Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to be effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 359-370

  De Brauw, Alan ^a   Hoddinott, John ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Cash transfers; Conditionality; Matching; PROGRESA; School enrollment

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FORMATION; DEVELOPING WORLD; LOW INCOME POPULATION; SECONDARY EDUCATION; WELFARE IMPACT;

MEXICO [NORTH AMERICA];

EID: 79961129153     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.08.014     Document Type: Article

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