Globalization and national security after empire: The former Soviet space

Globalization and National Security

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 201-229

  Cooley, Alexander ^a  

^a Program on US Russia Relations at Columbia s Harriman Institute   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 80053992077     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203943762     Document Type: Chapter

References (114)

1. On the material sources of Soviet collapse, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security 24 (3) (Winter 2000): 5-53.
2. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
3. This literature is vast. For representative examples, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997);
4. Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
5. See Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).
6. There are some notable exceptions. See Georgi M. Derluguian, Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005);
7. Robert Legvold and Celeste Wallander, eds., Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004);
8. Rawi Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001);
9. Rajan Menon, ed., Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999);
10. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building (Boulder, CO: Routledge, 1998).
11. "Drugs, Terrorism, Money Laundering Links of One Chain-Putin," ITAR-TASS News Agency, December 5, 2003.
12. For example, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security 27 (3) (Winter 2002-2003): 30-58.
13. Also see Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
14. Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
15. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. "Weak States and Private Armies," in Beyond State Crisis: Postcolonial Africa and Post-Eurasia in Comparative Perspective, eds. Mark Beissinger and Crawford Young (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 146.
16. Xiabo Lu, "Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China," Comparative Politics 32(3) (2000): 273-295.
17. See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 2000);
18. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 1999).
19. See D. M. Anderson and David Killingray, eds., Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
20. See David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
21. See William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
22. Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
23. Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 21-25.
24. Also see Andreas, "Illicit International Political Economy: The Clandestine Side of Globalization," Review of International Political Economy 11 (3): 641-652.
25. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
26. See Andreas, Border Games;
27. James Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), chap. 11;
28. R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
29. See Mary Kaldor, Old and New Civil Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999)
30. Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old Civil Wars': A Valid Distinction?" World Politics 54(1) (1999): 99-118. See also the World Bank's ongoing research program on "The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence."
31. On criminality and warfare in Bosnia, see Peter Andreas, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace," International Studies Quarterly 48 (1) (Spring 2004): 29-51. On Kosovo, see Adamson, chapter 2 of this volume.
32. On the state requirements to combat such internal security threats, see Peter Andreas and Richard Price, "From War-fighting to Crime-fighting: Transforming the American National Security State," International Studies Review 3 (3) (Fall 2001): 31-52.
33. On institutional development and state formation in the modern international system, see Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
34. On the consolidation of military capacity, see Charles Tilly, Capital, Coercion and the Formation of European States: AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
35. On bureaucratic expansion and administrative centralization, see Thomas Erstman, Birth of the Leviathan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997);
36. Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
37. For an organizational overview, see Robert V. Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup: Departization and Decentralization," Armed Forces & Society 19 (1) (Fall 1992): 27-45.
38. On the collapse of Soviet administrative hierarchies, see Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
39. Alexander Cooley, "Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty and Security in the Post-Soviet Space," International Security 24 (3) (Winter 2000): 100-125;
40. Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 130-230.
41. For an overview of these conflicts, see Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., PostSoviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (New York: Routledge, 1998).
42. Charles H. Fairbanks, "The Post-Communist Wars," Journal of Democracy 6(4) (1995): 18-34.
43. International Crisis Group, "Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform," 1. Accessed at http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=843.
44. Steven Solnick, Stealing the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
45. See William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
46. For a discussion, see Celeste Wallander, "Economics and Security in Russia's Foreign Policy and the Implications for Ukraine and Belarus," in Legvold and Wallander, Swords and Sustenance, 63-100.
47. Michael R. Gordon, "Russia is Pushing to Increase Share in Weapons Trade," New York Times, July 14, 2000;
48. Guy Chazan, "Russia's Defense Industry Launches Bid to Boost Sales," Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2000.
49. Eve Conant and Adam Piore, "Open for Business," Newsweek (International ed.), September 8, 2003, 31.
50. Wallander, "Economics and Security in Russia's Foreign Policy," 75. Wallander also notes that Russian aircraft manufacturers sell more to China than to the Russian military.
51. Robert Legvold, "The United States, the European Union, NATO and the Economics of Ukrainian and Belarusian Security," in Legvold and Wallander, Swords and Sustenance, 195.
52. Kimberly Marten Zisk, Weapons, Culture, and Self-Interest: Soviet Defense Managersin the New Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), chap. 4.
53. Naylor, Wages of Crime, 100.
54. "Supreme Court to Advise on Illegal Arms Trafficking Cases," ITAR-TASS News Agency, January 31, 2002.
55. "Russian Military Prosecutor Discusses High Profile Crime in Armed Forces," Rossiskaya Gazeta, December 24, 2003.
56. Graham H. Turbville, Jr., "Organized Crime and the Russian Armed Forces," Transnational Organized Crime 1 (4) (Winter 1995): 63-64.
57. See Jeffrey Robinson, The Merger: The International Conglomerate of Organized Crime (New York: Overlook Press, 2000).
58. Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora, "Global Crime, Inc." in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, ed. Maryann Cusimano Love (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2002), 149.
59. Remarks by Glenn Howard, president of the American Committee on Chechnya, presented to the Carnegie Council Roundtable on Ethics and Foreign Affairs, New York, April 21, 2004.
60. Also see Yuri Zarakhovic, "Profits of Doom: A Russian Special Ops Commander Says the Chechen War Is Really Being Fought for Oil, Arms and Money," Time (Europe), September 28, 2003.
61. Adam Geibel, "Potential MANPAD Threat in Central Asia," Journal of Electronic Defense 25 (1) (June 2002): 29. On the hybrid governance arrangements that underpin these post-Soviet basing arrangements, see Cooley, "Imperial Wreckage."
62. Geibel, "Potential MANPAD Threat," 29-30.
63. Nancy Lubin, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Challenges for International Assistance (New York: Open Society Institute, 2002), 5.
64. Lubin, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia, 5.
65. See UNODC, Illegal Drug Trade in Russia (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, 2000), 5.
66. For a sobering account of drug trafficking and corruption on the Tajik-Afghan border, see Aram Roston, "Central Asia's Heroin Problem," The Nation, March 25, 2002, 23-25.
67. ICG, "Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform," i.
68. Eugen Tomiuc, "Presidents from Moscow, Kyiv and Chisnau Discuss Transdniester Trafficking," RFE/RL Report (March 2002). Accessed at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/18032002105939.asp.
69. Also see ICG, Moldova: Regional Tensions Over Transdniestria, Europe Report No. 157, June 14, 2004 (Brussels/Chisnau: ICG, 2004).
70. See Louise Shelley, "The Trade in People in and from the Former Soviet Union," Crime, Law & Social Change 40 (2003): 231-249.
71. Also see Shelley, "Trafficking in Women: A Business Model Approach," The Brown Journal of World Affairs 10 (1) (Summer/Fall 2003): 119-131.
72. International Migration Organization, Trafficking in Migrants 23 (April 2001): 5.
73. Quoted in Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 129.
74. Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," World Politics 53(4) (2001): 524-552.
75. Rensselaer W. Lee, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe (London: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 47-72.
76. Lee, Smuggling Armageddon, 89.
77. Lee, Smuggling Armageddon, 140-141.
78. See also P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
79. See Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 126-154.
80. On the lack of state capacity during Russian privatization, see Michael McFaul, "State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia," World Politics 47 (2) (January 1995): 210-243.
81. Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs, 138. According to Volkov, as of July 1, 1998, "out of total of 156,169 licensed private security employees in Russia, 35,351 (22.6%) came from the MVD, 12,414 (7.9%) from the KGB-FSB, and 1,223 (0.8%) from other security and law enforcement organizations," 133.
82. Vadim Volkov, "Who is Strong when the State is Weak? Violent Entrepreneurship in Russia's Emerging Markets," in Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective, eds. Mark Beissinger and Crawford Young (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 94.
83. On the origins and rise of the Russian mafia, see Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs;
84. Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
85. RFE/RL Security Watch 1(16) (November 6, 2000). Accessed at: http://www.rferl.org/reports/securitywatch/2000/11/16-061100.asp. Accessed April 18, 2006.
86. Sergei L. Loiko, "Ex-Soviet 'Top Guns' Shot Down, Face Possible Death as Mercenaries," Los Angeles Times, July 19, 1993.
87. Jon Auerbach, "Azerbaijan Hires Afghan Mujahideen to Fight Armenia," Boston Globe, November 8, 1993.
88. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "Weak States and Private Armies."
89. On Chechnya, see Mathew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003). Also see the background information provided by Human Rights Watch at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/russia/chechnya/docs.htm.
90. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 173.
91. "Ukrainian Mercenaries Serve in Many Conflict Areas," Special Warfare 11 (2) (Spring 1998): 41.
92. "Sierra Leone Seeks UN Action on Liberia, Burkina Faso Intervention," Agence France Presse, January 29, 1999.
93. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 84.
94. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "Weak State and Private Armies."
95. For a theoretically informed overview, see Rubin and Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order.
96. For overviews, see Rashid, Jihad;
97. Gregory Gleason, "The Politics of Counterinsurgency in Central Asia," Problems of Post-Communism 49 (2) (March/April 2002): 1-11.
98. Rashid, Jihad, chap. 8.
99. For an overview, see International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, Asia Report No. 58, June 30, 2003 (Brussels: ICG, 2003).
100. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "Weak State and Private Armies," 138-139.
101. Pyotr Akopov, "Sergei Yastrzhembsky: There Are No More Than 200 Mercenaries in Chechnya," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 53(41) (November 7, 2001): 14.
102. Amelia Gentleman and Jamie Wilson, "LSE 'Has Links' with Chechen Terrorists," The Guardian, February 25, 2001.
103. Fiona Hill, "Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Impact of the War on Terrorism," in Nations in Transit, 2003 (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 43.
104. Hill, "Central Asia and the Caucasus," 47.
105. For an overview, see Victor Yasmann, "Russia-Between Terror and Corruption," RFE/RL Report, September 26, 2004. Accessed at: http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/3cab44ec-da1d-4a9a-9366-d66c2381c27c.html. Accessed April 18, 2006.
106. Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 27, 2004, 8-9.
107. "Russian Plane Bombers Exploited Corrupt System," Washington Post, September 18, 2004, A1.
108. Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 27, 2004, 9.
109. For similar arguments, about Africa see Reno, Warlord Politics and African States;
110. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001);
111. Nicholas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
112. On the logic of NATO criteria and admissions bargaining, see Andrew Kydd, "TrustBuilding, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," International Organization 55(4) (2001): 801-828.
113. On NATO conditionality and institutional change, see Alexander Cooley, "Western Conditions and Domestic Choices: The Influence of External Actors on the PostCommunist Transition," in Nations in Transit: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia, eds. Amanda Schnetzer et al. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield and Freedom House, 2003).
114. I am thankful to Rawi Abdelal for suggesting this point. For further analysis of the potential political consequences of WTO membership, see Igor Burakovsky, "Economic Integration and Security in the Post-Soviet Space," in Legvold and Wallander, Swords and Sustenance, 159-188.