Misrepresenting consciousness

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 154, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 409-433

  Weisberg, Josh ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Empty higher order thought; Higher order thought; Misrepresentation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958254831     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3     Document Type: Article

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