The poverty of the Doha round and the least developed countries

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 611-627

  Scott, James ^a   Wilkinson, Rorden ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; DEVELOPING WORLD; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POVERTY; TRADE AGREEMENT; TRADE POLICY; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 79957998392     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2011.569322     Document Type: Article

References (84)

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81. This insistence on full reciprocity has been mirrored in bilateral negotiations, notably those between the EU and its former colonies.
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