New approaches to nonproliferation: Supplementing or supplanting the regime?

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 123-136

  Saunders, Phillip C ^a  

^a MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960931189     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736700108436868     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. See Phillip C. Saunders, “Foreign Policy and International Transitions: A Case for Foreign Policy Paradigms,” paper presented at the 1999 International Studies Association annual convention, February 16-20, 1999, Washington, DC.
2. For the distinction between preferences over outcomes and preferences over actions, see Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist—Neoliberal Debate,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 318-321.
3. See “Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy, (Washington, DC: January 2001).
4. For a critique, see Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115.
5. See George Perkovich, “Five Propositions on Nonproliferation,” in Michael Barletta, ed., Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities for New Administrations, Occasional PaperNo.4, Center for NonproIiferationStudies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, September 2000, pp. 17-21.
6. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).
7. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
8. See Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000,” September 2001 at .
9. See William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994).
10. See Peter Zimmerman, “Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology Is Enough,” Obis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1994), pp. 67-82.
11. See Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999,” August 2000 at .
12. Doug Struck, “North Korea Extends Missile Test Halt,” Washington Post, May 4,2001, p. 1.
13. A. Norman Schindler, “Statement on Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,” September 21,2000.
14. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through31 December2000,” September 2001.
15. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000,” September 2001.
16. Karen DeYong, “Bush Seeks Power to Lift Arms Curbs: Waiver Would Allow Military Assistance to Once-Shunned Nations,” Washington Post, September 24,2001, p. A1.
17. Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
18. Gu Guoliang, “Success or Failure? - Clinton Administration’s Policy and Approach in Handling North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” unpublished paper, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 2000.
19. See George W. Bush, “Address to the National Defense University,” Washington, D.C., May 1,2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ 05/text/20010501-10.html.
20. Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
21. Evan S. Medeiros, rapporteur, Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2001).
22. Phillip C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, “China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications for the United States,” in Barletta, ed., Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities for New Administrations, pp. 40-46. http://cns.miis.edu/ cns/projects/eanp/conf/op4_sjd.pdf.
23. David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Tell Chinalt Will Not Object to Missile Buildup,” New York Times, September 2,2001, p. 1.