The 2009 federal election and the economic crisis

German Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 12-27

  Zohlnhöfer, Reimut ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 79956367463     PISSN: 09644008     EISSN: 17438993     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2011.554093     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. Bank for International Settlements, 79th Report (Basel: BIS, 2009), chapter 4; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2009 (Paris: OECD, 2009), pp.17ff.
2. See Statistisches Bundesamt, Press release No.174, 14 May 2010, available from http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/2010/05/PD10__174__51,templateId=renderPrint.psml (accessed 14 June 2010).
3. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR), Die Zukunft nicht aufs Spiel setzen. Jahresgutachten 2009/2010 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2009), p.46.
4. See Dieter Roth, Das rot-grüne Projekt an der Wahlurne: Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl vom 22. September 2002, in Christoph Egle, Tobias Ostheim and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (eds), Das rot-grüne Projekt. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder 1998-2002 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), pp.46-47.
5. For a more comprehensive analysis of the German governments response to the economic crisis see Reimut Zohlnhöfer, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The German Response to the Economic Crisis, German Politics, forthcoming.
6. Peer Steinbrück, Rede zur Einbringung des Bundeshaushaltes 2009, in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 16. Wahlperiode, 174. Sitzung, 16 Sept. 2008 (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2008), p.18548.
7. See Henrik Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition: Eine Bewertung des Krisenmanagements der Bundesregierung, in Christoph Egle and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (eds), Die zweite Große Koalition. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel, 2005-2009 (Wiesbaden: VS, 2010), pp.236-238.
8. At that time, a sum of 35 billion was agreed, of which private banks took over E8.4 billion (see Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition, pp.243-244). In the course of the crisis, much more public money had to be used to rescue HRE, however (see below).
9. See Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR), Die Finanzkrise meistern - Wachstumskrä fte stärken. Jahresgutachten 2008/2009 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2008), p.117.
10. For an in-depth description see SVR, Die Finanzkrise meistern, pp.156-164.
11. E.g., in the UK only bonuses were limited, while in the US management salaries of over $500,000 were subject to a special tax (but were allowed)
12. see Enderlein Finanzkrise und große Koalition, p.245.
13. See Bundestag printed matter 16/12100.
14. For a detailed discussion of the German bad bank scheme see OECD, OECD Economic Surveys. Germany (Paris: OECD, 2010), pp.89-90.
15. SVR, Die Zukunft nicht aufs Spiel setzen, pp.125-130.
16. See Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition, pp.246-247.
17. For the details see SVR, Die Zukunft nicht aufs Spiel setzen, pp.220-222.
18. See Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition, pp.239-240.
19. Data taken from OECD, Economic Surveys. Germany, pp.63-64.
20. Data taken from SVR, Die Zukunft nicht aufs Spiel setzen, p.65.
21. See OECD, Economic Outlook, Interim Report, p.110.
22. See OECD, OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2007 (Paris: OECD, 2008), p.93 (table 2).
23. See Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition, p.241.
24. See OECD, Economic Outlook, Interim Report, p.106.
25. See Bank for International Settlements, 79th report, p.113.
26. Jeremy Leaman, Germany Country Report, in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), Managing the Crisis. A Comparative Assessment of Economic Governance in 14 Economies (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010), p.18.
27. See Statistische Bundesamt, Press release No. 099, 12 March 2010, available from http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/2010/03/PD10__099__811.psml (accessed 14 June 2010).
28. See Leaman, Germany Country Report, p.28.
29. For arguments against the scrapping bonus
30. see ibid., p.13.
31. For the following see SVR, Die Finanzkrise meistern, pp.224-226.
32. OECD, Economic Surveys. Germany, p.12.
33. OECD, Economic Surveys. Germany, pp.26-27.
34. Kathrin Dümig, Ruhe nach und vor dem Sturm: Die Arbeitsmarkt- und Beschäftigungspolitik der Großen Koalition, in Egle and Zohlnhöfer (eds), Die zweite Große Koalition, pp.289-290.
35. Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Der Arbeits- und Ausbildungsmarkt in Deutschland. Monatsbericht März 2010 (Nürnberg: BA, 2010), p.9.
36. See Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition.
37. OECD, Economic Outlook, Interim Report, p.123.
38. See Reimut Zohlnhöfer, New Possibilities or Permanent Gridlock? The Policies and Politics of the Grand Coalition, in Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz (eds), Germany after the Grand Coalition. Governance and Politics in a Turbulent Environment (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010) for an overview and the chapters in Egle and Zohlnhöfer (eds), Die zweite Große Koalition for the details.
39. See Enderlein, Finanzkrise und große Koalition, pp.244-246.
40. See Nicole Herweg and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, Das Verhältnis von Markt und Staat unter der Großen Koalition: Entstaatlichung in der Ruhe und Verstaatlichung während des Sturms?, in Egle and Zohlnhöfer (eds), Die zweite Große Koalition.
41. See Spiegel Online, 2 June 2009, available from http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,628067,00.html (accessed 20 May 2010).
42. See FAZ.net, available from http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~EA00D934ED77A4E89844E36D1D74F9E49~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (accessed 20 May 2010).
43. Daniel Goffart, Peter Müller and Peter Thelen, Koalitionsausschuss: 50-Milliarden-Konjunkturpaket kommt, available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/50-milliarden-konjunkturpaketkommt;2120591;0 (accessed 20 May 2010).
44. Figure 1 and the data used in the following paragraph were compiled from data retrieved from various Politbarometer issues, published by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.
45. see http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Startseite/
46. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Nov. 2008, p.2, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2008/november/ (accessed 9 June 2010).
47. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Feb. 2009, p.4, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/februar/ (accessed 9 June 2010).
48. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Feb. 2009, p.4. Similar results were obtained by surveys in March, April and May 2009 by Infratest dimap.
49. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Aug. 2009.
50. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Aug. 2009, p.6, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/august/ (accessed 9 June 2010).
51. The most significant results of the regular Politbarometer surveys can be found in the Forschungsgruppe Wahlens online archive, at http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen_und_Publikationen/Politbarometer/Archiv
52. See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Oct. I 2008.
53. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Oct. II 2008.
54. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Nov. I 2008.
55. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Dec. 2008.
56. Surprisingly, data from Infratest dimap show a more sceptical public; according to these data, only 43 per cent of the respondents thought a second stimulus package would be an effective instrument to cope with the crisis. The apparent contradiction has probably got to do with the fact that, even though people did not expect that fiscal policy measures would help too much they nevertheless thought it might be better to try these measures at least. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that respondents in a Forschungsgruppe Wahlen survey on the first stimulus package which found a two-thirds majority in favour of a stimulus package also found that only 37 per cent of the respondents believed that it would be possible to prevent a recession with these kinds of programmes, while 56 per cent believed this was not possible.
57. See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Nov. I 2008.
58. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Feb. 2009 (38 per cent just right, 34 per cent too little, 15 per cent too much), Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer April 2009 (32 per cent just right, 33 per cent too little, 18 per cent too much).
59. ARD-DeutschlandTrend May 2009, p.4, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragenanalysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/mai/ (accessed 9 June 2010).
60. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer, Dec. 2008. Infratest dimap came to somewhat similar results in November 2008.
61. see Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Nov. 2008, p.5.
62. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Jan. I 2009.
63. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Jan. 2009, p.1, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/januar/ (accessed 9 June 2010).
64. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Nov. II 2008.
65. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer March I 2009 (44 per cent in favour, 50 per cent against), Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend April 2009, p.9, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/april/ (accessed 9 June 2010) (43 per cent in favour, 51 per cent against), Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer May I 2009 (33 per cent in favour, 61 per cent against).
66. According to Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer June 2009, only 18 per cent of the voters approved of government help for Arcandor while 77 per cent opposed it. Similarly, 64 per cent of respondents were against a loan for the mail order firm Quelle which belonged to Arcandor, while 31 per cent were in favour. With regard to automotive supplier Scheffler/Continental, 65 per cent of the respondents argued it would be better not to intervene while only 28 approved of government help.
67. see Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend March 2009, p.4, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/maerz/ (accessed 9 June 2010).
68. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend March 2009, p.6.
69. See Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Sept. 2009, p 8, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/september/ (accessed 10 June 2010).
70. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Dec. 2008, p.13, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2008/dezember/ (accessed 10 June 2010). A similar result was obtained by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Oct. II 2008. According to that survey 32 per cent of the respondents thought the Christian democrats were the most competent crisis managers compared with only 11 per cent for the SPD. A quarter of the respondents answered Dont know while another 29 per cent did not see any party as competent. The high number of Dont knows is probably due to the fact that the question was asked shortly after the crisis had come to the attention of the general public in September.
71. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend March 2009, p.7.
72. It has to be mentioned that the wording of the question in March (Which party has the best political recipes against the crisis) differs from the wording of the question asked in December 2008 and again in the summer of 2009 (I name a number of political issues. Please tell me which party you think is most likely able to solve this problem. To cope with the current economic crisis). Thus, the drop in support for the CDU/CSU was probably not as steep as the figures suggest. Nevertheless, other indicators (among them the fact that the figures for the SPD are similar for both questions) also suggest that the perception of the Christian democrats economic policy competence among the voters was declining.
73. see also Richard Hilmer, Bundestagswahl 2009: Ein Wechsel auf Raten, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 41/1 (2010), pp.147-180.
74. In February 2009, only 25 per cent of the respondents were content with Glos performance while 56 per cent were not, see Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Feb. 2009, p.10.
75. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Aug. 2009, p.12. Similar results were obtained by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer June 2009.
76. Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Sept. 2009, p.7.
77. Hilmer, Bundestagswahl 2009, p.172.
78. At least that may be inferred from the fact that 95 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that it is annoying that in the end taxpayers money has to be used to rescue banks.
79. see Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Oct. 2008, p.1, available from http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragenanalysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2008/oktober/ (accessed 10 June 2010) Similarly, in March 2009 only 35 per cent of respondents thought that state help for German banks was justified (61 per cent against) while three-quarters of respondents believed that state aid for small and medium businesses that were unable to get credit was justified (22 per cent against).
80. see Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTrend March 2009, p.3.
81. See Hilmer, Bundestagswahl 2009, p.155.
82. See ibid., p.170.
83. Ibid., p.172.
84. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Politbarometer Oct. 2009.