Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)

Public Choice

Volumn 147, Issue 3-4, 2011, Pages 377-393

  Johnson, Noel D ^a   LaFountain, Courtney L ^b   Yamarik, Steven ^c  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b US Government Accountability Office   (United States)

^c CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corruption; Economic growth; Investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955592363     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9634-5     Document Type: Article

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