Dual processes and moral rules

Emotion Review

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 284-285

  Mallon, Ron ^a   Nichols, Shaun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

automatic process; Bargh; dual process; emotion; Greene; Haidt; intuition; moral dumbfounding; moral judgment; moral rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959937207     PISSN: 17540739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1754073911402376     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. Bargh, J., & Chartrand, T. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462-479.
2. Cushman, F., Young, L., & Greene, J.D. (2010). Multi-system moral psychology. In J. Doris (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of moral psychology (pp. 47-71). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
3. Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M.D. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuitions in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17, 1082-1089.
4. Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work ? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 612, 517-523.
5. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834.
6. Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., & Murphy, S. (n.d.). Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason. Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia.
7. Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Kang-Xing Jin, R., & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications. Mind and Language, 22, 1-21.
8. Mallon, R., & Nichols, S. (2010). Moral rules. In J. Doris (Ed.), Moral psychology handbook (pp. 297-320). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
9. Nichols, S., & Mallon, R. (2006). Moral dilemmas and moral rules. Cognition, 100, 530-542.