Swiss experiment shows physicians, consumers want significant compensation to embrace coordinated care

Health Affairs

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 510-518

  Zweifel, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONSUMER; COORDINATED CARE; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HOME CARE; HUMAN; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL PRACTICE; PHYSICIAN; PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE; SWITZERLAND; UNITED STATES; WORKMAN COMPENSATION;

CHOICE BEHAVIOR; CONSUMER SATISFACTION; DATA COLLECTION; DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE, INTEGRATED; DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE REFORM; HUMANS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PHYSICIANS, FAMILY; SWITZERLAND;

EID: 79955486257     PISSN: 02782715     EISSN: 15445208     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0954     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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15. This is a minimum estimate. Additional attributes of coordinated care, such as capitation payment, evoke negative willingness-to-pay values as well. However, the present paper focuses on those attributes that are valued by patients. Zweifel P, Rischatsch M, Brändle A. GPs' preferences: what price for fee-forservice? Unpublished manuscript.
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17. The standardized normal distribution indicates that one has to deviate 85 percent of one standard deviation to leave 20 percent of the probability mass in the tail. As can be gleaned from the 95 percent confidence interval around total willingness to pay in Exhibit 3, the standard error is 15.8 (31/1.96). Eighty-five percent of that value is 13 Swiss francs; thus, 98 Swiss francs (-111+13) is the willingness-to-pay value for the low 20 percent tail.