Pooling, access, and countervailing power in channel governance

Management Science

Volumn 57, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1692-1702

  Hendrikse, George ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Channel governance; Cooperatives; Foreclosure; Incomplete contracts; Market power; Pooling

Indexed keywords

CHANNEL GOVERNANCE; COOPERATIVES; FORECLOSURE; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; MARKET POWER; POOLING;

COMPETITION;

EID: 80052782478     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1369     Document Type: Article

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