Informal social networks and Rational Voting

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 229-257

  Abrams, Samuel ^a   Iversen, Torben ^b   Soskice, David ^c  

^a SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051651027     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123410000499     Document Type: Article

References (120)

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4. See also David Laitin, Identity in Formation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998);
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16. As Palfrey and Rosenthal, 'Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty', showed,
17. Feddersen, 'Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting', p. 103, reiterates.
18. A recent article, by David K. Levine and Thomas R. Palfrey, 'The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study', American Political Science Review, 101 (2007), 143-58,
19. Uses quantal response equilibria (QRE), as opposed toNash equilibria, inter alia to derive sensible turnout rates in large-N elections.
20. But this is not rational choice: in the QRE equilibrium in a large-N election, the pivotal probability for the individual player is virtually zero, just as in a Nash equilibrium and as Levine and Palfrey themselves say
21. Levine and Palfrey, 'The Paradox of Voter Participation', p. 155).
22. A quantal response only 'explains' turnout in this case because it assumes that players make mistakes. Therefore, the standard rational choice paradox remains.
23. Morton, 'A Group Majority Voting Model of Public Good Provision';
24. Morton, 'Groups in Rational Turnout Models';
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30. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout';
31. Shachar and Nalebuff, 'Follow the Leader'.
32. As shown in Morton, 'A Group Majority Voting Model of Public Good Provision';
33. Morton, 'Groups in Rational Turnout Models'
34. Uhlaner, 'Rational Turnout'
35. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout';
36. Shachar and Nalebuff, 'Follow the Leader'.
37. Morton, 'A Group Majority Voting Model of Public Good Provision';
38. Morton, 'Groups in Rational Turnout Models';
39. Uhlaner, 'Rational Turnout'.
40. This is the Coate assumption. The Feddersen assumption is that they behave as simple ruleutilitarians, but this distinction does not affect our argument.
41. Coate and Conlin, 'A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence', p. 1476.
42. John C. Harsanyi, 'Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behaviour', Theory and Decision, 12 (1980), 115-33.
43. Feddersen and Sandroni, 'A Theory of Participation in Elections';
44. Coate and Conlin, 'A Group Rule- Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout'. Experimental evidence supporting ethical group behaviour in large elections is provided
45. Timothy Feddersen, Sean Gailmard and Alvaro Sandroni, 'Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence', American Political Science Review, 103 (2009), 175-92.
46. Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1970).
47. Coate and Conlin, 'A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout', p. 1497.
48. Feddersen, 'Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting', p. 106.
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70. We are greatly indebted to a referee for drawing this research to our attention.
71. David W. Nickerson, 'Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments', American Political Science Review, 102 (2008), 49-57, shows a 'contagion' effect between spouses;
72. see also Scott D. McClurg, 'Indirect Mobilization: The Social Consequences of Party Contacts in an Election Campaign', American Politics Research, 32 (2004), 406-43.
73. James H. Fowler, 'Turnout in a Small World';
74. Alan S. Zuckerman, ed., The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), pp. 269-87.
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77. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980)
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80. Marsden, 'Core Discussion Networks of Americans'.
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82. Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (New York: Longman, 2005);
83. Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, 'Political Polarization in the American Public', Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (2008), 563-88.
84. Mark N. Franklin, 'Electoral Participation',
85. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, eds, Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Comparative Perspective (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), pp. 216-35;
86. Mark N. Franklin, 'The Voter Turnout Puzzles' (paper presented at the Fulbright Brainstorm Conference on Voter Turnout, Lisbon, 2002);
87. Mark N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
88. Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Historical Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
89. Robert D. Putnam, ed., Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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91. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout';
92. Shachar and Nalebuff, 'Follow the Leader'.
93. Diana C. Mutz, 'The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), 838-55;
94. Diana C. Mutz and Jeffrey J. Mondak, 'Democracy at Work: Contributions of the Workplace Toward a Public Sphere' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association , Chicago, 1998).
95. A constant term is included so that xi 151 for all i.
96. This assumption can readily be changed.
97. We assume for convenience that the actual number of non-voters in equilibrium is equal to the expected number, and that the number is continuous.
98. As with non-voting, the punishment for not punishing occurs a period later.
99. N̄(-∞)= 0, while v̄(infin;) = 0 and v̄(∞)= 1. For simplicity, we assume: (1) that N is continuous; (2) N(A) ≤N̄(A*) if A≥A*.
100. A).
101. Morton, 'A Group Majority Voting Model of Public Good Provision';
102. Morton, 'Groups in Rational Turnout Models';
103. Uhlaner, 'Rational Turnout'.
104. Queries about our module of questions on the YouGov survey should be addressed to Samuel Abrams.
105. The actual turnout rate is a subject of debate and disagreement with rates ranging anywhere between 50 and 56 per cent participation.
106. See Michael P. McDonald, 'Up, Up and Away! Voter Participation in the 2004 Presidential Election', The Forum, 2 (2004) ), issue 4, article 4, for a more thorough discussion.
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108. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945;
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115. Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, 'Culture War',
116. Fiorina and Abrams, 'Political Polarization in the American Public';
117. Alan Wolfe, The Transformation of American Religion: How We actually Practice Our Faith (New York: The Free Press, 2003).
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