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1
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0042143837
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'Omnes et singulatim': Toward a critique of political reason
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James D. Faubion ed., (New York: The New York Press)
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Michel Foucault, "'Omnes et Singulatim': Toward a Critique of Political Reason." In James D. Faubion, ed., Michel Foucault, Power (New York: The New York Press, 2000), 302.
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(2000)
Michel Foucault, Power
, pp. 302
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Foucault, M.1
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2
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0003831836
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Stanford: Stanford University Press
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René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 100. Unfortunately, Agamben does not discuss Girard - and as far as I know, there exists no exhaustive comparative analysis on their theories.
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(1987)
Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World
, pp. 100
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Girard, R.1
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4
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0003931980
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Stanford: Stanford University Press
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In Homo Sacer Agamben mentions Immanuel Kant's moral law as being the first such law signifying nothing - and I agree with him, at least partly (given the fact that we can already find this law in Luther). See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 51-52. However, the paradigmatic case of the law without significance - as well as that of the ban - in modernity is not Kant's moral law but rather Martin Heidegger's call of conscience, although for some unknown reason Agamben does not mention him in this context in Homo Sacer. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is precisely this call that Agamben has in mind when he writes: "The cipher of this capture of life in law is not sanction (which is not at all an exclusive characteristic of the juridical rule) but guilt (not in the technical sense that this concept has in penal law but in the originary sense that indicates a being-in-debt: in culpa esse), which is to say, precisely the condition of being included through an exclusion, of being in relation to something from which one is excluded or which one cannot fully assume.
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(1998)
Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life
, pp. 51-52
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Agamben, G.1
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5
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84870453823
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Guilt refers not to transgression, that is, to the determination of the licit and the illicit, but to the pure force of the law, to the law's simple reference to something." Agamben, Homo Sacer, 26-27. What else is at issue here but Heidegger's call of conscience? "The call asserts nothing, gives no information about the events of the world, it has nothing to tell." In other words, it is in force without signifying. This is not to say, however, that it has not effect whatsoever. In the case of Kant's moral law this effect was respect (Achtung) but in Heidegger's case it is precisely guilt (Schuld).
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Homo Sacer
, pp. 26-27
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Agamben1
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6
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0003422445
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Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 334, 331
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The call of conscience "discloses Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-Being as Being-guilty." Moreover, this guilt (Being-guilty) refers not to transgression, to the determination of the licit and the illicit; it is something that man always-already is, primordially and permanently: "Dasein as such is guilty." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 318, 334, 331.
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(1962)
Being and Time
, pp. 318
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Heidegger, M.1
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7
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0003730309
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translated by Carol Diethe, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), II § 10
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Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Carol Diethe, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), II § 10.
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(1994)
On the Genealogy of Morality
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Nietzsche, F.1
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