Reconstituting the neostructuralist state: The political economy of continuity and change in Chilean mining policy

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 31, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 1413-1433

  Nem Singh, Jewellord T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING WORLD; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; MINING; NATURAL RESOURCE; NEOLIBERALISM; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

CHILE; LATIN AMERICA;

EID: 79955631138     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2010.538240     Document Type: Article

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46. Domínguez delineates technopols from technocrats: Technopols are a variant of technocrats [they] are political leaders (1) at or near the top of their country's government and political life (including opposition political parties) who (2) go beyond their specialised expertise to draw on various different streams of knowledge and who (3) vigorously participate in the nation's political life (4) for the purpose of affecting politics well beyond the economic realm and who may, at times, be associated with an effort to remake their country's politics, economics, and society. Technopols so defined may operate in either authoritarian or democratic regimes. Whereas technocrats often rise through bureaucratic ranks (as do some technopols), technopols may have also been outsiders to the bureaucracy -Technopols fear politics much less than technocrats ... a rational policy is not just technically correct but also politically enduring. Rationality thus defined can only be achieved in politics. Technocrats are not new. Authoritarian technopols are not new. Technopols in democratising politics are relatively new, however'.
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48. ML Cook, The Politics of Labour Reform in Latin America: Between Flexibility and Rights, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007
49. Grugel, "'Basta de realidades, queremos promesas"';
50. Silva, In the Name of Reason;
51. Silva, 'Technocrats and politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks', Journal of Latin American Studies, 23(2), 1991, pp 385-410
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55. Neoliberal policy ideas refer to the Washington Consensus proposal regarding privatisation of public services, liberalisation of industries and deregulation of the financial sector. In Chile these were not implemented in one moment, rather, it was typically done in two phases to cushion the impact of market reforms. Under Pinochet the Chicago Boys insisted on deepening the first phase (1974-79) towards the second phase (1985-88) as a response to the debt crisis of 1981.
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66. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time for Equality: Closing Gaps, Opening Trails, 33rd Session of ECLAC, 30 May-1 June 2010, Brasilia: ECLAC, p 12.
67. Structural inflation refers to the phenomenon in Latin America where inflation is seen as caused by imbalances and not monetary expansion. These are related to trade and production, where Latin American economies tend to be vulnerable to external constraints and the proposed policy response has been foreign exchange management rather than fiscal and monetary policies. Bielschowsky, 'Sixty years of ECLAC', p 184.
68. R Ffrench Davis, Macroeconomía, comercio y finanzas para reformar las reformas en America Latina, Bogota: ECLAC, 2005.
69. Brazil and Chile have expanding social programmes within the framework emphasising fiscal and monetary discipline. The key programme under La Concertación Democrá tica is Chile Solidario, which is an integrated anti-poverty programme that targeted 5% of households. Its coverage includes health, education, employment, registration, intra-household relations, housing, income and consumption, making it one of the most comprehensive programmes in capturing the different dimensions of poverty. In Brazil the key anti-poverty programme is the Programa Bolsa Familia, which is a more integrated conditional cash transfer of funds scheme by Lula's government in comparison to the earlier programme of Fernando Cardoso (Bolsa Escola, Programa Nacional de Acesso á Alimentaçaõ-PNAA. Bolsa Alimentaçaõ, and Programa Auxílio Gás). Its coverage includes consumption, schooling, child labour, and family relations. For assessments.
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72. Taylor L, From Pinochet to the 'Third Way', ch 8.
73. Bielschowsky S, 'Sixty years of ECLAC', p 185.
74. R Devin & G Moguillansky, 'Public-private alliances for long-term national development strategies', CEPAL Review, 97, 2009, pp 99-102.
75. The Brazilian state-owned company Petrobrá s, with its dominant role in the whole oil sector extending to the petrochemicals industry, reflects this economic strategy.
76. L Bielschowsky, 'Sixty years of ECLAC', p 185; and ECLAC, Structural Change and Productivity Growth, 20 Years Later: Old Problems, New Opportunities. Summary, Santiago: ECLAC, 2008.
77. L Bielschowsky, Sixty years of ECLAC', p 187.
78. Consejo Minero represents the interests of big mining firms. Its membership includes the foreign companies operating in La Gran Mineria (big mining sites), and CODELCO is part of the council. CODELCO's interest clearly runs against other firms since the former aims to produce for the state while the latter is simply for profit. This was demonstrated in the royalty debate, where CODELCO threatened to withdraw from the Council because of conflicts of interest. SONAMI is the national grouping of miners in Chile. The organisation goes back as far as 1883 and has therefore long been engaged in policy consultations.
79. Consejo Nacional de Inovación para La Competetividad (CNIC), Evaluation Report on National Innovation Strategy for Competitiveness, Chile: International Evaluation Panel, Santiago, March 2010, p 3, emphasis in the original.
80. The latter point is subject to debate. From the business perspective the state is imposing too many constraints that impede labour flexibility, as well as stringent environmental regulations. From the viewpoint of NGOs, especially if we take the contentious Pascua Lama case, the state has practically handed over licences to foreign firms on a silver platter with its minimal regulatory framework on the environment. The Pascua Lama case is a proposed gold project that expands to the Argentine and Chilean borders of the Andean mountains. Other than requiring an international treaty that harmonises the liberal mining policies of Argentina and Chile, the project will transplant glaciers to extract the gold through open pit mining. This involves possible changes in the hydraulic cycle in the mountain ranges, displacement of indigenous communities and obviously expertise in moving glaciers. For discussions on indigenous rights and privatization.
81. N Yañez & R Molina, La Gran Minería y los Derechos Indígenas en el Norte de Chile, Santiago: LOM Ediciones/IWGIA, 2008.
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83. An important indicator here is the view among Chileans that mining companies comply with the law on subcontracting, despite the glaring fact that there are more subcontracted than permanent workers in both public and private firms.
84. J Nem Singh, 'Legitimating mining-based development: resource dependency, institutions, and state-capital relations in Chile', paper presented at the panel on 'Mining Exploitation and Energy Issues: Multi-level Governance and Conflicts on Rights' at the RISC International Symposium on 'Environment, Regions, and Strategic Resources: Governance Models for Rights Based Perspectives', Lille, 5-7 July 2010.
85. R Ffrench Davis, La Concertación economist and independent consultant, interview with the author, Santiago, August 2009.
86. ILO 169 is the international treaty recognising the rights of indigenous peoples, which runs counter to the firm-based logic of productivity in mining.
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91. Despite the series of tripartite negotiations between the government, big business and national union CUT, labour reforms were never settled until 2001, when Ricardo Lagos initiated a full labour reform agenda in Congress. See Cook, The Politics of Labour Reform in Latin America.
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94. Notre Dame: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies; and Winn, Victims of the Chilean Miracle, Indiana.
95. Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO), Annual Sustainability Report, Santiago: CODELCO, 2007, pp 98-99.
96. L Palma, Asesora, Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT), interview with the author, Santiago, 16 October 2009.
97. CODELCO's Board of Directors consists of ministers, professionals and two representatives from unions and engineers' associations.
98. RB Collier & D Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002, p 41.
99. Cook, The Politics of Labour Reform in Latin America
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102. R Ffrench Davis, Interview with the author, August 2009.
103. Foreign firms are subjected to an additional 35 per cent tax on repatriated income but 15 per cent credit on paid corporate taxes are deducted. DL 600 allows mining firms to remove further taxes for depreciation, encouraging re-investment. After the royalty tax law was passed, DL 600 was modified to allow for the firms to opt for an invariable tax rate for the following 15 years. See Comisión Chileno del Cobre (COCHILCO), Chile Presentation to the OECD Steel Committee', presented by Juan-Crístobal Ciudad, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 2008; and A Ruiz-Dana, Commodity Revenue Management: The Case of Chile's Copper Boom, Manitoba: International Institute for Social Development, 2007.
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107. MA Dávila, Fuentes CS (eds), Promesas de Cambio: Izquierda y derecha en el Chile contemporáneo, Santiago: FLASCO/Editorial Universitaria, 2002.