca and Psychological Dualism", pp. 166-176 argues that in orthodox Stoic thought, individuals are accountable for any effect that can be formulated in elementary linguistic utterances. For Didymus, it is sufficient that the ability to express the reaction in meaningful language demonstrates, in his view, the rationality of Christ's human soul, and he does not pursue this problem any further.
115. Didymus, Ps. T. 222. 8-12. In the final sentence, Didymus alludes to Isa. 7:15, a verse he adduces elsewhere to contest Apollinarian Christology.
116. See, e.g. Eccl. T 221. 18-21, appealing to the propatheia theory
117. and Ps. T. 30. 1-31.7.
118. Didymus, Ps. T 222. 12-14:.