Does a mandatory telemedicine call prior to visiting a physician reduce costs or simply attract good risks?

Health Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 10, 2011, Pages 1257-1267

  Grandchamp, Chantal ^a   Gardiol, Lucien ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

^b Center for Labor and Social Policy Studies BASS   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

efficiency; health; insurance; selection; telemedicine

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HEALTH CARE ACCESS; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH SERVICE; HUMAN; PHYSICIAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REIMBURSEMENT; SWITZERLAND; TELEMEDICINE;

ADOLESCENT; CHILD; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; COST CONTROL; FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS; FEMALE; HEALTH EXPENDITURES; HUMANS; INFANT; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MALE; MANDATORY PROGRAMS; MIDDLE AGED; PHYSICIANS; RISK REDUCTION BEHAVIOR; SWITZERLAND; TELEMEDICINE;

EID: 80052534014     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: 10991050     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/hec.1668     Document Type: Article

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