General-interest-orientated accounting in public sector enterprises and regulated industries

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 261-275

  Greiling, D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959779048     PISSN: 13704788     EISSN: 14678292     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8292.00112     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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