After Fukushima: Preparing for a More Uncertain Future of Nuclear Power

Electricity Journal

Volumn 24, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 27-35

  Glaser, Alexander ^a  

^a Princeton University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960562083     PISSN: 10406190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tej.2011.06.003     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. A similar process played out in Japan. In Feb. 2011, one month before the accident, Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi plant was given a 10-year life extension. Hiroko Tabuchi, Norimitsu Onishi and Ken Belson, Japan Extended Reactor's Life, Despite Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011. The original press release (in Japanese) is available at www.meti.go.jp/press/20110207001/20110207001.pdf.
2. This episode has been previously described in Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, Containment of a Reactor Meltdown, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Aug./Sept. 1982, at 52-59.
3. A copy of the memorandum is available at www.ipfmlibrary.org/hen72.pdf.
4. John Gaertner, Ken Canavan and Doug True, Safety and Operational Benefits of Risk-Informed Initiatives, EPRI White Paper, Electric Power Research Institute, Feb. 2008.
5. For a more detailed discussion of this scenario, see for example Robert Socolow and Alexander Glaser, Balancing Risks: Nuclear Energy and Climate Change, DAEDALUS, 138 (4), Fall 2009, at 31-44.
6. This is based on an analysis of EMF 22 data by Robert J. Goldston,Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation:Magnitude Matters, SCIENCE and GLOBAL SECURITY, forthcoming.
7. Historically, construction rates peaked in 1984 with 32 GW connected to the grid, IAEA Power Reactor Information System, at www.iaea.org/programmes/a2.
8. With regard to similar expansion scenarios, the 2003 MIT study on the future of nuclear power noted: ''The United States. must experience very substantial expansion of its nuclear reactor fleet if the global growth scenario is to be realized. In addition, nations such as Germany, where there is currently strong anti-nuclear sentiment, would almost certainly need to participate.'' The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, at 111.
9. America's Energy Future: Technology and Transformation, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, National Research Council, Washington, DC, July 2009.
10. Id. The report also pointed out that ''the deployment of existing energy efficiency technologies is the nearestterm and lowest-cost option for moderating our nation's demand for energy, especially over the next decade'' (p. 40).
11. For an overview, see Mark Holt, Nuclear Energy Policy, RL33558, Congressional Research Service, Oct.21, 2010.
12. John W. Rowe, Fixing the Carbon Problem Without Breaking the Economy, Briefing, Resources for the Future Policy Leadership Forum Lunch, May 12, 2010.
13. NRG Energy, Inc. Provides Greater Clarity on the South Texas Nuclear Development Project (STP 3 and 4), News Release, Princeton, NJ, April 19, 2011.
14. These two to four reactors would most likely be the Vogtle plants in Georgia and perhaps the Summer plants in South Carolina (two units each, all Westinghouse AP-1000).
15. Specifically, the report concluded: ''If the first new plants are constructed on budget and on schedule, and if the generated electricity is competitive in the marketplace, the committee judges that it is likely that many more plants could follow these first plants. Otherwise, few new plants are likely to follow,'' AEF, Ch. 8, at 447.
16. Among these failed projects are: the fast-neutron reactor project (Kalkar, 1972-1991), which faced public and state-level political opposition, a difficult licensing process due to problems in the reactor design, and severe cost overruns, which added up to an estimated $4 billion compared to an original cost estimate of $150-200 million for the project; second, a large-scale reprocessing and MOX plant (Wackersdorf, 1985-1989), which again faced public opposition and massive demonstrations even before construction starts; it was ultimately canceled when the main customer signed an agreement for reprocessingof spent fuel in France, at which point an estimated $5 billion had been spent on the project; and finally, the repository project (Gorleben, since 1977), whose fate is still unclear: about $2 billion (1.5 billion Euro) had been spent on the project until 2007 and public and political opposition to it remains very strong.
17. The Green Party, which had first entered the German Bundestag in 1983, had (and still has) an even more critical position towards nuclear power.
18. The full text of the policy statement is available at www.spd.de/linkableblob/1812/data/berliner_programm.pdf.
19. The key provisions of this law are: it prohibits construction of new commercial nuclear power plants; it limits the remaining electricity production to 2.62 million GWh after Jan. 1, 2000; this cumulative energy production may be reached around the year 2025; it prohibits sending spent fuel for reprocessing after July 1, 2005; and it requires construction of dry-cask storage facilities at reactor sites; see www.gesetze-im-internet.de/atg/index.html.
20. See www.bfs.de/en/kerntechnik/strommengen.html for updates of electricity volumes.
21. Bridge technology (Brückentechnologie) is the term used in the German debate.
22. Long-Term Scenarios and Strategies for the Deployment of Renewable Energies in Germany: Guidance Scenarios 2009 (Langfristszenarien und Strategien für den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien in Deutschland: Leitszenarien 2009), Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Berlin, Aug. 2009.
23. The differences for primary energy demand are even more striking: Here, the International Energy Agency projects a demand reduction of about 5 percent by 2030 for the OECD+ in the 450-ppm scenario. In contrast, the guidance scenario for Germany envisions a demand reduction of more than 30 percent by 2030 (and more than 40 percent by 2050).
24. OECD/IEA data from Table 9.4, World Energy Outlook 2009, International Energy Agency, Paris, 2009.
25. Energy Scenarios for an Energy Concept of the Federal Government (Energieszenarien für ein Energiekonzept der Bundesregierung), Project 12/10, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Aug. 27, 2010.26. These reductions are relative to the emissions in 1990.
26. Energy Scenarios, supra note 25, at 192.
27. More precisely, the agreement envisioned eight additional years for the seven reactors that came online before 1980 and 14 additional years for the 10 reactors that came online afterwards. Note that the seven oldest reactors are the same that were shut down in response to the Fukushima accidents.
28. According to polling data from April 4-5, 2011, 86 percent of the respondents supported a nuclear phaseout by 2020 (43 percent: prior to 2020; 43 percent: by 2020; and 13 percent by 2040); see www. presseportal.de/pm/6694/2022635/ard_das_erste.
29. The new legislation is expected for the summer of 2011. It is also worth pointing out that, as of April 2011, only 52 percent of the Germany's nuclear capacity was operating. Electricity demand in the spring is belowaverage, but there has been a discussion about how this situation has affected imports and exports of electricity to and from Germany. For a discussion, see for example, Felix Matthes, Ralph Harthan and Charlotte Loreck, Nuclear Electricity from France? Short-Term Shut Down of German Nuclear Power Plants and the Development of Electricity Exchanges with Foreign Countries (Atomstrom aus Frankreich? Kurzfristige Abschaltungen deutscher Kernkraftwerke und die Entwicklung des Stromaustauschs mit dem Ausland), Ö ko-Institut, Berlin, April 2011.
30. The reasons for pursuing nuclear power are not always clearly defined or unambiguous and reducing greenhouse gas emissions is only factor among many others: these include energy security, but also the possibility of acquiring latent weapons capabilities or aspects of perceived prestige andmodernity associated with a nuclear program.
31. D.T. Ingersoll, Small Modular Reactors and Proliferation Risk, Briefing, AAAS headquarters, Nov. 15, 2010.
32. D.T. Ingersoll, Deliberately Small Reactors and the Second Nuclear Age, PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY, 51, 2009, at 589-603.
33. Steven Chu, America's New Nuclear Option, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2010.
34. This number includes $67 million for "LWR SMR Licensing Technical Support" and R and D support for advanced SMR designs ($29 million).
35. For a discussion of the adequacy of the once-through fuel cycle, see also The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An InterdisciplinaryMIT Study, supra note 8.
36. In Dec. 2009, the civilian stockpile of separated plutonium reached a new maximum value of 251.6 tons, not including the weapons plutonium declared excess by the United States and Russia. Global FissileMaterial Report 2010, International Panel on Fissile Materials, Princeton, NJ, Dec. 2010, at www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdf, at 27.