Ostrom for anthropologists

International Journal of the Commons

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 319-339

  Acheson, James M ^a  

^a University of Maine ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

ADICO; Anthropology; Collective action; Ostrom; Resource management

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053615148     PISSN: 18750281     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.18352/ijc.245     Document Type: Article

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