Hybrid mean field game dynamics in large population

Proceedings of the American Control Conference

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 5109-5114

  Tembine, Hamidou ^a  

^a SUPELEC   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

CONVERGENCE PROPERTIES; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; FINITE POPULATION; LARGE POPULATION; MEAN FIELD GAMES; POTENTIAL GAMES; SUITABLE CONDITIONS; TIME-SCALES;

DYNAMICS;

EID: 80053150557     PISSN: 07431619     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/acc.2011.5990794     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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5. Taylor and Jonker. Evoltionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Bioscience, 40:145-156, 1978.
6. H. Tembine. Mean field stochastic games: Simulation, dynamics and network applications. Supelec, 2010.
7. H. Tembine. Mean field stochastic games: convergence, q/h learning, optimality. American Control Conference, 2011.
8. H. Tembine, E. Altman, R. ElAzouzi, and W. H. Sandholm. Evolutionary game dynamics with migration for hybrid power control in wireless communications. 47th SIAM/IEEE CDC, December 2008.
9. J. Weibull. Evolutionary game theory. MIT Press, 1995.