A "constant and difficult task": Making local land use decisions in states with a constitutional right to a healthful environment

Ecology Law Quarterly

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-62

  Mudd, Michelle Bryan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA   (United States)

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PATRICIA;

EID: 79959767048     PISSN: 00461121     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (513)

1. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
2. For an extensive discussion of the advent of local environmental law, see generally John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (2002)
3. reprinted in The Intersection of Environmental and Land Use Law, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 821 (special ed. 2006) [hereinafter In Praise of Parochialism].
4. For additional articles discussing the vital role of local government in environmental protection see, for example, Pamela Corrie, Comment, An Assessment of the Role of Local Government in Environmental Regulation, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145, 145-48 (1986);
5. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 972-73 & n. 47 (2007);
6. A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 156-61 (2002).
7. Those states include Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7, 9
8. Illinois, ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2
9. Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. amends, art. XCVII
10. Montana, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3, art. XI, §§ 1-3
11. Pennsylvania, PA. CONST. art. I, § 27
12. and sometimes Rhode Island, R. I. CONST, art. I, § 17
13. although the right mentioned in the Rhode Island Constitution reads more like a public trust right for access to natural resources, rather than a broader right to a healthy environment. New York also is sometimes listed in this group, but its constitution differs in that it recognizes a citizen's right to standing to enforce environmental laws but does not expressly recognize a personal right to a healthy environment in and of itself. N. Y. CONS. art. XIV, §§ 4-5.
14. Nearly every state constitution mentions natural resources or the environment, most often in a public policy statement. See Bret Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 74 (2002).
15. The abovelisted states, however, stand apart in having a declared, affirmative "right" to a healthful environment. Richard O. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063, 1104 (1991) (identifying five categories of environmental provisions in state constitutions, of which affirmative rights statements are one);
16. see also Anil S. Karia, A Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment: A Proposed Amendment to Oregon's Constitution, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 37, 42-44 (2006).
17. For a broader comparative analysis of environmental provisions in state constitutions, see generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 863 (1996) [hereinafter Substantive Guidance];
18. Robert A. McLaren, Comment, Environmental Protection Based on State Constitutional Law: A Call for Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 123 (1990).
19. This Article will not focus on Massachusetts. To date Massachusetts case law has involved the public policy portion of the state's constitutional provision, and an attempt by an individual to enforce the "right" portion of the constitutional provision was rejected for lack of standing, without any explanation. See Enos v. Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs, 731 N. E.2d 525, 532 n. 7 (2000);
20. see also Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 185-86 (1993). Thus, there is an insufficient body of case law to draw upon.
21. The phrase "environmental rights" is used throughout the article to denote the constitutional right to a healthful environment contained in the state constitutions of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
22. In states without a right, there is likely a constitutional policy provision, an environmental statutory scheme, or both. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 867-80, tbls.1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.
23. See John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously when It Protects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693, 725-26 (1999) ("The scientific and technical complexity of environmental problems, the existence of competing policies, and the economic and social consequences of environmental protection put resolution of most environmental matters outside the expertise and ordinary role of judges.").
24. See 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 2.9-.11 (5th ed. 2010).
25. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 (rev. ed. 1926).
26. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT § 7 (1928).
27. This trend is summarized aptly by Nolon in In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at 377-86. See, e.g., Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995);
28. Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 669-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
29. Gardner v. N. J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N. J. 1991);
30. Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N. Y. S.2d 668, 672 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
31. Moviematic Indus. Corp., 349 So. 2d 667.
32. Id. at 669.
33. Id. at 670.
34. See id. at 669-70.
35. See id.
36. Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N. Y. S.2d 668, 672 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
37. Id.
38. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (a) ("It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the conservation and protection of natural resources.");
39. N. Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 ("The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty...").
40. See Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla. 1995).
41. See Verbatim Transcript of March 1, 1972, 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1223 (1971-72).
42. Seven Up Pete Venture v. State, 2005 MT 146, 327 Mont. 306, 114 P.3d 1009, 1023
43. (citing W. Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 635 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Mont. 1981)). This holding is in the context of state police powers, but the same result presumably would be reached for local police powers.
44. See Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cnty. Mun. Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274, 279, 283-84 (C. P. Bucks Cnty. Pa. 1972) (citing other cases therein).
45. See Kepo'o v. Watson, 952 P.2d 379, 387 (Haw. 1998);
46. City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N. E.2d 427, 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002);
47. Vill. of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 320 N. E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
48. For examples, see generally John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. LAW REV. 821 [hereinafter Historical Overview];
49. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at 386-413.
50. Admittedly, there are variations among states concerning whether the courts will liberally or narrowly construe implied authority. These variations have resulted in differing amounts of local government authority to regulate the environment. Nonetheless, the overall trend is one toward broader implied authority. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at 385-86.
51. See generally Nolon, Historical Overview, supra note 27, for areas of state and federal preemption, as well as the large remainder of local government authority. Generally, federal areas of regulation include selected toxic substances, wetlands, endangered species, and discharges into air and water. Within these areas many regulatory exemptions exist. State areas of regulation vary by state, but states often assist the federal government and also commonly review facilities siting and sanitation matters.
52. JunJie Wu, Land Use Changes: Economic, Social, and Environmental Impacts, CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2008, at 8 tbl.2.
53. See id. at 10 fig.1 (citing National Resources Inventory of the Natural Resources Conservation Service, USDA).
54. See Elizabeth P. Marshall & James S. Shortle, Urban Development Impacts on Ecosystems, in LAND USE PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS 81-90 (Stephan J. Goetz et al. eds., 2005);
55. Wu, supra note 28, at 10;
56. M. G. Chapman & A. J. Underwood, Comparative Effects of Urbanisation in Marine and Terrestrial Habitats, in ECOLOGY OF CITIES AND TOWNS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 57-68 (Mark J. McDonnell et al. eds., 2009).
57. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at 376-77 (footnote citations omitted).
58. See id. at 376-77.
59. See id. at 377.
60. Id.
61. E.g., 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 60 (2d ed. 2010). Even in states with lesser environmental policy provisions in their constitutions, commentators have concluded that those policy statements necessarily imbue the decision making of government officials who must factor public interest and public policy into their decisions.
62. See, e.g., A. E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193, 209 (1972) ("It is implicit in the character of public agencies that they are to act in the public interest and, in particular, that their acts are to be compatible with public policy as ordained by the Constitution. ").
63. Cmty. Coll. of Delaware Cnty. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 481 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
64. See id. at 481-82.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 482;
67. see also Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 721-22 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion) (observing that local governments have a "constitutional charge" to protect and enhance the quality of the environment for its citizens).
68. REPORT OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE ON A PROPOSED ENVIRONMENT ARTICLE, 6 COMMITTEE PROPOSALS 697, 700 (1970) [hereinafter COMMITTEE PROPOSALS]. At the same time, the delegates were cognizant of the reality that legislation alone would not suffice, and that a constitutional right was needed as well.
69. See Verbatim Transcript of July 22, 1970, 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2991 [hereinafter ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION];
70. Leahy, infra note 97, at 3-4.
71. City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 322 N. E.2d 11, 13 (Ill. 1975).
72. See id. at 14-15.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1003 (Haw. 2006) (emphasis added)
76. (addressing the water resources provision in HAW. CONST, art. XI, § 1).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 990, 1004.
79. Id. at 1004-08.
80. See Flathead Citizens for Quality Growth, Inc. v. Flathead Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2008 MT 1, 341 Mont. 1, 175 P.3d 282.
81. Id. at 290.
82. See Cape-France Enters, v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 205 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011, 1017. In Cape-France, a private buyer sued a private seller to rescind a contract for the purchase of land after learning of groundwater pollution beneath the property. The buyer, who planned to subdivide the property, would have been required by state subdivision laws to drill a test well that likely would have caused the spread of a contaminated plume and endangered the public health. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held, inter alia, that to require specific performance of the contract would be to require the landowner to violate the state's fundamental constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment. The contract was thus voided.
83. See id.
84. See Wu, supra notes 28-29.
85. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409, 427 (Haw. 2000).
86. When local governments are not proactive, they also leave more environmental decisions in the hands of the judiciary, which can be ill-equipped to handle scientifically complex, nuanced community issues. Brooks, supra note 3, at 1096, 1110 ("The design for such [environmental] compensation or restoration is best achieved at the local level.").
87. For a classic argument that states should "pull back" local control, see Eric Pearson & Gerald J. Hutton, Land Use in Pennsylvania: Any Change Since the Environmental Rights Amendment?, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 165, 201 (1975-76).
88. For past examples of federal and state intervention on behalf of the environment, see Nolon, Historical Overview, supra note 25, at 834-42 (observing how past environmental harms "left unabated by the land use control system driven by local governments" resulted in state and federal intervention over some environmental matters).
89. See generally Michael F. Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 33 (1989) (summarizing the history of federal and state incursions into local government environmental authority).
90. The source of the powers could come from a statute, constitution, charter, or some combination of these sources, depending on the form of local government involved. The numerous variations in local government forms, including those with home rule versus delegated powers, are addressed generally in 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING ch. 2 (5th ed. 2010).
91. Salkin notes that the forms "resist easy generalization", but that regardless of the form of government, statutes play a key role in shaping how land use authority is exercised because all states have adopted specific zoning enabling legislation. Id. §§ 2.4, 2.6, 6.28;
92. see also 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.8 (4th ed. 2010) (concluding that regardless of the source of authority, "a local ordinance may be held invalid if found to be inconsistent with, and thus preempted by, state law"). This Article focuses principally on enabling statutes as sources of authority, but similar observations can be extended to authority derived from a charter or constitution.
93. Unless the local government elects to challenge the legality of the statute or seeks legislative amendment of the statute. See discussion infra Part I. B.
94. See discussion supra Part I. A.1.
95. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A (West 2010).
96. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 205A-4,-26 (West 2010). When a county fails to follow the statutory guidelines, its development permits can be reversed by a court.
97. See Mahuiki v. Kauai Planning Comm'n, 654 P.2d 874, 882-83 (Haw. 1982).
98. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-504 (1) (b),-603,-608 (2009).
99. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/39.2 and 5/3.330 (West 2010).
100. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-504 (1) (g) (iii) (2009). For subdivisions not connecting to municipal water supply, on-site wells are the typical means of supply.
101. See Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011, 1013, 1017. Discussed supra note 51 and accompanying text.
102. The zoning statutes include 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-12001 (counties);
103. 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/110-10 (West 2010) (townships);
104. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-1 (West 2010) (municipalities).
105. The subdivision statutes are dispersed but include 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1041 (West 2010) (counties);
106. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/105-35 (b) (1) (West 2010) (townships);
107. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-12-5 to-8 (West 2010) (municipalities).
108. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10503 (2010).
109. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 10603-10604 (2010).
110. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-203,-304 (2009).
111. John L. Horwich makes this same observation in the context of judicial guidance in his article Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 347-50 (1996)
112. (citing Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-36 (1978)).
113. Carl W. Tobias & Daniel N. McLean, Of Crabbed Interpretations and Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-Existing Agency Authority, 41 MONT. L. REV. 177, 257 (1980)
114. (citing Richard J. Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of State Constitutions to Protect the Environment, 3 ENVTL. AFF. 473, 475 (1974)).
115. Gen. Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 862-63 (Mont. 1975)
116. (citing 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 56) (discussing the constitutional mandate that existing water rights be protected).
117. Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion);
118. see, e.g., Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) (communities suing to prevent state water rights decision that affected instream flow, habitat, and community water supply);
119. Vill. of Hillside v. John Sexton Sand & Gravel Corp., 434 N. E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (village and county suing to prevent the state from permitting a solid waste landfill within the corporate limits of the landfill). A related example would be suing for existing environmental damages. Town of Superior v. ASARCO Inc., No. 04-668 (Mont. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 4, 2005) (local governments and school district suing for damages caused by mining contamination despite extant cleanup efforts under federal and state regulations).
120. See Franklin Twp., 452 A.2d at 720.
121. Id. (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
122. See generally, e.g., Vill. of DePue v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 854 (CD. Ill. 2009) (documenting village's unsuccessful attempts to adopt local regulations compelling cleanup at a contaminated smelter site because village was dissatisfied with pace of cleanup progress under state law);
123. Liberty Cove, Inc. v. Missoula Cnty., 2009 MT 377, 353 Mont. 286, 220 P.3d 617 (where county adopted emergency ordinance banning gravel pit due to concerns about inadequate review by two state agencies).
124. In some instances the recovery of attorney fees may also be possible, making this type of litigation a more viable option for local governments with limited financial resources. In Pennsylvania, for example, at least one statute awards attorney fees to prevailing local governments in a dispute with a state agency.
125. See 35 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 691.307 (b) (West 2010);
126. Solebury Twp. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 928 A.2d 990 (Pa. 2007) (awarding attorney fees to township which challenged proposed issuance of water quality certificate in connection with development project, and holding that the state's strong policy to justly compensate parties who challenge agency actions requires that the fee-shifting provision in the Clean Streams Act be liberally interpreted).
127. See McLaren, supra note 3, at 135, 139, 149 (discussing the risks of deferring to statutes alone). It also overlooks, as Brooks has aptly observed, the reality that the "system of regulations may fail for myriad reasons: agency capture, bureaucratic mismanagement, inappropriate standardization, unreliable information, distortions from litigation or threat of litigation, costs of administration, incorrect standards and their mistaken application, 'discrimination' against new facilities, political intervention, economic corruption, and lack of legitimacy." Brooks, supra note 3, at 1063, 1065 & n. 14.
128. Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 2002 MT 201, 311 Mont. 194, 53 P.3d 1268.
129. See id. at 1269-70.
130. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-209 (3) (2009).
131. The case involved an earlier version of this statute: MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-209 (2001).
132. See Merlin Myers Revocable Trust, 53 P.3d at 1272.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1273 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (internal citations omitted).
136. Cape-France Enters, v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011, 1017. Discussed supra notes 51 and 65 and accompanying text.
137. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 558 N. E.2d 89, 94 (Ill. 1990) (concerning a statute abrogating constitutional provisions regarding the structure of the judiciary).
138. See discussion infra Part II. A.
139. See Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 722-23 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion) (responding to state agency contention that local government lacked standing to sue).
140. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass'n. v. Township of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 702-04 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
141. This ruling is based on the fact that zoning is optional in Pennsylvania. Id.
142. Id.
143. See e.g., Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1010 (Haw. 2006) ("Although in some respect, exercise of [the Department of Health]'s authority is discretionary in nature, such discretionary authority is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine.").
144. Admittedly, the occasional need to challenge offending statutes in court will present litigation costs for the local government. On the other hand, the government would likely face comparable or even greater costs defending litigation alleging that it violated environmental rights by enforcing a statute that is unconstitutional.
145. For a sampling of such articles, see supra note 3.
146. This article does not directly enter into the debate of whether the environmental rights provisions are self-executing, observing instead that the courts in each state have as a practical matter already applied the provisions to local government land use questions. See discussion supra Part I. A.2.
147. While the states rely in part on state environmental agencies to implement environmental rights, the discussion in this Part is largely focused on local government spheres of authority.
148. See ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 2991, 2998 (including both physical and noise pollution);
149. COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, supra note 40, at 697, 700.
150. Mary Lee Leahy, Individual Legal Remedies against Pollution in Illinois, 3 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1, 14 (1972). Leahy was a delegate to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention.
151. Id. at 1. Leahy further observed that the Act, which is couched solely in terms of pollution, is narrower than the range of activities that might affect human health as contemplated in the Illinois Constitution.
152. Id. at 14.
153. See id. at 14;
154. see also ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 2996, 3003, 3006 (noting right of persons to seek judicial invalidation of statutes that violate the environmental right).
155. See e.g., Cobin v. Pollution Control Bd., 307 N. E.2d 191, 193, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (affirming cease and desist order against salvage company engaged in open burning of automobiles);
156. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 290 N. E.2d 892, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (affirming requirement that a manufacturer pay to treat contaminants discharged from private sewer system before they reached a municipal sewage treatment plant and were discharged into state waters). Regulatory priority is separate from the question of whether a regulation constitutes a taking that requires just compensation.
157. See City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 322 N. E.2d 11, 14-15 (Ill. 1975). Discussed supra Part LA.
158. See Tri-Cnty. Landfill Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 353 N. E.2d 316, 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
159. See Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N. E.2d 1034, 1042-45 (Ill. 1999) (concluding plaintiff lacked standing under article XI where a proposed dam and reservoir would harm two threatened and endangered species);
160. see also Scattering Fork Drainage Dist. v. Ogilvie, 311 N. E.2d 203, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (finding no connection between harm to a person's ability to hunt and fish and the right to a healthful environment).
161. But see infra Part III. B.1 (noting Pennsylvania's finding that wildlife harms are related to human harms).
162. See sources cited supra note 96.
163. Ill. Pure Water Comm., Inc., v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N. E.2d 988, 992 (Ill. 1984).
164. See id.
165. See sources cited supra note 96.
166. See discussion supra Part LB.
167. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N. E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999).
168. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/40 (a) (1) (West 2010). The only exception appears to be for hazardous waste facilities, where local governments, but not individual citizens, are allowed to challenge a permit decision.
169. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/39.3, 40 (b) (West 2010).
170. See City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N. E.2d 875, 880, 884 (Ill. 1995);
171. White Fence Farm, Inc. v. Land & Lakes Co., 424 N. E.2d 1370, 1376-77 (Ill. 1981).
172. See City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N. E.2d 427, 435-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (possibility of development's septic system failing and entering water supply);
173. Tri-Cnty. Landfill Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 353 N. E.2d 316, 319-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (possibility of one contaminated aquifer threatening water supply in adjacent aquifer);
174. Vill. of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 320 N. E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (possibility that any discharge of waste into Lake Michigan would be practically irreversible).
175. See sources cited supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
176. See sources cited supra note 66.
177. See also the planning statutes at 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-14001 (West 2010) (counties);
178. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1/105-35 (West 2010) (townships);
179. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-12-5,-6 (West 2010) (municipalities).
180. See Illinois Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1 (West 2010).
181. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-12001 (West 2010).
182. See discussion infra Part II. C.
183. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-125-2 (West 2010).
184. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/39.2, 5/3.330 (West 2010);
185. see also Local Solid Waste Disposal Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1 to 6 (West 2010);
186. Solid Waste Planning & Recycling Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/1 to 2 (West 2010). With certain exceptions, the Act requires separate local government approvals in addition to state agency permits. The local government need not conduct a separate environmental review, but it can if it so chooses.
187. See City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N. E.2d 875, 881-82 (Ill. 1995).
188. For an example of how this concurrent jurisdiction can favor local government, see generally Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Board, 553 N. E.2d 362 (Ill. 1990). In that case, a village height restriction prevented Cargill from installing a 100-foot incinerator discharge stack for hazardous waste, even though state and federal law would have allowed the discharge to occur.
189. See 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 805/3 to 4 (West 2010).
190. See Howard J. Wein, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, in PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE 16-17 (Terry R. Bossert & Joel R. Burcat eds., 6th ed. 2008).
191. This chapter was previously authored by Franklin L. Kury, who originated and introduced the environmental rights amendment. Id. at 15.
192. Bertram C. Frey, Pennsylvania's Self-Executing Environmental Amendment: A View of the Battle of Gettysburg, 9 URB. L. ANN. 245, 256 (1975) (citing Commonwealth v. Fox, Docket No. 73-078, (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. June 12, 1973)).
193. For a list of examples, see Wein, supra note 121, at 23-32.
194. See Eric Pearson & Gerald J. Hutton, supra note 55, at 185 (arguing strongly for such a duty);
195. Frey, supra note 122, at 254-55 (noting the possibility but expressing concern about the administrative burden of such a duty).
196. See discussion supra Part I. A; notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
197. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. 1973) (ruling that a street widening that eliminated portions of a public river common did not violate public trust responsibilities under section 27).
198. The test apparently originated with the defendant in the case, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 710.
199. See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 712.
200. See id. at 696 (noting that the test "utterly ignores the constitutional text" and "is so weak that litigants using it to challenge environmentally damaging projects are almost always unsuccessful");
201. Horwich, supra note 70, at 364 (concluding that the test "yield[s] merely marginal benefits beyond Pennsylvania statutory law" and "strips the [constitutional] provision of much substantive impact");
202. Pearson & Hutton, supra note 55, at 196 ("Unfortunately, rather than propose a standard by which much environmental harm can be avoided, this test strikes a balance against environmental values.... [I]t seems inexcusable to relegate these constitutional values to such secondary status.").
203. See McLaren, supra note 3, at 139.
204. For a list of examples where plaintiffs have lost, see Wein, supra note 121, at 22-23.
205. Pennsylvania commentators concur that "the amendment still remains largely untested as an environmental protection tool" and anticipate that future factual situations "could develop and expand the amendment's current scope." See Wein, supra note 121, at 37.
206. Pa. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 691 A.2d 1023, 1031 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
207. See discussion supra Part LA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that although balancing is required, no specific balancing test is mandated.
208. See Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 879 (Pa. 2005) (upholding Department of Environmental Protection review criteria for landfill permits, which contain a harms/benefits test with differing language from the Payne test).
209. See In re Fried-El Corp. v. Borough of Monroeville, 474 A.2d 713, 717 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
210. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
211. See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 726-29, 731 (observing gaps in the current regulatory scheme, especially related to suburban sprawl and loss of biodiversity);
212. Wein, supra note 121, at 37 (listing possible future scenarios where the right may be implicated outside the state agency permitting process).
213. See Thomas M. Schmidt, Laws Which Regulate Land Use in Pennsylvania, 46 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 417, 421-24 & n. 18 (1975).
214. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10301, 10503, 10603-10604 (West 2010) (on planning, subdivision, and zoning, respectively).
215. See id. § 10603 (b). In the area of oil and gas, however, the courts have recently recognized limited authority to regulate the placement of gas wells through zoning, so long as the local government does not tread on the state's authority to regulate the technical aspects of the gas development.
216. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 864-66 (Pa. 2009) (upholding borough's denial of gas well drilling in a residentially zoned district where oil and gas wells were not a permitted or conditional use);
217. Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722, 730-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (upholding county zoning ordinance that permitted oil and gas development only in certain zoning districts and only by special exception because the primary purpose of the ordinance was to "preserv[e] the character of residential neighborhoods").
218. Cf. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 875-77 (Pa. 2009) (invalidating township ordinance that comprehensively regulated technical aspects of oil and gas development as preempted by state law). Although amici in the Range Resources-Appalachia decision argued that article 1, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution should be applied so that there are "shared state and local responsibilities to protect the environment" in oil and gas development, the court did not address this argument.
219. See id. at 873.
220. See 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5204 (West 2010).
221. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 9.1-.301 (West 2010).
222. See id. § 9.3 (k). Discussed further infra Part III. A.
223. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2322, 2324 (West 2010).
224. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 4004(19), 4012 (West 2010) (air);
225. PA. STAT. ANN. § 750.8 (West 2010) (sewage);
226. PA. STAT. ANN. § 804 (West 2010) (trail).
227. Deborah Beaumont Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a Clean & Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 411, 414 (1990)
228. (citing LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA, A BETTER CONSTITUTION FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT 5 (1969)).
229. Id.
230. (citing MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, STUDY NO. 10, BILL OF RIGHTS 250 (1971)).
231. Verbatim Transcripts of March 1, 1972, 4 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1200, 1214 (1971-72).
232. See Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N. E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999) ("'Healthful' is chosen rather than 'clean', ... because 'healthful' describes the environment in terms of its direct effect on human life while the other suggestions describe the environment more in terms of physical characteristics.").
233. See State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Scis. v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1987) (holding that law regulating motor vehicle junkyards validly protects right to a clean environment and outweighs property interests);
234. State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138-39 (Mont. 1977) (same);
235. see also discussion supra Part II. A regarding Illinois.
236. See discussion supra Part II. B.
237. See, e.g., Tobias & McLean, supra note 71, at 252-66;
238. Daniel Kemmis, Comment, Environmental Rights, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously, 39 MONT. L. REV. 224, 233-37 (1978).
239. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246-49.
240. See id. at 1238.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-5-317 (2) (j) (2009).
244. See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249.
245. Id. (reversing the district court's holding that plaintiffs had to demonstrate a threat to public health or "significant impact" to current water quality before environmental rights would be implicated).
246. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana's Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 165-74 (2003) [hereinafter Constitutionalizing];
247. Jason J. Czarnezki, Environmentalism and the Wisconsin Constitution, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 483-84 (2007).
248. See, e.g., Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 2002 MT 201, 311 Mont. 194, 53 P.3d 1268, 1272. ("This Court has repeatedly recognized that courts should avoid constitutional issues whenever possible.").
249. Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011, 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted). Discussed supra note 51.
250. See Thompson, Conslitutionalizing, supra note 158, at 179-80, 183-93.
251. This is in contrast with the facts of MEIC, which involved agency approval without environmental review. Discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 150-155.
252. Cf. Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 488, 491-92 (concluding that ordinary agency review applies if the constitutionality of an environmental statute or regulation is not raised, but also concluding the agency abused its discretion under the facts of the case).
253. See sources cited supra note 69.
254. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-103 (15),-104 (2009). While this is a much broader definition than Illinois' subdivision definition, it still leaves room for great environmental harm. As one example, consider Plum Creek Timber Company subdividing and developing thousands of acres of its unzoned land holdings in the Crown of the Continent into parcels of 160 acres, each with a new residence and a new road system, without any environmental review. While the government and conservation groups have stepped forward to purchase some of these lands, thousands of acres remain open to development.
255. For more information, see Montana Legacy Project, NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/states/montana/preserves/ art29100.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
256. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1) (b) (2009).
257. See id. § 76-3-609 (2).
258. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-209 (2009).
259. See id. § 76-2-205 (6).
260. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (2009).
261. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-603,-608 (2009).
262. Further, these criteria are a statutory minimum that can be augmented by local government subdivision regulations. See Burnt Fork Citizens Coal. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 951 P.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Mont. 1997).
263. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-511 (2009).
264. See Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1002-06 (Haw. 2006). This holding makes sense when considering that environmental review under Hawaii Environmental Policy Act (HEPA) is informational only and does not require that the government actually choose an alternative that protects environment rights.
265. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
266. Further, HEPA contains many exemptions for land use activities. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. Thus, a local government must go beyond any HEPA analysis to ensure meaningful environmental protection within its jurisdiction.
267. Article XII, section 7 reads: "The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights."
268. For the analytical framework, see Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Commission, 7 P.3d 1068, 1083-54 (Haw. 2000)
269. which is discussed in Chasid M. Sapolu, Comment, Dumping on the Wai'Nae Coast-Achieving Environmental Justice Through the Hawai'i State Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 204, 239-40 (2010).
270. David Kimo Frankel, Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 85, 134-35 (1994).
271. See discussion supra Parts I. A.2-3.
272. Cnty. of Haw. v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103, 1125 (Haw. 2010).
273. Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina, 7 P.3d at 1078.
274. See Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1010 (Haw. 2006);
275. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000).
276. Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 442-43, 456.
277. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 310 & n. 26 (Haw. 2007) (discussing agency exemptions and noting that California courts employ de novo review of agency exemptions).
278. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-4,-26 (West 2009).
279. Discussed in Mahuiki v. Kauai Planning Comm'n, 654 P.2d 874, 878 (Haw. 1982).
280. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343 (West 2009).
281. For a recent example of the interplay between local land use regulations and HEPA, see Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423 (Haw. 2010).
282. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5 (West 2009).
283. Discussed in Michael McPherson, Vanishing Sands: Comprehensive Planning and the Public Interest in Hawaii, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 779, 807-08 (1991)
284. (citing Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 577 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Haw. 1978));
285. Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Cobb, 629 P.2d 1134, 1143 (Haw. 1981)).
286. The environmental review process is detailed in Lisa A. Bail et al., Emerging Environmental and Land Use Issues, 9 HAW. B. J. 4, 4-13 (2005).
287. See HAW. ADMIN. C. § 11-200-8 (West 2010).
288. See generally, e.g., Frankel, supra note 174;
289. McPherson, supra note 184, at 807-08, 830-31.
290. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 205 (West 2009).
291. See David L. Callies, The Interplay Between Land Use and Environmental Law, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 688-90 (spec. ed. 2006);
292. DAVID L. CALUES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 769 (5th ed. 2008);
293. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 7-13 (1971).
294. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 226-52 (West 2009). Unlike other states, Hawaii local government land use regulation is housed in counties and not divided between counties and cities.
295. See infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
296. Honolulu City-County is the notable exception, but even there, the planning is via a consolidated government process. Department of Planning and Permitting, CITY & CNTY. HONOLULU, http://www.honoluludpp. org (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
297. See Cnty. of Haw. v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103, 1122 (Haw. 2010).
298. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 205 (West 2009). The classifications are found in § 205-2.
299. See id. § 205-4.
300. See id. §§ 205-2,-3.1,-5,-6,-16.
301. Discussed in McPherson, supra note 184, at 785-97;
302. JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 124-29 (7th ed. 2008).
303. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-5 (West 2009).
304. See generally Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, A voiding The Next Hokuli'a: The Debate Over Hawai'i's Agricultural Subdivisions, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 441 (2005)
305. (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-4.5 (West 2009)).
306. HAW. REV. STAT. § 344-3 (West 2009).
307. See discussion supra Part I. A.2.
308. See discussion supra Part I. B.
309. When possible this Part cites precedent from each of the four states, but in some instances a jurisdiction has not yet spoken on a particular topic.
310. Indeed, outside of Hawaii where planning is mandated, local government planning and zoning is optional and many local governments have likely opted not to fully use their regulatory authority. See overview of the states' land use laws supra Part II.
311. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501 (7) (2009);
312. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4 (West 2010).
313. See 4 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 42.39 (5th ed. 2010).
314. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 460-61 (Haw. 2000) (speaking in the context of water resources).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See discussion supra Part II. D and accompanying notes.
318. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-605 (2009).
319. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (2009).
320. See supra notes 113 and 120 and accompanying text.
321. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10301-10302 (West 2010).
322. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
323. This factor would be similar to what the Hawaii Supreme Court requires in determining whether native Hawaiian rights are protected during land development. There, the court requires that the government consider "the identity and scope of 'valued cultural, historical, or natural resources' in the petition area...." Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1084 (Haw. 2000).
324. Discussed in Sapolu, supra note 173, at 239-40.
325. See supra Part II. A.
326. See Pa. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 477, 480 & n. 9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that agency must consider a landfill's impact on nearby mushroom farmers and fruit orchard owners, as well as the aesthetic intrusion on a nearby inn and residences);
327. Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (historic battlefield).
328. See 25 PA. CODE § 9.302 (2010).
329. See supra discussion Part II. C. and accompanying notes.
330. See Lohmeier v. Gallatin Cnty., 135 P.3d 775, 777-78 (Mont. 2006) (involving allegations that newly created sewer district would provide more environmental protection if it was enlarged to include plaintiffs' lands).
331. See supra Part II. D; Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Cobb, 629 P.2d 1134, 1143 (Haw. 1981).
332. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 55, at 51-52 nn. 120-26.
333. See Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1074, 1086 (Haw. 2000).
334. See id.
335. See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1237-38;
336. supra Part II. C;
337. see also Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 722 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion) (referring to site pollution as well as risks to the "surrounding environment" of the community).
338. See City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N. E.2d 427, 429-30, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
339. For a recent sampling of scholarship in this area, see generally Irma S. Russell, Measure for Measure: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy, 43 TULSA L. REV. 891 (2008);
340. Yusuf Esat, Note, The Influence of New Technology on the Common Law as Green Investment Grows, 2009 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL'Y 203 (2009);
341. Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Note, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615 (2008);
342. Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Rote of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897 (2006).
343. See generally Michelle Bryan Mudd et al., The Role of Fish and Wildlife Evidence in Land Use Regulation, 30 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 107 (2009), for a detailed discussion of environmental evidence in the land use context.
344. Gardner v. N. J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 258 (N. J. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
345. For a discussion of the difficulties associated with measuring harm across time appears, see generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble With Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of Future Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2004).
346. See City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N. E.2d 427, 429-30, 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
347. See id. at 429;
348. see also Cmty. Coll. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 481 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (suggesting that local governments planning development of open space area will need to consider broad effects of future development on that area).
349. See HAW. ADMIN. C. § 11-200-2 (West 2010) (defining cumulative impact);
350. id. § 11-200-7 (defining multiple actions);
351. id. § 11-200-8 (b) (cumulative impacts can override an exemption).
352. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (requiring state to examine cumulative impacts of existing and proposed diversions on state's water resources before issuing new use permits).
353. See, e.g., Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808, 820 (adopting the "hard look" standard for local government review of EAs).
354. The state has already done so with respect to state agency environmental review. Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep't of Natural Res. and Conservation, 2000 MT 209, 301 Mont. 1, 6 P.3d 972, 977-78.
355. Some commentators also advocate for an inquiry of disparate impacts on marginalized groups such as race or poverty See generally Klee, Robert J., What's Good for School Finance Should Be Good for Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135 (2005);
356. Sapolu, supra note 173, at 218-28.
357. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
358. See id. at 331-36.
359. See id.
360. see also Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Maui, 947 P.2d 378, 386-87 (Haw. 1997) (holding environmental assessment should have considered impact of an entire proposed development rather than simply the development's drainage system).
361. For a discussion on the harms of the Superferry project, see generally Jordon J. Kimura, The Environmental Assessment: Issues Surrounding the Exclusion of Project Significantly Affecting Hawai'i's Fragile Environment, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 168, 180-81 (2008).
362. See Cmty. Coll. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 472-73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
363. See id.
364. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
365. See id. The court also noted its belief that environmental harms would be addressed by existing erosion control laws applied at the local level.
366. See id. at 480;
367. see also Swartwood v. Commonwealth, 424 A.2d 993, 996 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (concluding that state agency need only consider impacts of sewage plan, and not resulting development that would rely on sewage services, because separate litigation can proceed against local government for permitting housing).
368. Fox, 342 A.2d at 468;
369. Swariwood, 424 A.2d at 996.
370. Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808, 812-15, 821.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. see also Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 491-92 (finding error when agency assumed mining company would perpetually treat mining discharge into Clark Fork River even though company was unlikely to perpetually exist).
374. See supra discussion Part II. C.
375. See HAW. ADMIN. C. § 11-200-8 (b) (West 2010).
376. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
377. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass'n v. Town of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 704 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
378. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000).
379. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-608 (5) (2009).
380. See id.
381. See, e.g., Richards v. Cnty. of Missoula, 2009 MT 453, 354 Mont. 334, 223 P.3d 878, 881-82 (concluding that an electric fence around a subdivision located in an elk migration corridor would be inadequate mitigation).
382. Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 2002 MT 201, 311 Mont. 194, 53 P.3d 1268, 1272. Discussed supra Part II. C.
383. See Jurcak v. Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 513 N. E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
384. See id.
385. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 497-98 (Haw. 2000).
386. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
387. See Commonwealth v. Commonwealth, 335 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
388. See Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cnty. Mun. Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274 (C. P. Bucks Cnty. Pa. 1972).
389. Despite this trend, local governments in Pennsylvania are making some inroads in zoning the location of oil and gas development a significant legal development during a time when Pennsylvania is experiencing significant oil and gas development pressures. See supra note 138.
390. See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246.
391. Cape-France Enters, v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 395 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011, 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted).
392. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N. E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. 1999).
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1037.
395. Id. at 1038.
396. See id. at 1045.
397. Butler Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Commonwealth, 513 A.2d 508, 510 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
398. Id. at 513.
399. Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005).
400. See id. at 871-72.
401. See id. at 872.
402. Id.
403. See id. at 878.
404. See id.
405. E.g., Brooks, supra note 3, at 1066 n. 17.
406. Kemmis, supra note 150, at 235-36;
407. see also Robert T. Mann & Richard Jackson, Environmental Protection through Constitutional Amendment, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 385, 404-05 (1985) ("[T]he expression 'healthful environment' does not indicate an absolute, all-ornothing concept. No one contends that all automobiles must stop and that all impurities must be eliminated....").
408. For a discussion of this inevitable balancing, see Czarnezki, supra note 158, at 490-94;
409. Thompson, Substantive Guidance, supra note 3, at 872-73;
410. Thompson, Constitutionalizing, supra note 158, at 162, 190-91.
411. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). Even in states with more basic environmental policy provisions, the trend is inapposite to Pennsylvania. In New York, for example, which has an environmental policy statement but no environmental right, the courts have concluded that "if both [environmental and economic] factors were to be placed upon the scales, the Pro bono publico considerations must prevail."
412. Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N. Y. S.2d 668, 672 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1971);
413. see also Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995) ("A personal [property] right does not necessarily supervene the rational concerns of public environmental policy.").
414. Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
415. Kemmis, supra note 150, at 234-35;
416. see also Pearson & Hutton, supra note 55, at 196;
417. Mann & Jackson, supra note 279, at 413.
418. Brooks, supra note 3, at 1109.
419. Kemmis, supra note 150, at 234-35.
420. Pearson & Hutton, supra note 55, at 182.
421. Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 881 (Pa. 2005).
422. See Commonwealth v. Commonwealth, 335 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
423. See Pa. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 503 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
424. See discussion supra Part II. B, especially note 132.
425. See id.
426. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000). Presumably, this constitutional presumption in favor of the environment overlays HEPA's balancing, which requires that the decision maker "make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action, as well as to make a reasoned choice between alternatives."
427. Unite Here! Local 5 v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423, 444 (Haw. 2010).
428. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 454.
429. In re Contested Case Hearing (Molokai), 174 P.3d 320, 330-31 (Haw. 2007);
430. see Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 472.
431. See supra note 99 and accompanying text;
432. see also Mann & Jackson, supra note 279, at 413 (discussing Illinois' use of the constitution to interpret authority broadly in favor of the environment).
433. For similar arguments related to other constitutional rights, see Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2006) ("Are both claims in the conflict first-order claims, in which balancing is appropriate, or does one of the claims... function as a second-order claim, in which case balancing is inappropriate?");
434. Mark Oring & S. D. Hampton, When Rights Collide: Hostile Work Environment vs. First Amendment Free Speech, 31 UWLA L. REV. 135, 160 (2000) ("The first step in balancing should be to make sure that it is really necessary and appropriate.... Are the rights of equal stature[?]... [C]onstitutional rights should not be 'balanced' away unless it is absolutely necessary.").
435. See discussion supra Part II. C.
436. See Thompson, Constitutionalizing, supra note 158, at 190-91.
437. See MONT. CONST, art. II, § 3.
438. See discussion supra Part II. C, especially note 148.
439. See Mann & Jackson, supra note 279, at 405 (noting that even when a constitution mentions a right to use property, that right "is limited at least to the extent of the obligation to provide and to maintain a healthful environment"). Reserved for future discussion is the related question of whether environmental rights thus constitute a background principle of state law that precludes a takings claim.
440. Unite Here! Local 5 v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423, 444 (Haw. 2010).
441. See Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808, 820.
442. Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 492.
443. See Tobin, supra note 71, at 479, 479 nn. 31-32 (citing to the convention records of both Illinois and Montana).
444. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (quoting Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N. Y. S.2d 668, 672 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
445. For an in-depth discussion regarding the sufficiency of scientific evidence in land use, see generally Mudd et al., supra note 226;
446. see also Julie Lurman Joly et al., Recognizing When the "Best Scientific Data Available" Isn't, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 247 (2010).
447. Further discussion of this principle appears, generally, in Jorge E. Vinuales, Legal Techniques for Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Law, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 437 (2010);
448. Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environmental Regulation, and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 173 (1992).
449. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 495-96 (Haw. 2000).
450. See id.
451. Id. at 426 (quoting conclusions of law of the state water commission).
452. Id. at 467.
453. Id. at 466-67 & n. 59 (emphasis omitted) (some internal citations omitted).
454. Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 722 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion).
455. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249;
456. see Barry E. Hill et al., Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 398-99 (2004) (characterizing the court's test as a form of the precautionary principle).
457. City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N. E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
458. See id. at 430.
459. See id.
460. Id.
461. See id. at 434-36.
462. See id.
463. See id.
464. See Schuster v. Plumstead Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 450 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (involving a proposed automobile wrecking yard that experts opined would result in various pollutants seeping into groundwater or combining with surface runoff).
465. Madison River R. V. Ltd. v. Town of Ennis, 2000 MT 15, 298 Mont. 91, 994 P.2d 1098, 1102-03.
466. See id.
467. Tri-Cnty. Landfill Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 353 N. E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
468. See id.
469. See id.
470. See id. at 320.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. See id. at 318.
474. Id. at 324.
475. Vill. of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 320 N. E.2d 524, 527-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
476. Id. While the courts appear to apply a precautionary approach in Illinois, the exception would be where the state legislature has limited standing to challenge certain agency permits, discussed supra Part II. A.
477. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000).
478. See In re Wai'ola O Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 704-05 (Haw. 2004) (concluding that the government is "duty bound to hold an applicant to its burden during a contested-case hearing").
479. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5 (c) (West 2009).
480. In re Water Use Permit Application (Moloka'i), 174 P.3d 320, 335, 338, 347-48 (Haw. 2007)
481. (citing In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 93 P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004)).
482. See id. at 338.
483. See id.
484. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 335 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
485. Discussed in Cusack, supra note 4, at 193 & n. 162.
486. See Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808, 812-15, 820-21 (affirming trial court decision to void preliminary plat when developer EA was lacking required information such as existing groundwater studies);
487. see also Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 491 (finding an abuse of discretion where agency fails to use its discretion to demand additional relevant evidence).
488. Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1074 (Haw. 2000). Although the case involved native gathering rights, the holding is instructive regarding the failure to issue findings when a constitutional right is implicated.
489. For a discussion of the use of native constitutional rights in environmental rights analysis, see supra Part II. D.
490. Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina, 7 P.3d at 1084.
491. Id. at 1085;
492. see also In re Water Use Permit Application (Moloka'i), 174 P.3d 320, 334 (Haw. 2007) (remanding to state water commission for failing to explain why private commercial water use took precedent over public trust water use under article XI, section 1).
493. Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cnty. Munic. Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274, 279, 283-84 (C. P. Bucks Cnty. Pa. 1972);
494. see also Pa. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (abuse of discretion not to consider environmental harms).
495. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001 MT 99, 305 Mont. 232, 25 P.3d 168, 173 (upholding the district court's decision). Below, the district court voided the local government zoning decision, concluding there was "nothing in the record" and "scant evidence in the record" to support the local government's finding of public benefit. The evidence showed just the opposite-that the "extremely sensitive nature of the Duck Creek parcel and its importance to wildlife habitat... is a significant factor to be weighed in evaluating the public welfare...." Findings of Fact no. 98-100, Conclusions of Law no. 21, Greater Yellowstone Coal, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, Cause No. DV-96-331 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Apr. 19, 2000).
496. See Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1086-89 (Haw. 2000).
497. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Maui, 947 P.2d 378, 386-87 (Haw. 1981) (holding that it was erroneous for City to delegate environmental review responsibility to another agency or concerned members of the public when City was the agency granting approval of a proposed development).
498. Molokai, 174 P.3d 320, 326, 335 (Haw. 2007).
499. See id.
500. Id. at 335;
501. see also Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 472 (Haw. 2000) (finding error when commission deferred rigorously scrutinizing a water use application until some future date when resources were more scarce).
502. See supra notes 244-247 and accompanying text.
503. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1011 (Haw. 2006). Discussed supra Part II. D.
504. Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1009-11.
505. Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 86 P.3d 982, 985, 991-93 (Haw. 2004).
506. See id.
507. See id.
508. see also Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 453, 471-72 (Haw. 2000) (upholding condition on water use permits that allows water commission to revoke or modify permit in the future as constitutional obligations may require).
509. See Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 872, 878 (Pa. 2005). Discussed supra Part II. A, III. B.
510. See Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 488, 491-92.
511. Unite Here! 5 Local v. City & Cnty. Of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423, 428, 452. (Haw. 2010).
512. See id.
513. See id.