The benefits of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games

Economics Letters

Volumn 112, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 176-178

  Rivas, M Fernanda ^a   Sutter, Matthias ^b,c  

^a MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Experiment; Public goods; Voluntary leadership

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957461262     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.007     Document Type: Article

References (6)

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3. Güth W., Levati M.-V., Sutter M., van der Heijden E. Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Public Economics 2007, 91:1023-1042.
4. Haigner S., Wakolbinger F. To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games. Economics Letters 2010, 108:93-95.
5. Moxnes E., Van der Heijden E. The effect of leadership in a public bad experiment. Journal of Conflict Resolution 2003, 47(6):773-795.
6. Van der Heijden, E., Moxnes, E., 2003. Leading by example? Investment decisions in a mixed sequential-simultaneous public bad experiment. CentER Discussion Paper No. 38. Tilburg University.