Blood electronics: Congo's conflict minerals and the legislation that could cleanse the trade

Southern California Law Review

Volumn 84, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 981-1034

  Raj, Shannon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 80054105310     PISSN: 00383910     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (157)

1. See id. § 2. Conflict minerals are also used in many nonelectronic products, including automotive, defense and aerospace products, and medical devices. Letter from Consumer Elec. Ass'n, et al., to Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title- xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-57.pdf. This Note, however, will focus on minerals regulation and look specifically at the electronics industry.
2. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 1502, § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18 (2010)
3. (to be codified at 15 U. S. C. § 78m (p)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act], with Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009). This Note will analyze the similarities between the two infra Part VI.
4. JOHN PRENDERGAST, THE ENOUGH PROJECT, CAN YOU HEAR CONGO NOW?: CELL PHONES, CONFLICT MINERALS, AND THE WORST SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE WORLD 1(2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Can%20Your%20Hear%20Congo%20Now. pdf. The Enough Project was founded in 2007 as a project of the Center for American Progress in order to highlight and confront key humanitarian crises in Africa, including in Sudan and the eastern DR Congo. Its founders Gayle Smith and John Prendergast are both considered experts in the field, with Ms. Smith now serving in the Obama administration and Mr. Prendergast working in particular on the issue of conflict minerals under the Enough Project's Raise Hope for Congo Campaign.
5. See INT'L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: RESULTS FROM A NATIONWIDE SURVEY, CONDUCTED September-November 2002 14(2003), http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/2002-2003-Survey.pdf.
6. Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2008, at 94, 95, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63401/sA&tild;© verine-autesserre/the-trouble-with-congo.
7. LAURA DAVIS & PRISCILLA HAYNER, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, DIFFICULT PEACE, LIMITED JUSTICE: TEN YEARS OF PEACEMAKING IN THE DRC 8(2009), http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/DRC/ICTJDavisHayner-DRC-DifficultPeace-pa2009. pdf.
8. THE ENOUGH PROJECT, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: ROOTS OF THE CRISIS
9. 3, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/pdf/crisis-roots-congo.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter ROOTS OF THE CRISIS].
10. BENJAMIN COGHLAN ET AL., INT'L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS ii (2007), http://www.rescue.org/sites/ default/files/migrated/resources/2007/2006-7-congomortalitysurvey.pdf.
11. THE ENOUGH PROJECT & THE GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CONGO'S CONFLICT MINERALS 1(2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/ Comprehensive%20Approach%20to%20Congo's%20Conflict%20Minerals.pdf [hereinafter A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH].
12. John Prendergast & Noel Atama, The Enough Project, Eastern Congo: An Action Plan to End the World's DEADLIEST WAR 1(2009), http://www.enoughproject. org/files/publications/eastern-congo.pdf.
13. Thomas Fessy & Mark Doyle, From Rebel-Held Congo to Beer Can, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7991479.stm.
14. DAVID SULLIVAN & NOEL ATAMA, THE ENOUGH PROJECT, DIGGING IN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON CONFLICT MINERALS 4(2010), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/ publications/DiggingInConflictMinerals.pdf.
15. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 2.
16. Id. at 4 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "YOU WILL BE PUNISHED": ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN EASTERN CONGO 105(2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1209 webwcover2.pdf (finding Congolese soldiers to have committed 350 of 527 documented cases of sexual violence in North Kivu during Kimia II)).
17. See Peter Greste, Nkunda's Spectacular Fall, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2009), http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/africa/7846940.stm.
18. Karen Allen, Ex-Rebels Accused of Extortion in DR Congo Mines, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8561330.stm.
19. ROOTS OF THE CRISIS, supra note 11, at 2.
20. PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY: ANNUAL REVIEW 2009 8 (Ian Smillie ed., 2009), http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/annual-reviews- diamonds/AR-diamonds-2009-eng.pdf.
21. See Guy Fiti Sinclair, "The Ghosts of Colonialism in Africa": Silences and Shortcomings in the ICJS 2005 Armed Activities Decision, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 121, 124-26 (2007).
22. See id. at 127; DR Congo Criticises Mobutu Ruling, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8151959.stm (reporting that Mobutu has been labeled as the third most corrupt leader of all time by the anticorruption watchdog Transparency International, behind Suharto of Indonesia and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines). Transparency International estimates that Mobutu personally looted nearly $6 billion in aid money from the DRC (then known as Zaire) during his reign. DR Congo Criticises Mobutu Ruling, supra.
23. FEDERICO BORELLO, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., A FIRST FEW STEPS: THE LONG ROAD TO A JUST PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO vii (2004), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/1/115.pdf.
24. See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 8, at 14.
25. ROOTS OF THE CRISIS, supra note 11, at 2.
26. Ian Fisher & Norimitsu Onishi, Many Armies Ravage Rich Land in the "First World War" of Africa: Chaos in Congo, A Primer, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, § 1, at 1.
27. PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 8.
28. U. N. S. C. Rep. of the Security Council Mission to Central Africa, Nov. 21-25, 2004, ¶¶ 5, 26, U. N. Doc. S/2004/934 (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C- 8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Mission%20S2004934.pdf.
29. Is This the World's Least Effective UN Peacekeeping Force?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4-10, 2004, at 45.
30. UN: DRC One of World's "Worst Humanitarian Crisis", MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (June 11, 2010), http://mg.co.za/article/2010-06-11-un-drc-one- of-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crises.
31. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 3.
32. Mr. Prendergast is a longtime human rights activist who has worked for peace in Africa for over twenty-five years; as previously mentioned, he is also the founder of the Enough Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes against humanity. John Prendergast, Co-Founder, The Enough Project, http://www.enoughproject.org/content/john-prendergast-co-founder (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). He was also in charge of African Affairs in the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration.
33. John Prendergast, "Conflict Minerals" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF INT'L SERV., at 1:35 (Feb. 4, 2009), http://deimos.apple.com/WebObjects/Core.woa/Browse/american. edu.4970502297?i=1608776650 [hereinafter Prendergast Podcast].
34. GLOBAL WITNESS, "FACED WITH A GUN, WHAT CAN YOU DO?": WAR AND THE MILITARISATION OF MINING IN EASTERN CONGO 5(2009), http://www.globalwitness. org/sites/default/files/pdfs/report-en-final-0.pdf.
35. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 4;
36. Jonathan Broder, Foreign Policy: In the Business of Change, CQ WEEKLY, Sept. 14, 2009, at 2028, 2030.
37. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at A1 (noting that one hospital, for example, has 350 beds but "sends women back to their villages before they have fully recovered because it needs space for the never-ending stream of new arrivals").
38. Clinton Demands End to Congo Rape, BBC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8194836.stm.
39. Robert Walker, "No Justice" for DR Congo's Raped, BBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4325397.stm.
40. Jeffrey Gettleman, Rape Victims' Words Help Jolt Congo Into Change, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A1.
41. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Death by Gadget, N. Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at WK11 (noting the protests outside an Apple store opening and mass messages to Intel calling on the companies to cease using conflict minerals in their products).
42. See Email from David Marshall, Nintendo of America, to author (Apr. 1, 2010, 02:01:07 PM PDT) (on file with author); Press Release, Calvert Invs., Investors Speak Out Against Fueling of Congo War by Conflict Minerals (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press/press-release/28446-Investors-Speak-Out- Against-Fueling-Of-Congo-War-By-Conflict-Minerals [hereinafter Investor Press Release].
43. See Mutual Convenience, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15-21, 2008, at 12, 13 (noting that "various prospective investors have balked at Congo's instability and dropped out" and that "[f]or several years now the World Bank has ranked Congo as the worst place in the world, bar none, to do business."). See also Autesserre, supra note 9 (deeming the crisis in the DRC as the world's "largest humanitarian disaster").
44. At the time of this Note's submission, the author is aware of only one other legal journal piece discussing the DRC's conflict minerals. See Daniel M. Firger, Note, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Examining the New Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the Dodd - Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1087-90 (2010). That piece is focused primarily on a separate issue, the Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009), but mentions the DRC's conflict minerals in the context of discussing the "resource curse" inhibiting international development efforts. See Firger, supra.
45. See Joe Bavier, Traxys Says Will Stop Buying Eastern Congo Tin, REUTERS AFRICA (May 4, 2009), http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/ idAFL424647920090504?pageNumber=2&virtualBrand Channel=0&sp=true. Traxys did not indicate it would cease buying from the country as a whole but did pledge to stop buying from the region: "we will stop sourcing any minerals from eastern Congo, that is to say, from (the provinces of) North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema." Id.
46. Nathanial Gronewold, U. N. Peacekeepers Failing to Stem Illegal Trades That Fuel Conflicts, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/ 2010/01/28/28greenwire-un-peacekeepersfailing-to-stem-illegal-trades-82836.html? scp=1&sq=MONUC&st=cse;
47. Joe Bavier, Thaisarco Suspends Congo Tin Ore Purchases, REUTERS AFRICA (Sept. 18, 2009), http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/ idAFJOE58H09S20090918 (reporting that the Thaisarco chairman made the following statement: "Although acting entirely lawfully, the threat of misleading and bad publicity remains for anyone who participates in the DRC tin trade. These pressures have led Thaisarco to suspend its purchases from the DRC."). Some sources report, however, that due to a desire to "honour existing contractual commitments", Thaisarco may still be purchasing conflict minerals from the DRC. SULLIVAN & ATAMA, supra note 18, at 5.
48. See Joe Bavier, Ban on "Conflict Minerals" Would Hurt Congo's Poor, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSL867206720090408.
49. See A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 6.
50. Bavier, supra note 72. See also NICHOLAS GARRETT & HARRISON MITCHELL, CRISIS STATES RESEARCH CTR., TRADING CONFLICT FOR DEVELOPMENT: UTILISING THE TRADE IN MINERALS FROM EASTERN DR CONGO FOR DEVELOPMENT 5(2009), http://www.resourceglobal.co.uk/documents/ Trading%20Conflict%20for%20Development.pdf (advocating formalizing the minerals trade rather than trying to stop or interrupt the trade, which would "have severe retarding effects on regional development").
51. See Vanessa O'Connell, Boss Talk: De Beers Polishes Its Image, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2008, at B1.
52. U. S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-978, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT 2(2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06978.pdf [hereinafter AGENCY ACTIONS NEEDED].
53. See Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 217, 219 (2005) (describing these properties for diamonds).
54. Kimberley Process, Background, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ background/index-en. html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
55. Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U. S. C. §§ 3901-3913 (2006); See infra Part V. B.
56. Edward R. Fluet, Conflict Diamonds: U. S. Responsibility and Response, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 103, 104 (2005).
57. Id. at 112. See also Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, §§ III-IV, Nov. 2002, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/download/getfile/4.
58. See PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1 ("the Kimberley Process [], designed to halt and prevent the return of 'conflict diamonds', is failing"). But see O'Connell, supra note 79 (noting statements by De Beers chief executive officer Gareth Penny that "[i]t is estimated that 99.8% of all diamonds in the world flow through the Kimberley Process, which is extraordinary").
59. See PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1, 8.
60. Sarah Childress & Farai Mutsaka, Zimbabwe's Diamond Production Draws Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2009, at A6.
61. Sarah Childress, Diamond Trade Finds Regulatory Loophole in Mozambique, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2009, at A14.
62. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Measuring a Diamond's True Price, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, § 4, at 3 ("Diamonds from war-torn areas get mixed in with others. Corrupt officials can forge certificates. Diamonds are easily smuggled.") (quoting Global Witness).
63. PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1.
64. See Fishman, supra note 81, at 229 (citing Final Communiqué: Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting Sun City, South Africa, October 29-31, 2003, at 2, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/download/getfile/7).
65. PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1.
66. PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1.
67. See Celia W. Dugger, Africa's Diamond Trade Under Scrutiny, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A8.
68. Thierry Vircoulon, Time to Rethink the Kimberley Process: The Zimbabwe Case, INT'L CRISIS GRP., (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/time-to-rethink-the-kimberley-process-the- zimbabwe-case.aspx ("[M]ost African countries, India, China and Russia advocated lifting the export ban, and the U. S., Canada and Australia opposed."). See also Dugger, supra note 107 (quoting Kimberley Process architect Ian Smillie as saying that "[i]t only takes one government to object and South Africa has been protecting Robert Mugabe for years").
69. PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 2.
70. See Joe Nocera, Diamonds Are Forever in Botswana, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at C1.
71. Sebastien Berger, Kimberley Process Considers Ban on Zimbabwe Diamond Exports, TELEGRAPH U. K. (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/6486414/Kimberley-Process-considers-ban- on-Zimbabwe-diamond-exports.html.
72. Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds Are Back, FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/22/blood-diamonds-are-back?page=0, 2.
73. Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U. S. C. § 3903 (a) (2006).
74. See U. S. Kimberley Process Authority, https://www.uskpa.org/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
75. 19 U. S. C. § 3705 (a).
76. AGENCY ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 80, at 4.
77. See U. S. Gov't Accountability Office, Conflict Diamonds: Agency Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act-Recommendations, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-978#recommendations (last visited Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter GAO Recommendations].
78. Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009).
79. Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H. R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009).
80. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213-18.
81. See id. §§ 101-176, 124 Stat. at 1391-1442 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U. S. C.) (financial stability);
82. id. §§ 501-542, 124 Stat. at 1580-96 (to be codified in scattered sections of 31 U. S. C.) (insurance reform);
83. id. §§ 601-628, 124 Stat. 1596-1641 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U. S. C.) (regulation of bank and savings association holding companies);
84. id. §§ 971-979, 124 Stat. 1915-26 (strengthening corporate governance); id. §§ 1400-1498, 124 Stat. at 2136-2212 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U. S. C. and 15 U. S. C.) (mortgage reform).
85. See id. § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213-18.
86. Id. § 1502 (b), 124 Stat. at 2213.
87. Id. § 1502 (b), 124 Stat. at 2213-15.
88. Id. § 1502 (b), 124 Stat. at 2214 (to be codified at § 78m (p) (1) (A) (ii)).
89. Id. § 1502 (b), 124 Stat. at 2214 (to be codified at § 78m (p) (2)).
90. See id. § 1502 (b), 124 Stat. at 2213-14 (to be codified § 78m (p) (1) (A)).
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
92. (codified as amended at 15 U. S. C. §§ 78a-78nn).
93. David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 137, 145-46 (2007).
94. Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433, 1455 (2002).
95. U. S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).
96. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1208-09 (1999).
97. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 449 (1976).
98. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 75 (2005).
99. Securities Exchange Act § 13, 15 U. S. C. § 78m (2006).
100. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 1502 (b), § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U. S. C. § 78m (p)).
101. reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item No. 17 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar comps., 2001)).
102. See Investor Press Release, supra note 62; Press Release, AsYouSow.org, Investor Statement Regarding Conflict Minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2009-01-07%20- %20DRC%20Investor%20Sttmt.pdf [hereinafter Investor Statement].
103. See, e.g., A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 1.
104. See A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 4-5.
105. HARRISON MITCHELL & NICHOLAS GARRETT, CMTYS. & SMALL-SCALE MINING, BEYOND CONFLICT: RECONFIGURING APPROACHES TO THE REGIONAL TRADE IN MINERALS FROM EASTERN DRC 44-45(2009), http://www.resourceglobal.co.uk/ documents/Beyond%20Conflict-RCS-CASM.pdf.
106. See IS THIS THE WORLD'S LEAST EFFECTIVE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE?, supra note 39.
107. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 1502 (b), § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U. S. C. § 78m (p) (1) (A)). The legislation requires that the regulations be issued within 270 days after the enactment of section 1502.
108. Dodd-Frank Act § 1502 (b), 124 STAT. at 2214 (to be codified at § 78m (p) (1) (A) (ii)) (emphasis added).
109. MITCHELL & GARRETT, supra note 187, at 45, 49.
110. Id. § 1502 (b), 124 Stat. at 2213-14 (to be codified at § 78m (p) (1) (A)).
111. Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80948, 80954 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C. F. R. pts. 229, 249).
112. U. S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION (2004) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE], available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d04808.pdf.
113. Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80948, 80954 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C. F. R. pts. 229, 249).
114. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE, supra note 205, at 24.
115. U. S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, About the Division of Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last modified Aug. 1, 2007).
116. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE, supra note 205, at 25.
117. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 1502 (b), § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-15 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U. S. C. § 78m (p)).
118. See Press Release, Center for American Progress et al., Statement: NGOs Welcome the Conflict Minerals Trade Act of 2009 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CongoJointStatement.pdf
119. Press Release, Global Witness, U. S. Passes Landmark Reforms on Resource Transparency (July 15, 2010), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/ pdfs/reformbill.pdf (supporting section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act).
120. See Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80948, 80954 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C. F. R. pts. 229, 249).
121. See Fishman, supra note 81, at 235;
122. Ann C. Wallis, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United Nations' Development of Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 388, 415-16 (2005).
123. See PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1.
124. SASHA LEZHNEV & JOHN PRENDERGAST, THE ENOUGH PROJECT, FROM MINE TO MOBILE PHONE: THE CONFLICT MINERALS SUPPLY CHAIN 6(2009), http://www. enoughproject.org/files/publications/minetomobile.pdf.
125. See Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80948, 80954 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C. F. R. pts. 229, 249).
126. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U. S. C. § 1592 (2006).
127. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U. S. C. § 3905 (a) (2006).
128. See AGENCY ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 80, at 19.
129. U. S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., SECURE BORDERS, SAFE TRAVEL, LEGAL TRADE: U. S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION FISCAL YEAR 2009-2014 STRATEGIC PLAN 2(2009), available at http://www.cbp. gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/mission/ strategic-plan-09-14.ctt/strategic-plan-09-14.pdf
130. U. S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP TRADE STRATEGY: FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 2(2009), available at http://www.cbp. gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/ trade-outreach/trade-strategy/cbp-trade-strategy.ctt/cbp-trade-strategy.pdf.
131. See U. S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP: SECURING AMERICA'S BORDERS 1 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.cbp. gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/ publications/mission/cbp-securing-borders.ctt/cbp-securing-borders.pdf (based on data from fiscal year 2005). On a typical day in 2009, Customs processed nearly 60, 000 containers and seized nearly 7000 pounds of narcotics, but a similar statistic was not available for seizures of prohibited meat, animal, and plant material products.
132. See U. S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., SNAPSHOT: A SUMMARY OF CBP FACTS AND FIGURES (2010), available at http://www.cbp. gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/ accomplish/snapshot.ctt/snapshot.pdf.
133. See H. R. 4128 § 9; Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U. S. C. § 1592 (2006).
134. See H. R. 4128 §§ 7-9. This, of course, is complicated by the ambiguity of the phrase "by means of inaccurate information. " See supra Part VI. B.2.
135. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1385 (d) (2006).
136. See Raul Pedrozo, The International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992: Unreasonable Extension of U. S. Jurisdiction in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean Fishery, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 77, 81 (1993) (noting that the success was due to a combination of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, processing facilities becoming "dolphin-safe", the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act labeling scheme, and the embargoes ordered by American courts). Although the standards for the dolphin-safe label were later weakened by free trade cases, this does not change their initial success at reforming the U. S. tuna market.
137. See Carol J. Miller and Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 73, 99-107 (1999).
138. See A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 4-5.
139. See PARTNERSHIP AFR. CAN., supra note 29, at 1.
140. See A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 11 (proposing to identify and secure individual strategic mines within a single country).
141. See Jeffrey Gettleman, U. N. to Pull 2, 000 Peacekeepers From Congo, Draft Resolution Says, N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A10 (noting also that the name of MONUC will be changed to MONUSCO, or the "United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo").
142. See UN Plans to End DR Congo Peacekeeping Mission, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548794.stm (noting that MONUC troops were "accused of working with Congolese troops who had committed human rights abuses" as well as "sex abuse, gold smuggling and running from rebels").
143. See Is This the World's Least Effective UN Peacekeeping Force?, supra note 39, at 45 (noting an incident in which "militiamen burned 17 people to death while a detachment of MONUC troops 200 metres away, whose mandate authorized them to use force to prevent such massacres, did nothing.").
144. Can DR Congo Cope Without UN Force?, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10175593.
145. Oxford Analytica, Global Strategic Analysis, http://www.oxan.com/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
146. Can DR Congo Cope Without UN Force?, supra note 275.
147. See Not Quite as Bloody as Before, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28-Dec. 4, 2009, at 54, 54 (noting that "the situation is as fraught as ever" due to factors including "the loathing many locals in Kivu harbour towards the Tutsis", the "[f]ear and hatred [that] abound", and the "mineral wealth of the region, along with continuing lawlessness, [which] means that groups still compete, often bloodily, for power.").
148. See A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 11 (describing a role for MONUC in collaborating with the Congolese government to identify and secure strategic mining sites under the control of armed groups).
149. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502 (e) (4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010).
150. See A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, supra note 13, at 2-3.
151. Clean Them Up, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21-27, 2010, at 38, 38.
152. See How Gold Pays for Congo's Deadly War, CBS NEWS (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/25/60minutes/main5774127.shtml.
153. See LEZHNEV & PRENDERGAST, supra note 228, at 4;
154. Will Ross, On the Trail of DR Congo's "Cursed" Gold, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4604627.stm.
155. David Sullivan, What Should Be Done About Congo's Gold Trade?, THE ENOUGH PROJECT (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/mine-mobile- phone?page=8.
156. Martin Plaut, DR Congo Rebel Massacre of Hundreds Is Uncovered, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8587305.stm.
157. See THE ENOUGH PROJECT, GETTING TO CONFLICT-FREE: ASSESSING CORPORATE ACTION ON CONFLICT MINERALS 2, 5(2010), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/ publications/corporate-action-1.pdf (noting Intel, Motorola and HP's efforts to visit suppliers and chair industry-wide efforts to audit tantalum; the report also applauds several companies' efforts to investigate loopholes in supplier statements on mineral sourcing, to visit smelters, and to aid the transparency effort by publishing their lists of suppliers).