Two conceptions of dignity: Honour and self-determination

Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 43-58

  Brennan, Andrew ^a   Lo, Y S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 79957343830     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_5     Document Type: Chapter

References (22)

1. Analects, 1.10.
2. Ibid., 1.8.
3. See for example, Milton Lewis, 'A Brief History of Human Dignity: Idea and Application', Chapter 8, this volume.
4. In medieval Europe, examples of the reward and responsibilities of dignity abounded-for example, in the selection of high officials in the early days of the Venetian Republic (based on merit, integrity, and previous service to the republic). Compare this with the widespread practice in 15thcentury Italy of purchasing public office, see Jacob Burkhardt, 'The Greater Dynasties', The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 1.5 (Oxford: Phaidon, 1945).
5. Quoted from 'On the Dignity of Man' in E. Cassirer, P.O. Kristeller, and H.H. Randall, Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp.224-225.
6. For his views on the joys of farming, and on the importance of earning respect in old age by means of deeds carried out when younger, see Cicero's 'On Old Age', Cicero: Selected Works, trans. Michael Grant (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1960).
7. In The Great Learning, one of the 'four classics' of Confucianism, it is recommended that in order to avoid self-deception, and so that 'what truly is within will be manifested without', therefore 'the gentleman must be watchful over himself when alone'. By contrast, the petty-minded or unscrupulous man knows no restraint in private.
8. see Jack Coulehan, 'Dying with Dignity: The Story Reveals Its Meaning', Chapter 21, this volume.
9. Analects, 7.34.
10. David Hume, 'On the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature', in S. Copley and A. Edgar (eds.), David Hume-Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
11. The idea here is Aristotelian: the virtuous person not only knows the good but loves the good. It follows that a good person at least loves what he believes to be good.
12. A hidden premise in the argument is that God necessarily exists. Without this hidden assumption, there would be possible worlds in which God does not exist, and therefore possible worlds in which human beings are not loved by God, and therefore possible worlds in which human beings have no value. Thus, without, the worth of human beings is not necessary.
13. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
14. Robin S. Dillon, 'Respect', in: E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003) (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect/).
15. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 6: 449.
16. The distinction between autonomy as capacity and autonomousness as exercise is described in detail in Y.S. Lo, 'Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature as Subject', Environmental Ethics 21 (1999), pp.247-66. In that paper, the distinction is used to distinguish different levels of impact made by human interference on animals and on the natural world.
17. This kind of view is expressed in many works by political philosophers. See, for example, the first chapter of John Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
18. Michael Sandel, quoted in Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.211.
19. For a modern version of Kantianism with the notion of reason at its core, see C.M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
20. In the case of Kant, the radical freedom of the moral agent culminates in a voluntary choice by the rational subject to place himself or herself under the constraints of the moral law. Since the moral law endorsed by Kant's rational agent is strangely similar to the Protestant ethics of his culture, sceptics may wonder whether Kant's entire theory of the rational will and the moral law is nothing but a rationalization of an existing moral tradition.
21. One of the best introductions to this idea is Antonio Damasio's description of his patient 'Elliot' in Chapters 3, 4, and 9 of Descartes' Error (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). Elliot's incapacity to make sensible choices was invisible on standard tests of reasoning, moral development, and judgement. The gap between his rational, theoretical understanding of situations and his disastrous real-life incapacity to choose was evident to Elliot himself in the following incident: 'At the end of one session, after he had produced an abundant variety of options for action, all of which were valid and implementable, Elliot smiled, apparently satisfied with his rich imagination, but added: And after all this, I still wouldn't know what to do' op. cit., p.49.
22. See, for example, J.D. Mayer and C.D. Cobb, 'Educational Policy on Emotional Intelligence: Does It Make Sense?' Educational Psychology Review, 12 (2000), pp.163-183.