Copyright as property in the post-industrial economy: A Research agenda

Wisconsin Law Review

Volumn 2011, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 141-165

  Cohen, Julie E ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79959581293     PISSN: 0043650X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (115)

1. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay-How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 65 (2002).
3. Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 657, 659 (1996).
4. Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 447, 478 (2007).
5. Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 926 (2004).
6. A signal virtue of the high-level principles set forth in the recent report of the Copyright Principles Project is that they avoid rote incantation of the "incentives for authors" fallacy in describing how a good copyright law should be constructed. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2010). Even so, the drafters were not always able to steer clear of the incentives formulation when discussing specific reform possibilities.
7. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE ch. 4 (forthcoming 2012).
8. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1177-92 (2007).
9. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 522-27 (2009).
10. One promising start is Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and 'Work-Makes-Work,' Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
11. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347-63 (1996).
12. For good discussions of the modernist ideal of progress that animates U.S. intellectual property law and theory, see Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001).
13. and Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993).
14. For more detailed discussion, see COHEN, supra note 4, at ch. 4.
15. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 116 (1998).
16. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1951-70 (2006). On the significance of liberal pre-commitments for copyright's model of the author.
17. see COHEN, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
18. See generally TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996).
19. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996);.
20. PETER GALISON, EINSTEIN'S CLOCKS, POINCARÉ'S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TIME (2003).
21. HOWARD GARDNER, CREATING MINDS: AN ANATOMY OF CREATIVITY AS SEEN THROUGH THE LIVES OF FREUD, EINSTEIN, PICASSO, STRAVINSKY, ELIOT, GRAHAM, AND GANDHI (1993).
22. DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY (1999).
23. See COHEN, supra note 4, ch. 4.
24. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
25. One recent study of British and German writers found that fewer than half subsist on copyright-related income alone. See MARTIN KRETSCHMER & PHILIP HARDWICK, AUTHORS' EARNINGS FROM COPYRIGHT AND NON-COPYRIGHT SOURCES: A SURVEY OF 25, 000 BRITISH AND GERMAN WRITERS 5 (2007).
26. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 (1997).
27. Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2002).
28. see also Netanel, supra note 6, at 358-61.
29. [remix reference to be supplied by the reader].
30. See COHEN, supra note 4, at ch. 4.
31. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121, 157-59 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
32. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 1170-77.
33. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 113 (1999).
34. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 113 (1990).
35. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 480-85 (2010).
36. Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
37. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2239 (2000).
38. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (2004).
39. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031-33 (2005).
40. Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418-21 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1804 (2007).
42. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-7 (2004).
43. Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-51), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688585.
44. By this I do not mean to suggest that corporate law is "older" than copyright law in an absolute historical sense. As copyright scholars are surely aware, modern copyright law evolved before the modern corporation did. Instead, the argument is that we can regard both corporate law and copyright law as regulatory schemes that required a baseline level of economic development to mature. Corporate law came into full flower only after the basic principles of industrial manufacture had emerged and the Industrial Revolution was well underway. In similar fashion, copyright has come into its own as a mode of facilitating cultural production in the era of the information economy.
45. The international intellectual property system uses the term "industrial property" to refer narrowly to patents, trade secrets, and trademarks. This terminology, which emanates from the Continental legal tradition, operates to distinguish intangible property interests most commonly held and exploited by corporations and other fictional persons from intangible interests that Continental legal systems regard as inherently personal, most notably copyrights. From the perspective developed here, that usage is overly narrow and inaccurate to the extent that it ignores the overwhelmingly tangible nature of industrial wealth for much of the industrial era. In an effort to mitigate terminological confusion, I will use "industrial-era property" rather than the simpler "industrial property" to refer to the regime that emerged to govern ownership, management, and use of industrial assets.
46. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
47. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1492-98 (1989).
48. see also MARK J. ROE, THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 5-8 (1994).
49. For a conceptual overview of a theory of property rights in natural resources, see generally Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom, The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural Resources (Aug. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656418.
50. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1047, 1068-70 (2008).
52. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999).
53. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 19-20 (2000).
54. see also Richard A. Epstein, What Is So Special About Intangible Property? The Case for Intelligent Carryovers (The Univ. of Chi.: The Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series No. 254, Aug. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659999 (rejecting the idea that intellectual property might be different). For glimmerings of a resource-specific approach.
55. see HENRY E. SMITH, Toward an Economic Theory of Property in Information, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712089.
56. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 1044-46.
57. See, e.g., Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951, 953-54 (2004).
58. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973).
59. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 553-54 (2010).
60. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 60-63 (2006).
61. see id. at 91-127.
62. cf. Smith, supra note 27 (outlining a theory of intellectual property based on "modularity" and information costs).
63. See Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 (2004) (arguing that copyright incorporates not only an "authorship" regime but also a "communication" regime that functions to "regulat[e] competition among rival disseminators").
64. For good general summaries, see 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 1205-86 (2d ed. 2006).
65. and Herman Cohen Jehoram, The Nature of Neighboring Rights of Performing Artists, Phonogram Producers and Broadcasting Organizations, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75 (1990).
66. Margaret Jane Radin, Property Longa, Vita Brevis, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 109.
67. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
68. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3 (2000).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 4 (1983).
70. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
71. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
72. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
73. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (protecting the right of workers to organize into unions).
74. Fair Labor Standards Act, §§ 201-19 (concerning wages and hours).
75. Occupational Safety and Health Act, §§ 651-78 (setting standards for occupational safety and health).
76. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (banning certain types of workplace discrimination).
77. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (banning anticompetitive collusion and monopolization).
78. Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 41-58 (granting authority to proscribe unfair or deceptive trade practices).
79. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 77a-77bbbb (prohibiting misrepresentations and fraud in the sale of securities).
80. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (establishing labeling and disclosure mandates for consumer products).
81. See generally Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334 (2009).
82. See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005).
83. see also Van Houweling, supra note 31, at 634-36.
84. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008).
85. Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: The Future of Intellectual Property Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195 (forthcoming 2011).
86. For a suggestion in a similar vein, see Van Houweling, supra note 31, at 637-38.
87. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64-3787, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71, 941 (S.D.N.Y 1966), modified United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64-3787, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
88. see also U.S. v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
89. See Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), available at www.authorsguild.org/ advocacy/articles/settlementresources.attachment/amendedsettlement-agreement/ Amended-Settlement-Agreement.pdf (proposed settlement, pending court approval).
90. James Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
91. Bernard Lang, Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An International Perspective, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111 (2010).
92. Matthew Sag, The Google Books Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19 (2010).
93. Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1308 (2010).
94. See Symposium, In Berle's Footsteps-A Symposium Celebrating the Launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777 (2010).
95. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) ("[I]t hardly follows from today's decision [holding that collective work publishers improperly included individual contributions in electronic databases] that an injunction... must issue.... The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter into an agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the Authors' works....").
96. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Modern Author at Work on Madison Avenue, in MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT 173 (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011).
97. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
98. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
99. See J.D. CHAMBERS & G.E. MINGAY, THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1880 (1966).
100. J.M. NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-1820 (1993).
101. E.P. Thompson, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963).
102. See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001). (Pubitemid 33636479)
103. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
104. see also Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008) (holding noncompete agreements to be illegal restraints of trade unless covered by a specific statutory exception).
105. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 519-20 (1994).
106. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 63 (3d Cir. 1978).
107. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 948-49 (9th Cir. 1954).
108. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
109. Hughes, supra note 9, at 127 (discussing Gross v. Seligman and the continuing interests of authors in their works).
110. Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429.
111. See Demsetz, supra note 36. For a sampling of commentary critical of Demsetz on this point.
112. see Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 408-09 (2009) (criticizing Demsetz's model as applied to state-created intellectual property).
113. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001) (questioning the inevitability of the privatization of common resources).
114. Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649 (2007).
115. Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005) (arguing that the Demsetzian account neglects the role of the state in property formation).