Imperfect competition in the recycling industry

Metroeconomica

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-24

  Eichner, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIEGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960945331     PISSN: 00261386     EISSN: 1467999X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00204.x     Document Type: Article

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