The limits of electoral and legislative reform in addressing polarization

California Law Review

Volumn 99, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 359-371

  McCarty, Nolan M ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051541004     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (27)

1. See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006).
2. For a more detailed discussion of DW-NOMINATE scores, see KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY AND CONGRESS (2007).
3. The debate about whether voters are as polarized as the elites is ongoing. See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010);
4. MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WARS? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (3d ed. 2010).
5. see also BYRON E. SHAFER & RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM: CLASS RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH (2006).
6. For examples, see PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004)
7. and Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q. J. POL. SCI. 87 (2006).
8. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 304 (1998).
9. David W. Brady et al., Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 59 (2007).
10. Shigeo Hirano et al., Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U. S. Congress, 5 Q. J. POL. SCI. 169 (2010).
11. See, e.g., RHODES COOK ET AL., AMERICA VOTES 2007-2008 (28th ed. 2009) (compiling data on primary elections). I thank Hahrie Han, Jeremy Pope, and David Brady for their data on the primary systems. The details of the statistical analyses reported here are available from the author.
12. See Charles Stewart & Barry R. Weingast, Slacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and American Political Development, 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 223 (1992).
13. See JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS: HOW PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 87-88 (2006);
14. SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 210-15 (2008);
15. see also Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, Paper Presentation at the University of California, Berkeley, History and Congress Conference: The Gingrich Senators and Their Effect on the U. S. Senate (July 26, 2010). Theriault and Rohde argue that Republican House members elected since 1978, which they dub "Gingrich senators", have driven polarization in the Senate in recent years. They provide no evidence that links the extremism of this group to gerrymandering.
16. Thomas L. Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political Competition, and Political Extremism in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1962-2002, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS 117 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2008).
17. Elisabeth Gerber & Jeffrey Lewis, Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1364 (2004).
18. See Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009).
19. Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 223 (Paul Pierson & Theda Scokpol eds., 2007).
20. See Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Response to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1999).
21. See T. J. HALSTEAD, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33009-20050726. pdf)
22. and Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487.
23. See, e.g., GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U. S. SENATE 61-87 (2006).
24. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 225 (1997). However, Fisk and Chemerinsky argue that a plausible legal case can be constructed against the two-thirds requirement for changing the standing rules of the Senate. Eliminating this rule, they speculate, would lead to majority cloture. I disagree on both counts. First, I find it implausible on political grounds that the Supreme Court would so directly confront the Senate. Second, it is widely held that a sufficiently determined Senate majority could change the standing rules if it wanted (Pubitemid 127437489)
25. see WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 29.
26. See Nolan McCarty & Lawrence Rothenberg, Coalitional Maintenance: Politicians, Parties, and Organized Groups, 28 AM. POL. Q. 291 (2000).
27. See Michael Murakami, Divisive Primaries: Party Organizations, Ideological Groups, and the Battle over Party Purity, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 918 (2008).