Imperfect vaccine aggravates the long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccination

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 6, 2011, Pages

  Wu, Bin ^a   Fu, Feng ^b   Wang, Long ^a  

^a PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

VACCINE;

ARTICLE; ATTITUDE TO HEALTH; CLINICAL PRACTICE; DRUG EFFICACY; EPIDEMIC; EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DATA; HEALTH BEHAVIOR; HEALTH PROGRAM; HUMAN; INFORMATION DISSEMINATION; MASS IMMUNIZATION; MASS MEDIUM; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE; THEORETICAL MODEL; IMMUNOLOGY; INFLUENZA; MEASLES; STATISTICAL MODEL; STATISTICS; VACCINATION; VOLUNTARY PROGRAM;

DISEASE OUTBREAKS; HUMANS; INFLUENZA, HUMAN; MEASLES; MODELS, STATISTICAL; VACCINATION; VACCINES; VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS;

EID: 79958082811     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0020577     Document Type: Article

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