Behavior, robustness, and sufficient statistics in welfare measurement

Annual Review of Resource Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2011, Pages 37-70

  Just, Richard E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral welfare; General equilibrium; Reduced form econometrics; Structural econometrics

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053048251     PISSN: 19411340     EISSN: 19411359     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-resource-040709-135125     Document Type: Review

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