How Unusual is the United Kingdom Coalition (and What are the Chances of It Happening Again)?

Political Quarterly

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 279-292

  Lees, Charles ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Alternative Vote; Coalition government; Conservative party; Electoral systems; Liberal Democrats

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959283211     PISSN: 00323179     EISSN: 1467923X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2011.02192.x     Document Type: Article

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