Microfinance and Investment: A Comparison with Bank and Informal Lending

World Development

Volumn 39, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 882-897

  Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

^b BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Banks; Informal lending; Investment; Microfinance

Indexed keywords

BANKING; CREDIT PROVISION; EXPENDITURE; INFORMAL SECTOR; INTEREST RATE; INVESTMENT; LENDING BEHAVIOR; MICROFINANCE;

BANGLADESH;

EID: 79956091597     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.03.002     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Ahlin C., Jiang N. Can micro-credit bring development?. Journal of Development Economics 2008, 86(1):1-21.
2. Aleem I. Imperfect information, screening and the costs of informal lending: A study of a rural credit market in Pakistan. World Bank Economic Review 1990, 4(3):329-349.
3. Anderson S. The economics of dowry and brideprice. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2007, 21(4):151-174.
4. Armendariz B. On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring. Journal of Development Economics 1999, 60(1):79-104.
5. Armendariz B., Morduch J. The economics of microfinance 2005, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
6. Båge, L. (2004). Savings: the forgotten half of microfinance, Statement delivered by the president of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. http://www.ifad.org/events/microcredit/op.htm.
7. Banerjee A.V., Besley T., Guinnane T. Thy neighbor's keeper: The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1994, 109(2):491-515.
8. Barua D., Dowla A. The poor always pay back: The Grameen II story 2006, Kumarian Press Inc., Bloomfield, CT.
9. Bassett G.W. Equivariant, monotonic, 50% breakdown estimators. American Statistician 1991, 45(2):135-137.
10. Bhattacharyya S. Interest rates, collateral and (de-)interlinkage: A micro-study of rural credit in West Bengal. Cambridge Journal of Economics 2005, 29(3):439-462.
11. Basu, A., Blavy R., & Yulek M. (2004). Microfinance in Africa: Experience and lessons from selected African Countries. IMF Working Paper 04/174.
12. Basu K. Implicit interest rates, usury and isolation in backward agriculture. Cambridge Journal of Economics 1984, 8(2):145-159.
13. Bouman F.J.A., Houtman R. Pawnbroking as an instrument of rural banking in the third world. Economic Development and Cultural Change 1988, 37(1):69-89.
14. Besley T., Coate S. Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral. Journal of Development Economics 1995, 46(1):1-18.
15. Bhaduri A. On the formation of usurious interest rates in backward agriculture. Cambridge Journal of Economics 1977, 1(4):341-352.
16. Binswanger H.P., Rosenzweig M.R. Behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture. Journal of Development Studies 1986, 22(2):503-539.
17. Blitz R.C., Long M.F. The economics of usury regulation. Journal of Political Economy 1965, 73(6):608-619.
18. Brandsma, J., & Chaouali R. (1998). Making microfinance work in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Discussion Paper, Washington DC.
19. Braverman A., Stiglitz J.E. Sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets. American Economic Review 1982, 72(4):695-715.
20. Caldwell J.C., Reddy P.H., Caldwell P. Periodic high risk as a cause of fertility decline in a changing rural environment: Survival strategies in the 1980-1983 south Indian drought. Economic Development and Cultural Change 1986, 34(4):677-701.
21. Christen, R. P., & Pearce, D. (2005). Emerging lessons in agricultural microfinance: Selected case studies. CGAP Occasional Paper, 11, Washington, D.C.
22. Cìzek P., Vìsek J.A. XploRe application guide 2000, 49-64. Springer, Heidelberg.
23. Eswaran M., Kotwal A. A theory of contractual structure in agriculture. American Economic Review 1985, 75(3):352-367.
24. Field E., Pande R. Repayment frequency and default in micro-finance: Evidence from India. Journal of European Economic Association Paper and Proceedings 2008, 6(2-3):501-509.
25. Ghatak M., Guinanne T.N. The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics 1999, 60:195-228.
26. Greene W. Econometric analysis 2000, Prentice Hall, New York. 4th ed.
27. Heckman J. The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection, and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 1976, 5(4):120-137.
28. Heckman J. Varieties of selection bias. American Economic Review 1990, 80(2):313-318.
29. Hermes N., Lensink R., Mehrteab H.T. Peer monitoring, social ties and moral hazard in group lending programs: Evidence from Eritrea. World Development 2005, 33(1):149-169.
30. Hermes N., Lensink R. The empirics of microfinance: What do we know?. The Economic Journal 2007, 117(1):F1-F10.
31. Jain S., Mansuri G. A little at a time: The use of regularly scheduled repayments in microfinance programs. Journal of Development Economics 2003, 72(1):253-279.
32. Khazzoom J.D. An indirect least squares estimator for overidentified equations. Econometrica 1976, 44(4):741-750.
33. Lawrance E.C. Poverty and the rate of time preference: Evidence from panel data. Journal of Political Economy 1991, 99(1):54-77.
34. Llanto G.M. Overcoming obstacles to agricultural microfinance: Looking at broader issues. Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development 2007, 4(2):23-40.
35. Madajewicz, M. (2003a). Does the credit contract matter? The impact of lending programs on poverty in Bangladesh. Working Paper. Columbia University, New York.
36. Madajewicz, M. (2003b). Capital for the poor: The effect of wealth on the optimal credit contract. Working Paper. Columbia University, New York.
37. McIntosh C. Estimating treatment effects from spatial policy experiments: An application to Ugandan microfinance. Review of Economics and Statistics 2008, 90(1):15-28.
38. McKernan S.M. The impact of microcredit programs on self-employment profits: Do noncredit program aspects matter?. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2002, 84(1):93-115.
39. Meyer R.L. The demand for flexible microfinance products. Lessons from Bangladesh. Journal of International Development 2002, 13(1-18):351-368.
40. Morduch, J. (1998). Does microfinance really help the poor? Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
41. Murray I. Cultivating client loyalty. MicroBanking Bulletin 2001, 6(16):20-24.
42. Park C. Risk pooling between households and risk-coping measures in developing countries: Evidence from rural Bangladesh. Economic Development and Cultural Change 2006, 54(2):423-457.
43. Park S. On indirect least squares estimation of a simultaneous equation system. Canadian Journal of Statistics 1974, 2(1):75-82.
44. Paxton J., Graham D., Thraen C. Modeling group loan repayment behavior: New insights from Burkina Faso. Economic Development and Cultural Change 2000, 48(3):639-655.
45. Pitt M.M., Rosenzweig M.R., Gibbons D.M. The determinants and consequences of the placement of government programs in Indonesia. World Bank Economic Review 1993, 7(3):319-348.
46. Pitt M.M., Khandker S. The impact of group-based credit programs on poor households in Bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter?. Journal of Political Economy 1998, 106(5):958-996.
47. Pitt, M. M. (1999). Reply to Jonatan Murdoch's "Does microfinance really help the poor? Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh" Brown University, Providence, RI.
48. Rahman A. Usury capital and credit relations in Bangladesh agriculture. Bangladesh Development Studies 1979, 12(2):1-46.
49. Rosenzweig M.R. Neoclassical theory and the optimizing peasant: an econometric analysis of market family labor supply in a developing country. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1980, 94(1):31-55.
50. Rosenzweig M.R., Stark O. Consumption smoothing, migration, and marriage: Evidence from rural India. The Journal of Political Economy 1989, 97(4):905-926.
51. Rosenzweig M.R. Risk, implicit contracts and the family in rural areas of low-income countries. Economic Journal 1988, 98(393):1148-1170.
52. Rosenzweig M.R., Wolpin K.I. Specific experience, household structure and intergenerational transfers: Farm family land and labor arrangements in developing countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1985, 100:961-987.
53. Rousseeuw P.J. Introduction to positive-breakdown methods. Handbook of statistics 1997, 101-121. Amsterdam, Elsevier. G.S. Maddala, C.R. Rao (Eds.).
54. Schubert R., Brown M., Gysler M., Brachinger H.W. Gender and economic transactions. financial decision-making: Are women really more risk-averse?. The American Economic Review 1999, 89(2):381-385.
55. Sharma M., Zeller M. Repayment performance in group-based credit programs in Bangladesh: An empirical analysis. World Development 1997, 25(10):1731-1742.
56. Stiglitz J.E. Peer monitoring and credit markets. The World Bank Economic Review 1990, 4(3):351-366.
57. Timberg T.A., Aiyar C.V. Informal credit markets in India. Economic Development and Cultural Change 1984, 33(1):43-59.
58. Stromberg A.J. High breakdown estimation of nonlinear regression parameters. Journal of American Statistical Association 1993, 88(421):237-244.
59. Varian H. Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1990, 146(2):153-174.
60. Wydick, B., Karp, H., & Hilliker, S. (2007). Social networks, neighborhood effects, and credit access. In Paper presented at the 1st Centre for International Banking, Insurance and Finance Conference on "Microfinance: What Do We Know?", Groningen, The Netherlands.
61. Wydick B. Can social cohesion be harnessed to repair market failures? Evidence from group lending in Guatemala. Economic Journal 1999, 109(457):463-475.