Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders

International Transactions in Operational Research

Volumn 12, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 559-580

  Chou, F S ^a   Parlar, M ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Certificate of entitlement; Multi unit auctions; Random number of bidders; Revenue maximization

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052270405     PISSN: 09696016     EISSN: 14753995     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-3995.2005.00526.x     Document Type: Article

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