On two alleged conflicts between divine attributes

Faith and Philosophy

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 47-57

  Alter, Torin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053695334     PISSN: 07397046     EISSN: 21533393     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20021913     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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