Why are some international agreements informal?

International Law and International Relations

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 293-330

  Lipson, Charles ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 79959382873     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511808760.016     Document Type: Chapter

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