seL4 enforces integrity

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6898 LNCS, Issue , 2011, Pages 325-340

  Sewell, Thomas ^a   Winwood, Simon ^a,b   Gammie, Peter ^a   Murray, Toby ^a,b   Andronick, June ^a,b   Klein, Gerwin ^a,b  

^a CSIRO   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONTROL PROPERTIES; ISABELLE/HOL; SECURITY PROPERTIES; SYSTEM COMPOSITION; UPPER BOUND; WRITE OPERATIONS;

PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING; USER INTERFACES;

ACCESS CONTROL;

EID: 80052184715     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-22863-6_24     Document Type: Conference Paper

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