Intellectual history as legal analysis

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 96, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1025-1034

  Margalioth, Yoram ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959469933     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (81)

1. See, e.g., ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (2004).
2. See William J. Baumol, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 1072, 1072 (1986).
3. See id.
4. See International Macroeconomic Data Set, U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/#HistoricalMacroTables.
5. See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 3-4 (2007).
6. Elhanan Helpman, Introduction to INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1, 1 (Elhanan Helpman ed., 2008).
7. See DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 51 (2007) ("In the long run, the main thing that ensures convergence with the living standards of advanced countries is the acquisition of high-quality institutions.").
8. Helpman, supra note 6, at 13.
9. RODRIK, supra note 7, at 51.
10. For further elaboration of these claims, see JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBUC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 2007);
11. GARETH D. MYLES, PUBUC ECONOMICS (1995);
12. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBUC FINANCE (6th ed. 2002);
13. JOSEPH E. STIGUTZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (3d ed. 2000).
14. For example, private property was not legally recognized in the 1990s in China, and even today, the court system is not independent Nevertheless, investors' property rights were well protected through the following mechanism: investments typically took place in enterprises that were partly owned by local governments. By letting the Chinese government hold residual rights in the investment, the investors benefited from the government's expectation of future profits, which protected them against its desire to expropriate the investment. See RODRIK, supra note 7, at 188-89.
15. Helpman, supra note 6, at 13.
16. Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalise 96 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2011).
17. See id. at 973-1001.
18. See id. at 1002-18.
19. See id. at 1018-23.
20. Development, international trade, economic growth, political economy, and economic history are all separate fields of expertise in economics. They occasionally overlap, and some scholars specialize in more than one of these fields, but in their scholarly work, these scholars usually contribute to each field separately. For how the faculty in the Economics Department at Harvard define their fields of expertise, see Faculty Directory, HARVARD UNIV. DEP'T OF ECON., http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). Legal academics do not seem to make such distinctions, and legal scholars writing in these fields seem to engage in all of the above and possibly more, often within the same paper.
21. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 988-89.
22. THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM xi (2005)
23. [hereinafter ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s];
24. see also John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (discussing proposed reforms under the Washington Consensus). John Williamson was the economist who coined the term "Washington Consensus" in a background paper prepared in 1989.
25. See John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 14 (Narcís Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008) [hereinafter Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus].
26. See JOSEPH E. STIGUTZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE 229-30 (2003);
27. Narcfs Serra et al., Introduction to THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 3, 3.
28. See RODRIK, supra note 7, at 55 ("If Latin America were booming today and China and India were stagnating, we would have an easier time fitting the world to our policy framework.");
29. see also International Macroeconomic Data Set, supra note 4 (showing growth rates for countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as for China and India).
30. See Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 973, 978 (2006).
31. Id.
32. See ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s, supra note 19 ("What for many countries had been the 'lost decade' of the 1980s made it evident that government interference in the economy-through price controls, foreign exchange rationing, distorted trade regimes, repressed financial markets, and state ownership of commercial enterprises-wasted resources and impeded growth. Hence, the logic went, rolling back the state would lead developing countries to sustained growth.").
33. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 41, 46.
34. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 937-1001.
35. See id. at 970, 973-91.
36. See id. at 970-71, 973-1001.
37. See id. at 970-71.
38. See id. Appendix.
39. See id.
40. Anne Osborn Krueger, WIKIPEDIA, http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Anne- Osborn-Krueger (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
41. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13 (2002).
42. See Rodrik, supra note 22, at 977.
43. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 970-71, 991-93.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 992.
47. See supra note 19.
48. Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, supra note 19, at 15-16.
49. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 985-90.
50. Id. at 989.
51. See e.g., ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s, supra note 19. Rodrik described this publication as "a genuinely interesting document: it represents a mea culpa as well as a way forward." Rodrik, supra note 22, at 986.
52. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 970.
53. Id. (footnote omitted).
54. See id. at 971, 991-94.
55. See RODRIK, supra note 7, at 185-86.
56. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 1012-15.
57. See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1370 (2001).
58. See id. at 1370-71, 1395.
59. See id. at 1373-74.
60. See id. at 1374.
61. See id. at 1370, 1375.
62. See id. at 1395.
63. See id. at 1388-95.
64. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 1014.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1003-05.
67. See id. at 1005.
68. See id. at 1005-07.
69. See id. at 1006-07, 1014-17.
70. See id. at 1018-23.
71. See id. at 1019.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1018-20.
74. See id.
75. Historians or political scientists specializing in economic history could also have written the central theme of Thomas's essay. Specifically, Thomas mentions that the first part of the paper was influenced by David Scott, an anthropologist.
76. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 971 n. 22. Clearly, an economist specializing in the field of development could also discuss the change in development policies, but the type of analysis, or perhaps merely the style of analysis, performed in the first part of her essay is different from development-economics scholarship and would fit into the category of economic history.
77. See id. at 973-1001.
78. See id. at 1002-07.
79. See id. at 970-71, 992-94.
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., RODRIK, supra note 7, at 184-92 (discussing these issues outside of a legal context).