Three waves of new governance in the European Union

European Law Review

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 208-225

  Dawson, Mark ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

EU law; European governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053270885     PISSN: 03075400     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final.
2. See, for larger scale studies, A. Héretier and M. Rhodes (eds), New Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy (Palgrave, 2010);
3. P. Pochet and J. Zeitlin, The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (Peter Lang, 2005).
4. See also, the essays in S. Kröger (ed.), "What we have learnt: Advances, pitfalls and remaining questions in OMC research" (2009) 13 European Integration Online Papers Special Issue 1, at http://eiop. or.at/eiop/texte/EIoP-2009-SpecIssue-1.pdf [Accessed March 4, 2011].
5. For two notable efforts, see C. Möllers, "European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept" (2006) 43 C. M. L. Rev. 313;
6. P. Kjaer, Between Governing and Governance: On the Emergence, Functioning and Form of Europe's Post-national Constellation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
7. See M. Büchs, "The Open Method of Coordination as a 'Two-level Game'" (2008) 36 Policy and Politics 21.
8. See K. Vincent, "Mad cows and Eurocrats: Community Responses to the BSE Crisis" (2004) 10 European Law Journal 499;
9. Committee of Independent Experts. First Report on Allegations Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission (Brussels, 1999).
10. European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, pp. 11-18
11. European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 22.
12. See, e.g. the manifold number of critical papers collated in C. Joerges, Y. Meny and J. Weiler (eds), "Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance", Jean Monnet Working Papers 6 (2001).
13. See J. Zeitlin, "Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional Compromise?" in G. de Burca (ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);
14. A. Schäfer, "Beyond the Community Method: Why the Open Method of Coordination was Introduced to EU Policy-making" (2004) 8 European Integration Online Papers 13, 8-13
15. Schäfer, "Beyond the Community Method" (2004) 13 European Integration Online Papers 5.
16. See, e.g. Directive 96/36 on the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave [1996] OJ L145
17. Directive 97/81 concerning the Framework Agreement on Part-time Work [1997] OJ L014
18. Directive 99/70 of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work [1999] OJ L175.
19. F. Duina and T. Raunio, "The Open Method of Coordination and National Parliaments: Further Marginalization or New Opportunities?" (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 489.
20. On this "paper tiger" argument vis-à-vis OMC, see F. Scharpf, "The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity" (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 645;
21. A. Héritier, "New Modes of Governance in the European Union: Policy-making without Legislating?" (2001) 14 MPI Collective Goods Reprint, at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf-dat/2001-14online.pdf [Accessed March 4, 2011].
22. Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century: A White Paper, COM (93) 700.
23. On the legislative and political divisions which led to the creation of the EES, see J. Goetschy, "The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development" (1999) 5 European Journal of Industrial Relations 120.
24. European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 22. See also the recommendations of the final report of the Constitutional Convention's Social Policy Working Group, CONV 516/1/03, para.41.
25. See, e.g. J. Scott and D. Trubek, "Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union" (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1;
26. D. Trubek and L. Trubek, "Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination" (2005) 11 European Law Journal 343;
27. J. Scott and G. de Búrca, Law and New Governance in the EU and US (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).
28. J. Weiler, "Epilogue: Comitology as Revolution" in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
29. G. de Búrca, "The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union" (2003) 28 E. L. Rev. 814.
30. Council Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180; Council Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303. See, on the "hybrid" regime created by these directives, G. de Búrca, "EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?" in Law and New Governance in the EU and US, 2006.
31. As Deakin and de Schutter have argued, it may be that "the conditions under which a deliberative process may succeed can be identified, and once identified, must be affirmatively created, rather than taken for granted". See S. Deakin and O. De Schutter, "Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation" in Deakin and de Schutter (eds), Social Rights and Market Force: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe (Bruylant, 2005), p. 3.
32. Particularly notable here are the directives on parental leave, works councils and working time emerging in the late 1990s, which left a number of discretionary elements, such as the timing and duration of leave and rest periods to the Member States. On these directives, and their "continuity" with aspects of the EES, see C. Kilpatrick, "New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism" in Law and New Governance in the EU and US, 2006. On the specific issue of compliance problems with these specific directives-as well as other social policy legislation of the late 1990s-see G. Falkner et al., Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
33. A good example of this is the evolution in approach undertaken by influential early legal scholars of new governance such as de Búrca and Trubek. Contrast, for example, the distinctions drawn between law and new governance in G. de Búrca ("The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union" (2003) 28 E. L. Rev 814) and
34. D. Trubek ("Mind the Gap" (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1) with the more nuanced "hybrid" approach they both embraced in later work, e.g. G. de Búrca, "EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?"
35. or D. Trubek, P. Cottrell and M. Nance, "Soft Law, Hard Law and EU Integration: Towards a Hybrid Model", both in Law and New Governance in the EU and US, 2006.
36. See C. Sabel and W. Simon, "Epilogue: Accountability without Sovereignty" in Law and New Governance in the EU and US, 2006;
37. M. Dawson, "Soft Law and the Rule of Law in the European Union: Revisionor Redundancy?", EUI Working Papers (RSCAS) 24(2009), pp. 3-6.
38. See J. Lenoble and O. de Munck, "Transformations in the Art of Governance", in O. de Schutter, N. Lebessis and J. Paterson (eds), Governance in the European Union (Office for Official Publications of the EC, 2001), pp. 40-41.
39. See "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the application of patient's rights in cross-border healthcare", COM (2008) 414 final.
40. See, e.g. the critical statements of MEPs and several health NGOs contained in "Confusion surrounds EU Health Services Directive" (EurActiv, January 28, 2008), at http://www.euractiv. com/en/health/confusion- surrounds-eu-health-services-directive/article-169882 [Accessed March 4, 2011].
41. See Möllers, "European Governance" (2006) 43 C. M. L. Rev. 313;
42. M. Greven, "The Informalization of Trans-national Governance: A Threat to Democratic Governance" in E. Grande and L. Pauly (eds), Complex Sovereignty: Re-constituting Political Authority in the 21st Century (University of Toronto Press, 2005).
43. C. Joerges, "What is Left of the European Economic Constitution", EUI Working Papers (Law) 13(2004), p. 24.
44. Sabel and Simon, "Epilogue: Accountability without Sovereignty" in Law and New Governance in the EU and US, 2006.
45. C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, "Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU" (2008) 14 European Law Journal 323.
46. M. Dorf and C. Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism" (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267;
47. C. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, "Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?" in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
48. Walker and de Búrca describe this as the "absorption thesis"-"there is no necessary conceptual boundary separating law and NG, rather NG is something that may in principle be fully incorporated within our understanding of law". "Re-conceiving Law and New Governance" (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 522.
49. See, as one institutional example, the Commission's 2008 Communication on the OMC SPSI, which lauded the Community Action Programme for social inclusion (PROGRESS) for "helping the development of 'social experimentation' as a way to test innovative ideas before engaging in large-scale social programmes". Commission Communication "A renewed commitment to social Europe: re-enforcing the open method of coordination for social inclusion and social protection" COM (2008) 418 final, p. 8.
50. This obvious deficiency is addressed by Sabel and Zeitlin, "Learning from Difference" (2008) 14 European Law Journal 323. The "patchwork" nature of the article, however, is potentially problematic, as is the shift from seeing particular methods as "experimental" to pointing towards a general "experimental architecture" in the European Union (where the authors can pick and choose between processes in various disparate fields in order to evidence each core experimentalist claim).
51. On the consequences of this problem for empirical evaluation of new governance methods, see S. Kröger, "The Effectiveness of Soft Governance in the Field of European Anti-poverty Policy: Operationalization and Empirical Evidence" (2009) 11 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 197.
52. The pensions OMC was created by the Stockholm European Council of February 2001 (see Presidency Conclusions, Stockholm European Council, March, 23-24, 2001, para.33). Its first national reports were submitted in 2003. Commission monitoring of national education policies was also applicable in research and development policy from 2003 and is now more broadly monitored through the European Union's strategic framework for education and training. See Council Conclusions of May 12, 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training.
53. See M. Rhodes, "Employment Policy: Between Efficacy and Experimentation" in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 302.
54. See Dorf and Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism" (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267.
55. See, e.g. W. Scheuerman, "Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronisation: Critical Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy" (2004) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 101.
56. European Parliament Resolution, Analysis of the Open Coordination Procedures in the field of Employment and Social Affairs and Future Prospects, 2002/2233 (INI), Point Y.
57. For recent examples of such scholarship, see D. Trubek and L. Trubek, "New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation" (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 539;
58. J. Scott and S. Sturm, "Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance" (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565;
59. C. Kilpatrick, "New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism" in Law and New Governance in the EU and US, 2006;
60. T. Hervey, "Adjudicating in the Shadow of the Informal Settlement" (2010), unpublished, available at http://www.shef.ac.uk/law/ staff/acstaff/herveyt.html [Accessed March 4, 2011].
61. See Commission Communication "Working together for growth and jobs: a new start for the Lisbon strategy" COM (2005) 24 final.
62. See also the Kok report, Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment, Report of the High Level Group on the Lisbon Agenda (Office for Official Publications of the EC, 2003).
63. See Commission Staff Working Document, "Lisbon Strategy Evaluation Document", SEC (2010) 114 final, p. 3.
64. Facing the Challenge, Report of the High Level Group on the Lisbon Agenda, 2003, p. 6
65. Commission Staff Working Document, "Lisbon Strategy Evaluation Document" SEC (2010) 114 final, p. 21.
66. Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020. Presidency Conclusions, European Council (June 17, 2010).
67. Zapatero, quoted at http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/2020- vision/66873.aspx [Accessed March 4, 2011].
68. Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020, p. 9.
69. "Germany, Spain Divided over Lisbon 2020 'Sanctions'" (Euractive, February 20, 2010) at http://www.euractiv. com/en/priorities/ germany-spain-divided-eu-2020-sanctions/article-188747 [Accessed March 4, 2011].
70. European Council, Presidency Conclusions (March 25-26, 2010), para.5 (c).
71. Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020, pp. 18-19
72. Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020, p. 21
73. J. Scott and S. Sturm, "Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance" (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565, 567.
74. For a recent academic re-statement, see J. Zeitlin, "JCMS Symposium: EU Governance after Lisbon" (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 436.
75. See also, for an NGO response, EAPN, "Engaging with the National Reform Programmes" at http://www.eapn.eu/content/view/256/10/lang.en [Accessed March 4, 2011].
76. Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020, p. 27.
77. See, e.g. M. Büchs, "How Legitimateis the Open Method of Coordination" (2009) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 765;
78. S. Kröger, "When learning hits politics or: Social policy coordination left to the administrations and the NGOs?" (2006) 10 European Integration Online Papers at http://eiop. or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/ view/2006-003a/18 [Accessed March 4, 2011].
79. See the "Open Letter" of Social Platform (an umbrella social NGO organisation) (November 19, 2009) at http://cms.horus.be/files/99907/ MediaArchive/Policies/Lisbon-Strategy/ Social%20Platform%20Letter%20Agenda%202020.pdf [Accessed March 4, 2011].
80. For an analysis above the superficial assessment of this case law given below see L. Azoulai, "The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions for its Realization" (2008) 45 C. M. L. Rev. 1335;
81. C. Kilpatrick, "The ECJ and Labour Law: A 2008 Retrospective" (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 180.
82. See Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (C-341/05) [2007] E. C. R. I-11767;
83. [2008] 2 C. M. L. R. 9;
84. International Transport Workers Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP (C-438/05) [2007] E. C. R. I-10779;
85. [2008] 1 C. M. L. R. 51;
86. Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachen (C-346/06) [2008] E. C. R. I-1989;
87. Commission v Luxembourg (C-346/06) [2008] E. C. R. I-4323;
88. [2009] All E. R. (EC) 1049.
89. On these dual origins of the PWD, see P. Davies, "Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems?" (1997) 34 C. M. L. Rev. 571.
90. See, e.g. B. Bercusson, "The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day" (2007) 13 European Law Journal 279;
91. C. Joerges and F. Rödl, "Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 'Social Deficit' of European Integration: Reflections After the Judgements of the ECJ in Laval and Viking" (2009) 15 European Law Journal 1.
92. Laval (C-341/05) [2007] E. C. R. I-11767 at [80];
93. Rüffert (C-346/06) [2008] E. C. R. I-1989 at [40].
94. Laval (C-341/05) [2007] E. C. R. I-11767 at [84].
95. On this criticism of the OMC, see F. Scharpf, "The European Social Model" (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 645;
96. Héritier, "New Modes of Governance in the European Union: Policy-making without Legislating?" (2001) 14 MPI Collective Goods Reprint, at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf-dat/2001-14online.pdf [Accessed March 4, 2011].
97. "I have clearly stated my attachment to the respect of fundamental social rights and to the principle of free movement of workers. The interpretation and the implementation of the posted workers directive falls short in both respects. That is why I commit to propose as soon as possible a Regulation to resolve the problems that have arisen. " Jose-Manuel Barrosso, Speech to the European Parliament, September 15, 2009.
98. On this point, see P. Syrpis and T. Novitz, "Economic and social rights in conflict: political and judicial approaches to their reconciliation" (2008) 33 E. L. Rev. 415.
99. This concern has particularly animated the political response-see, e.g. "ETUC Response to ECJ Judgments in Viking and Laval" (March 4, 2008) at http://www.etuc.org/a/4704 [Accessed March 4, 2011].
100. See also the comments of former President of the Federal Republic of Germany: R. Herzog and L. Gerken, "Stop the European Court of Justice" (September 10, 2008) at http://euobserver.com/9/26714 [Accessed March 4, 2011].
101. See, e.g. "Editorial Comments" (2008) 45 C. M. L. Rev. 1574.
102. See Joerges and Rödl, "Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 'Social Deficit' of European Integration: Reflections After the Judgements of the ECJ in Laval and Viking" (2009) 15 European Law Journal 1.
103. On this "reflexive" role for open co-ordination, see M. Dawson, "The Ambiguity of Social Europe in the Open Method of Coordination" (2009) 34 E. L. Rev. 63.
104. K. Armstrong and D. Trubek, "The Role of the European Court in Public Law Litigation: Destabilizing Social Sovereignty and Mandating Alternative Processes" (2010), unpublished, on file with author.
105. This criticism must be seen in light of the operation of the European Union's preliminary reference procedure, in which a determination of the appropriate balance when EU rights and national laws conflict is properly left to the national court. At the same time, part of the very concern the Laval and Viking judgments have provoked is the tendency of the Court to strike the balance itself, or instruct national courts in narrowly defined terms (see, for example, the curt dismissal of the actions of the ITF in Viking as lacking "objective justification" (Viking (C-438/05) [2007] E. C. R. I-10779 at [86]-[89]).
106. See, e.g. the criticisms offered by Joerges and Rödl, "Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 'Social Deficit' of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgements of the ECJ in Laval and Viking" (2009) 15 European Law Journal 15.
107. For some suggestions on how this may be possible, see T. Hervey, "Adjudicating in the Shadow of the Informal Settlement" (2010), unpublished, available at http://www.shef.ac.uk/law/staff/acstaff/herveyt.html [Accessed March 4, 2011].
108. See F. Scharpf, "The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU cannot be a 'Social Market Economy'" (2009) 4 Socio-Economic Review 29.
109. As well as the "third wave" literature mentioned in the section "The origins and meaning of new governance in the European Union", see the papers of the recent Transatlantic Conference on New Governance and the Transformation of European Law (Madison, Wisconsin, November 20-21, 2009), published in [2010] Wisconsin Law Review Issue 2.