Strategic argumentation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1362-1397

  Dziuda, Wioletta ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Argumentation; Disclosure games; Expert advice; Persuasion; Strategic communication; Two sided messages

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960210741     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.017     Document Type: Article

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