Defense transformation and legitimacy in Scandinavia after the cold war: Theoretical and practical implications

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 701-724

  Petersson, Magnus ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES   (Norway)

Author keywords

Defense; Legitimacy; NATO; Scandinavia; Transformation

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053443033     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X10382216     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. See, for example, Dan Bilefsky, "Europe asked to send Afghanistan more troops," New York Times, September 10, 2008.
2. and Jim Michaels, "NATO pressed for Afghanistan Troops," USA Today, August 2, 2008.
3. See, for example, Efthyshia Nikolaiodu, "The Demand for Military Expenditure: Evidence from the EU 15 1961-2005," Defence and Peace Economics 19, 4 (2008): 273-92.
4. The figures are from Jomana Amara, "Evaluating NATO Long Run Defense Burdens Using Unit Root Tests," Defence and Peace Economics 18, 2 (2007): 157-181.
5. CIA, The World Factbook 2009 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).
6. and Forsvarsdepartementet, Fakta om Forsvaret 2009 [Facts about the Defence 2009] (Oslo, Forsvarsdepartementet, 2009).
7. Olof Santesson, "Frågan om var förbanden finns: Vad högkvarteret länge inte ville prata om [The Secret Life of the Armed Forces]," Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift 208, 1 (2006): 97-106.
8. All translation from Danish, Norwegian and Swedish to English is made by this author.
9. Försvarsdepartementet [Swedish Department of Defence], Ett användbart försvar [A Functional Defence] (Stockholm, Försvarsdepartementet, 2009).
10. Ståle Ulriksen, "Brydningstid-paradigmskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001-2005) [Time of unrest-The paradigm shift in the Norwegian Armed Forces (2001-2005)]," in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag [The Nation or the World? The Defence Forces of the Nordic countries today], ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007), 175.
11. For an overview, see Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud, eds., Denationalization of Defence: Convergence and Diversity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
12. Sveinung Berg Bentzrød, "Generalen som sa fra [The General that put his foot down]," Aftenposten, February 6, 2009.
13. In this article, the concept "peace operations" is used as an umbrella for all types of operations-for example, peace enforcement operations, counterinsurgency operations, and stability operations-conducted in such contexts.
14. See Pascal Vennesson, Fabian Breuer, Chiara de Franco, and Ursula C. Schroeder, "Is there a European Way of War? Role Conceptions, Organizational Frames, and the Utility of Force," Armed Forces & Society 35, 4 (July 2009): 628-45.
15. There are lots of studies that deal with legitimacy and military operations, especially the literature on so called counter insurgency.
16. see, for instance, James W. Hammond, "Legitimacy and Military Operations," Military Review, July-August (2008): 61-72.
17. But the literature does not focus on legitimacy and defense transformation. There are though some exceptions to that general rule, for example, parts of Svein Vigeland Rottem's dissertation Hva forsvarer Norge? Det norske forsvarets møte med en ny virkelighet [What does Norway defend? The Norwegian Armed Forces faces a new reality] (PhD diss., Universitetet i [University of] Tromsø, 2008).
18. Norden, or the Nordic countries, consists of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, while Scandinavia consists of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The Scandinavian countries are very similar concerning political-ideological-cultural structures. They also have a very similar language.
19. See, for example, Norbert Götz, "Norden: Structures That Do Not Make a Region," European Review of History 10, 2 (2003): 323-41.
20. Ian Roxborough, "From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field," Joint Forces Quarterly 32 (Autumn 2002): 68 (quote), 75.
21. That description is, however, questioned in, for example, Aaron Major, "Which Revolution in Military Affairs? Political Discourse and the Defense Industrial Base," Armed Forces & Society 35, 2 (January 2009): 333-61.
22. Eliot A. Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," The Journal of Strategic Studies 27, 3 (2004): 407.
23. In former authoritarian and/or undemocratic states, such as South Africa, Turkey, and the states within the Warsaw Pact, defense transformation has also been a tool for democratization.
24. See, for example, James Winkates, "The Transformation of the South African National Defence Force: A Good Beginning," Armed Forces & Society 26, 3 (Spring 2000): 451-72.
25. Nil S. Satana, "Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy," Armed Forces & Society 34, 3 (April 2008): 357-88.
26. and Rachel A. Epstein: "NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations," Security Studies 14, 1 (2005): 63-105.
27. Derrick J. Neal, "Do We Really Understand What is Meant by Transformational Change for Defence?" Defence Studies 6, 1 (2006): 77. My emphasis.
28. Neal, "Do We Really Understand What is Meant by Transformational Change for Defence?" 78.
29. Christopher Flaherty, "The Relevance of the US Transformation Paradigm for the Australian Defense Forces," Defense & Security Analysis 19, 3 (2003): 219-40 (especially p. 226).
30. Flaherty, "The Relevance of the US Transformation Paradigm for the Australian Defense Forces," 221.
31. Bertel Heurlin, "Forsvar og sikkerhed i Norden: Ligheder og forskelle hos de nordiske lande [Defence and Security in the Nordic Countries: Differences and Similarities in the Nordic Countries]," in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag [The Nation or the World? The Defence Forces of the Nordic Countries Today], ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007), 65-70.
32. Bertel Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering [The new Danish Armed Forces. Denationalisation, militarization, and democratization]," in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag [The Nation or the World? The Defence Forces of the Nordic Countries Today], ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007), 114.
33. Gullow Gjeseth, Hæren i omveltning: 1990-2005 [The Reshaping of the Norwegian Army: 1990-2005] (Bergen: Vigmostad & Bjørke, 2008), 237.
34. See also Ulriksen, "Brydningstid-paradigmskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001-2005)," 144.
35. and Rottem, Hva Forsvarer Norge? Det norske forsvarets møte med en ny virkelighet, 20.
36. Arita Eriksson, Europeanization and Governance in Defence Policy: The Example of Sweden (PhD diss., University of Stockholm, 2006), 84.
37. A similar interpretation is made by Eva Haldén in Den sva °ra konsten att reformera. Fra °n invasionsförsvar till insatsförsvar [The difficult art of reforming. From territorial to expeditionary defence] (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2007).
38. For an overview and problematization of the "trade-off model,"
39. see Douglas Gibler and Toby J. Rider, "Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behaviour," International Interactions 30, 4 (2004): 310-11.
40. Jens Ringsmose, "Paying for Protection. Denmark's Military Expenditure during the Cold War," Cooperation and Conflict 44, 73 (2009): 75.
41. Ringsmose, "Paying for Protection: Denmark's Military Expenditure during the Cold War," 79-80 (quote from p. 80).
42. On burden sharing within NATO.
43. see also, for example, William R. Gates and Katsuaki L. Terasawa, "Reconsidering Publicness in Alliance defence Expenditures: NATO Expansion and Burden Sharing," Defence and Peace Economics 14, 5 (2003): 369-83.
44. Laura C. Ferreira-Pereria, "The Military Non-Aligned States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Solidarity 'ma non troppo,"' Journal of Contemporary European Studies 13, 1 (2005): 29-32.
45. Theo Farell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
46. Theo Farell and Terry Terriff, "Introduction," in The Sources of Military Change: Culture Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
47. Farell and Terriff, "Introduction," 7-13 (first quotation p. 7, second quotation p. 8, and third quotation p. 13).
48. Another common categorization of defense transformation-in a wider sense organizational change-is inside-out and outside-in explanations.
49. See, for instance, Adam M. Stulberg and Michael D. Salomone with Austin G. Long, Managing Defense Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007): 17-27.
50. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), 324-29.
51. Quote from Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Loose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), xii.
52. Excellent overviews is given by Gilley in The right to Rule, 1-28.
53. and Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1-42.
54. Corneliu Bjola, "Legitimacy and The Use of Force: Bridging the Analytical-Normative Divide," Review of International Studies 34, 4 (2008): 627-44.
55. Mark C. Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approach," Academy of Management Review 20, 3 (1995): 575.
56. Agneta Karlsson, Om strategi och legitimitet. En studie av legitimitetsproblematiken i förbindelse med strategisk förändring i organisationer [On Strategy and Legitimacy: A Study of the Problem of Legitimacy in Connection with Strategic Change in Organizations] (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991), 29-31.
57. Philip Everts, "When the Going Gets Rough: Does the public Support the Use ofMilitary Force?" World Affairs 3, 162 (Winter 2000): 91.
58. See also James Pattisson, "Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention," Journal of Social Philosophy 38, 4 (Winter 2007): 569-87.
59. Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approach."
60. Analytically, it is important to separate legitimacy from legality. Legality is a technical term connected to law. An organization that lacks legitimacy can be legal and an organization that has legitimacy can be illegal.
61. Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," 88.
62. Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," 88-89.
63. Quotation from Heurlin: "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," 101.
64. Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," 106-7.
65. Ulriksen: "Brydningstid-paradigmskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001-2005)," 158-59.
66. Nina Græger, Norsk forsvarsdiskurs 1990-2005: Internasjonaliseringen av Forsvaret [Norwegian defence discourse: The internationalization of the Norwegian Defence Forces] (PhD diss., Universitetet i [University of] Oslo, 2007), 76.
67. Ulriksen, "Brydningstid-paradigmskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001-2005)," 165.
68. Haldén, Den svåra konsten att reformera. Från invasionsförsvar till insatsförsvar, 41-42, 46-47.
69. Försvarsdepartementet, Ett användbart försvar, 29.
70. Haldén: Den svåra konsten att reformera. Från invasionsförsvar till insatsförsvar, 41.
71. Michael Moore, Revolution i det svenska försvaret [Revolution in the Swedish Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2000), 14.
72. See, for example, Lars R. Møller, "Er vi da bare de glade amatører?" [Are we just happy amateurs?], Militært Tidsskrift 133, 1 (2004): 202-20.
73. Jan Grünberger, "Ny struktur-men er den bedre?" [New structure-But is it better?], Militært Tidsskrift 134, 1 (2005): 103-8.
74. Eigil Schønning, "Den ny hær!" [The new Army!], Militært Tidsskrift 134, 2 (2005): 259-67.
75. Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," 104, 106.
76. Møller, "Er vi da bare de glade amatører?" 219-20.
77. Heurlin, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationalisering, militarisering og demokratisering," 104.
78. and Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "Camp Eden: The 2004 Defence Agreement, Military Power and Danish Values," in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005, ed. Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), 49-51.
79. Carlsen and Mouritzen, eds., Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005, 183-84.
80. Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, eds., Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006), 214.
81. Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, eds., Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2007 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007), 191.
82. and Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, eds., Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008), 174.
83. Pertti Joenniemi, "Farwell to conscription? The case of Denmark," (DIIS Working Paper no 2005/10, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2005).
84. Jørgen Dragsdal, "Forsvaret er valgkampens blinde punkt [The armed forces is a blind spot in the election campaign]," Information, November 6, 2007.
85. and Emil Rottbøll, "Forsvarets ledelse har glemt, hvordan man fører krig [The military leaders have forgotten how to wage war]," Information, March 14, 2009.
86. Rottbøll, "Forsvarets ledelse har glemt, hvordan man fører krig."
87. Ulriksen: "Brydningstid-paradigmskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001-2005)," 155.
88. Robert Mood, "Hær og nå-og i fremtiden [Here and now-And in the future]," Offisersbladet 2 (2007): 48.
89. See also Petter André Moe, "Svekket hær [Weakened Army]," Dagsavisen, July 11, 2006.
90. NTB, "Tynnslitt tillit i Forsvaret-En av fire vurderer å slutte i Forsvaret [Minimal confidence inside the Armed Forces-One of four considers to quit]," Aftenposten, November 21.
91. See also Per Christensen, "Ondt blod i Forsvaret [Bad blood stirred up inside the Armed Forces]," NTB, June 10, 2008.
92. and Leif Rosén, "Forsvarets maktmisbruk [The Defence Forces Abuse of Power]," Aftenposten, July 29, 2009.
93. See for example, Ole Magnus Rapp, "Kan bli beordret nordover-Forsvaret vil miste viktig kompetanse [Can be ordered to move north-The Armed Forces will loose important competence]," Aftenposten, November 5, 2008.
94. Quotation from Cathrine Hellesøy, "Ønsker debatt om Afghanistan" [Wants debate on Afghanistan], Aftenposten, August 30, 2009.
95. Sjur Holsen Magne Gaasemyr, "Dagens marineoffiserer er rigide og umodne. Lederutdanningen ved Sjøkrigsskolen holder ikke mål, viser omfattaende studie [Today's Naval officers are rigid and immature. The education of leaders at the Naval College is inferior, a comprehensive study shows]," Bergens Tidene, June 11, 2008.
96. Torkel Hovland, "Elitens svik [The treachery of the elite]," Verdens Gang, March 15, 2009.
97. Jacob Børresen, "Forblindet av teknologi [Blind faith in technology]," Aftenposten, May 10, 2005.
98. Torkel Hovland, "Diesen skader Forsvaret [Diesen damages the Armed Froces]," Aftenposten, November 8, 2006.
99. and Øystein Steiro, "Styrt avvikling av Forsvaret [A guided settlement of the Armed Forces]," Adressavisen, October 17, 2007.
100. Hovland: "Diesen skader Forsvaret."
101. The opinion polls show figures from 2007 to 2009, with the exception of the figures on the very existence of the Norwegian Armed Forces (back to 1969).
102. See Folk og Forsvar, Holdninger til Forsvaret Februar 2008 [Attitudes to the Armed Forces, February 2008] (Oslo: Folk og Forsvar, 2008).
103. and Folk og Forsvar, Holdninger til Forsvaret Februar 2009 [Attitudes to the Armed Forces, February 2009] (Oslo: Folk og Forsvar, 2009).
104. Mikael Bergling, "Försvarsanställda protesterade i Stockholm [Staff of the Swedish Armed Forces protested in Stockholm]," Östersundsposten, November 17, 2004.
105. See also, for example, Adam Engström, "Sex flottiljer blir fyra: Uppgiven och chockad personal [Six Wings becomes four: Resigned and shocked staff]," Dagens Nyheter, May 5, 2001.
106. Lars Fresker and Peter Lövendahl, "Politiker missköter försvaret [Politicians mismanages the Armed Forces]," Svenska Dagbladet, August 9, 2003.
107. Ewa Stenberg, "Försvaret var förlamat av maktkamp [The Armed Forces paralyzed by struggle for power]," Dagens Nyheter, February 25, 2005.
108. and "Maktkamp, prestige ochintriger är vardag i försvarsledningen [Power struggle, prestige, and intrigues everyday life in the leadership of the Swedish Armed Forces]," Om Försvarsförbundet, 1 (2005).
109. Mats Alvesson and Karl Ydén, "Karriärstyrda officerare skapar inkompetent försvar [Career directed officers creates incompetent defence forces]," Dagens Nyheter, November 6, 2008.
110. See also Johan Tunberger, "Försvarsmakten måste läggas ned [The Armed Forces must be discontinued]," Dagens Nyheter, September 26, 2004.
111. and Gunnar Jonsson, "Försvaret fullt av befall-vid skrivbord [The Armed Forces has many officers-At the writing tables]," Dagens Nyheter, March 10, 2008.
112. Carl Björeman, "Inget annat än ett flummigt prestigeförsvar [Nothing else than fuzzy prestige forces]," Länstidningen, July 24, 2004.
113. Olof Santesson, "Försvara landet med ett kompani: Mellan nätverkets löften och krigets väsen [Defend the country with one company: Between the promises of the technical networks and the nature of war]," Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift 209, 2 (2007).
114. and Wilhelm Agrell, "Försvaret enbart symboliskt [The Armed Forces is only a symbol]," Svenska Dagbladet, July 22, 2007.
115. Mike Winnerstig, "Vi kan inte försvara Sverige utan att offra alliansfriheten [We can not defend Sweden without sacrificing the non-alignment]," Dagens Nyheter, January 1, 2006.
116. See, for example, Sten Tolgfors, "Sveriges relation till NATO handlar inte bara om medlemskap [Sweden's relation to NATO is not exclusively about membership]," Svenska Dagbladet, February 16, 2008.
117. and Ulf Bjereld, "Nu minskar motståndet mot Natomedlemskap [The resistance against a Swedish NATO membership is decreasing]," Dagens Nyheter, April 4, 2009.
118. In the following, Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Opinion 2007: Tabellversion: Om den svenska allmänhetens syn pa ° samhället, säkerhetspolitiken och försvaret [Opinion 2007: Tabellversion: Swedes' views of the society, security policy and national defence] (Stockholm, Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, 2007).
119. will be a central source. It contains statistics from and interpretations of the opinion polls, sometimes as far back as the 1950s. The National Board of Psychological Defence, who has made the polls, is from January 1, 2009, absorbed in the new Swedish authority, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency).
120. Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Opinion 2007: Tabellversion: Om den svenska allmänhetens syn på samhället, säkerhetspolitiken och försvaret, 39-40.
121. The figures from 2008 is from Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Opinion 2008: Om den svenska allmänhetens syn på samhället, säkerhetspolitiken och försvaret [Opinion 2008: Swedes views of the society, security policy and national defence] (Stockholm, Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, 2008), 62-3.
122. Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Opinion 2007: Tabellversion: Om den svenska allmänhetens syn på samhället, säkerhetspolitiken och försvaret, 47, 55, 67.
123. and Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar, Opinion 2008: Tabellversion: Om den svenska allmänhetens syn på samhället, säkerhetspolitiken och försvaret, 65, 80.
124. John C. Bruckman, "Overcoming Resistance to Change: Casual Factors, Interventions, and Critical Values," The Psycologist-Manager Journal, 11 (2008): 212.
125. Ryan Hendrickson, "Swedens partnership with NATO," NATO Review, 3 (2007).
126. On the behavior of small states, see for example Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Introducing Small State Foreign Policy," in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 2003), 1-11.