From data to phenomena: A Kantian stance

Synthese

Volumn 182, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 101-116

  Massimi, Michela ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bogen; Data; Kant; McAllister; Phenomena; Woodward

Indexed keywords

EID: 79961030939     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9611-z     Document Type: Article

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