Efficient proximate cause: Is california headed for a katrina-scale disaster in the same leaky boat?

Hastings Law Journal

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 757-793

  Young, Jacqueline ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955403330     PISSN: 00178322     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (346)

1. David P. Rossmiller, Interpretation and Enforcement of Anti-Concurrent Policy Language in Hurricane Katrina Cases and Beyond, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 43,46,64 (2007).
2. Approaches to Mitigating and Managing Natural Catastrophe Risk: HR. 2555, The Homeowners' Defense Act: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2555 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters, of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111 Cong. 12-14 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Glenn Pomeroy, Chief Exec. Officer, Cal. Earthquake Auth.)
3. Barbara Bowers, Funding the Inevitable, BEST'S REV., Feb. 2005, at 21, 24.
4. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 13
5. see also Bowers, supra note 2.
6. H.R. 2555 [111th]: Homeowners' Defense Act of 2010, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111 11-2555 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Homeowners' Defense Act of 2010]. Although the HDA was introduced in 2009, it remained under consideration throughout 2010 and is sometimes referred to as the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2010.
7. See, e.g., id. Because many sources refer to it by its 2009 title, and for the purposes of consistency, I wiU refer to it only as the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2009. At the time this Note went to print, the HAD had not yet been reintroduced in Congress's 112th Term
8. see id, and although this Note argues that it ought to be reintroduced, the solution this Note proposes is not dependent upon the HDA. The larger goal is to urge a federal disaster insurance scheme, and while the HDA is the most promising option currently available, other similarly well-conceived federal schemes would be equally applicable.
9. H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009).
10. A named-peril, or "specified-risk," policy is one that covers loss to the named property only if the loss resulted from any of the specifically identified risks in the policy. ROBERT H. JERRY, II A DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 391 (4th ed. 2007);
11. Roy C. McCullough, Property Insurance, 1963 INS. L.J. 75, 84.
12. JERRY A RICHMOND, supra note 6.
13. At least thirty-five states employ some version of the EPC doctrine in first-party property cases. Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation Versus Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 36 BRIEF 32, 33, 35-39 (Winter 2007). For an interesting discussion on the history and development of the doctrine,
14. see Julie A. Passa, Comment, Insurance Law-Property Insurance: Adopting the Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine, But Saying No to Contracting Out of It, 79 N.D. L. REV. 561,564-72 (2003).
15. 7 LEE R. RUSS A THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §101:55 (3d ed. 2005).
16. See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704,707 (Cal. 1989).
17. See, e.g., id. at 708.
18. 7 Russ A SEGALLA, supra note 9, §101:45.
19. Id. §101:43.
20. Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, Prosser's Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. I, 6-7 (2008);
21. see also Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 388-89 (1985) (explaining that the decisions of the California courts, in particular, have caused a great deal of uncertainty for insurers, as they have used the efficient proximate cause doctrine to create "new 'causes' of loss never contemplated by property insurance policy drafters").
22. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 16-17 & n.73.
23. 7 Russ A SEGALLA, supra note 9, §101:55.
24. Id.
25. Id. §101:49.
26. See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35-39 (listing seven states as employing a concurrent causation analysis and two states as "uncertain").
27. Id. at 34.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 33-34.
30. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 55.
31. 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).
32. 514 P-2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
33. 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989);
34. Bragg, supra note 14, at 388-89.
35. Bragg, supra note 14, at 388-89.
36. See Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 53 ("[W]hen large numbers of independent losses can be measured, the average loss becomes relatively easy to calculate, or in other words, there is great statistical confidence that any one actual loss will not deviate from the overall loss calculation to a degree that it places insurers' financial solvency in jeopardy.").
37. Id. at 53-54 (footnote omitted)
38. see RICHARD V. ERICSON A AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 180-84 (2004) (describing the difficulties in collecting reliable data on earthquakes and the subjectivity of any data that may be collected).
39. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 54.
40. Id. at 59-60
41. (citing Bragg, supra note 14).
42. Id. at 57-58.
43. See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8 (listing California, North Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia as having refused to implement the policy language).
44. Id. But see discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that this refusal may be wavering in California).
45. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684,688-89 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff'd but criticized by 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007)
46. see Tim Ryles, "Anticoncurrent Causation" Refined by Mississippi Supreme Court, IRMI.COM, http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2010/ ryleso4-personal-linesinsurance.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
47. Id. at 693. Note that although Judge Senter's reasoning on this point was later criticized by the Fifth Circuit
48. see Leonard, 499 F.3d at 430, it nevertheless serves as a cautionary example of how ACC language may appear ambiguous.
49. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
50. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346,351 (5th Cir. 2007).
51. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 63-64.
52. Id.
53. AM. ASS'N FOR JUSTICE, PATTERN OF GREED 2007: How INSURANCE COMPANIES PUT PROFITS OVER POLICYHOLDERS 3 (2007).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 5-6.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe After Katrina, 20 NAT. RESOURCES A ENV'T 26,26 (2006).
58. See Lavitt, supra note 14, at 31-32 (suggesting that while the "ever-shifting and sometimes nonsensical judgments" addressing concurrent causation have created confusion for policyholders and insurers alike, insurers have been able to "push the envelope," because they have the distinct advantage of being able to afford to wait out judicial trends).
59. Rhonda D. Orin, First-Party Coverage for Catastrophic Risks: Part I-Personal Lines, in INSURANCE COVERAGE 2007, at 89, 93 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 758, 2007).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 67-77.
61. Compare Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217, 224 (Miss. 1972) (explaining that the question of proximate cause is one of fact for the jury, and that a showing "that wind was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss"
62. will suffice), with Rhoden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (S.D. Miss. 1998) ("Mississippi courts have not specifically adopted the efficient proximate cause doctrine....").
63. See Lavitt, supra note 14, at 18-20, 22 (explaining that although two opposing lines of authority had emerged in Mississippi, in the Tuepker case, Judge Senter simply ignored Rhoden and assumed, under Grace, that Mississippi had adopted the EPC doctrine).
64. No. 1:05CV559 LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 1442489, at*1 (S.D. Miss. May 24,2006).
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying note 38.
67. Tuepker, 2006 WL 1442489, at*3.
68. Id.
69. Id. at*5.
70. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
71. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684,689-90 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff'd but criticized by 499 F.3d 419,430 (5th Cir. 2007)
72. see also supra text accompanying note 35.
73. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
74. Id. at 694.
75. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419,430 (5th Cir. 2007).
76. Id. at 431.
77. Id. at 431-32.
78. Id. at 436.
79. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346,354-55 (5th Cir. 2007).
80. Id. at 356.
81. 20 So. 3d 601,617-18 (Miss. 2009).
82. Id. at 606.
83. Id. at 606-07.
84. Id. at 606.
85. Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 618.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 616-17.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 618-19.
92. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957,959-60,979-81 (2010)
93. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 32-33
94. Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569,585 (1988).
95. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (explaining that after disaster strikes, insurers have every incentive to deny claims until a court declares that coverage existed, and that insureds suffer in the interim, as they often cannot begin to rebuild their lives until their claims are paid).
96. See Inquiry into Insurance Claims Payment Processes in the Gulf Coast After the 2005 Hurricane: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 10-15 (2007) (testimony of Jim Hood, Att'y Gen. of Miss.)
97. Gene Taylor, Hurricane Katrina Special Edition: Federal Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 Miss. L.J. 783, 784-90 (2008).
98. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 83-84.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 84.
102. FEMA Gulf Coast Recovery 3 Years Later, FEMA (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/news/ newsrelease.fema?id=45545.
103. See JONATHAN ORSZAG A DOUG FONTAINE, AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE HOMEOWNERS' DEFENSE ACT OF 2009 1 (2009)
104. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 46
105. Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Spread Risk with National Disaster Fund, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/ essays/spread-risk-with-national-disaster-fund/798581.
106. See, e.g., RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33892, POST-KATRINA INSURANCE ISSUES SURROUNDING WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSIONS IN HOMEOWNERS' INSURANCE POLICIES 3 (2007);
107. Taylor, supra note 80, at 788
108. Kathy Chu, Insurance Costs Become 3rd Storm, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2007, at AI.
109. Taylor, supra note 80, at 788-89.
110. Id. at 789.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 789-90 (calling for support for two such bills, including the Insurance Industry Competition Act (H.R. 1081) and the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act (H.R. 3121))
114. Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, H.R. 3355, 110th Cong. (2007)
115. modified and reintroduced as Homeowners' Defense Act of 2009, H.R. 2555,111th Cong. (2009).
116. Adrian Sainz, Ten Years After Hurricane Andrew, Effects Are Still Felt, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 18,2002, at 2, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sfl- 1992-ap-mainstory,o,7290462.story.
117. See ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 14-15
118. Bowers, supra note 2, at 21-22
119. Obama, supra note 86.
120. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 15 & n.22 ("The FHCF relies on bonding authority as it builds up reserves to meet its obligations. The recognized potential shortfall is a product of the current economic environment and lack of available capital, combined with an expansion of the FHCF.")
121. see also Obama, supra note 86 ("To shore [the FHCF] up, Floridians-already facing a budget shortfallare paying Warren Buffet a quarter of a billion dollars just for the option to borrow money if disaster strikes. And even then, the Cat Fund wouldn't have enough to cover its estimated $28-billion in exposure should a major hurricane hit.").
122. See supra Part I.B.
123. CAL. INS. CODE §§530,532 (West 2005).
124. Id. §530.
125. Id. §532 (emphasis added).
126. 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).
127. Id. at 891.
128. Id. at 891-92.
129. Id at 892.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 892, 895.
132. Id. at 896.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 896-97.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 895. 111.
137. 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
138. Id. at 125-27.
139. Id. at 130.
140. E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (Ct. App. 1985)
141. Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1983)
142. see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Partridge to find that the insured's loss was covered because thirdparty negligence was a cause of the loss, despite also finding that the EPC of the loss was flooding, an excluded cause under the policy)
143. see also Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704,704-05 (Cal. 1989).
144. 770 P.2d at 704-05.
145. Id. at 705.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 706.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 705.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 708.
154. Id. at 713 n.9.
155. Id. at 714-15.
156. No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County Cal. Super. Ct. July 1984).
157. 692 F.2d 551, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that coverage applied on a negligence theory, and that the lower court had misapplied the causation analysis in a case where insureds' property had been damaged by rain, an excluded cause).
158. 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1983) (applying Partridge to find coverage based on negligence where the insureds' home had been damaged by rain, an excluded cause).
159. Bragg, supra note 14, at 389-91, 393.
160. Id. at 391,393.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 196-99.
162. Bragg, supra note 14, at 393-94.
163. Id.
164. Scott G. Johnson, The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in California: Ten Years After Garvey, J. INS. COVERAGE, Autumn 1999, at 1,13.
165. See, e.g., Lavitt, supra note 14, at 17
166. Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35 tbl. 1
167. Passa, supra note 8, at 572
168. Johnson, supra note 136, at 13.
169. Some suggest that one of the goals of California's method of "causation analysis may be its demonstrated passion to find ways to compensate injured parties even at the expense of breaking down common law distinctions between tort and contract." Bragg, supra note 14, at 388.
170. Examples of more insured-friendly policies include California's application of the doctrine of contra proferentem, the rule that ambiguities in a contract are to be interpreted against the drafter, as well as the doctrine of reasonable expectations. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253,1264 (Cal. 1990).
171. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 60 (citing No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County Cal. Super. Ct. July 1984)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Bragg, supra note 14, at 390-91.
175. 692 F.2d 551,552 (9th Cir. 1982).
176. Id. at 552-53 (emphasis omitted).
177. Id. at 554-55.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 115-27.
179. 267 Cal. Rptr. 708,715-16 (Ct. App. 1990).
180. Id. at 709.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 709-10.
184. Id. at 710.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 711-12.
187. Id. at 715 n.6.
188. 110 P.3d 903 (Cal.2005).
189. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009).
190. Julian, 110 P.3d at 905.
191. Id. at 905 n.2.
192. Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 906.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 910.
197. Id. at 908.
198. Id. at 911.
199. See 7 Russ A SEGALLA, supra note 9, §101:55.
200. Julian, 110 P.3d at 911-12.
201. Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
203. Julian, 110 P.3d at 911.
204. Id.
205. 173 Id.
206. Id. at 911-12.
207. 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 652 (Ct. App. 2008).
208. Id. at 658-59.
209. Id. at 659.
210. Id. at 654.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 658.
213. Id.
214. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied (2009).
215. Id. at 299.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 298-99.
219. Id. at 299.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 301.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 46.
225. Bragg, supra note 14, at 389-91,393.
226. See supra notes 46-47,78 and accompanying text.
227. See Bragg, supra note 14, at 398.
228. Id.
229. Assemb. B. 2865, 1983-84 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) (codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§10081-10089.4 (West 2005)).
230. Bragg, supra note 14, at 398.
231. INS. §10088.
232. Id. §10088.5.
233. See Consumers: Earthquake Insurance, CAL. DEP'T OF INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/ 0100-corisumers/0060-information-guides/0040- residential/earthquake-insurance.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (explaining that under section 10088, earthquake will be considered the proximate cause of a loss regardless of any other causes that might be covered under the homeowner's property insurance).
234. Id.
235. INS. §10081 (requiring insurers issuing new or renewed residential property insurance policies to offer earthquake coverage also, either provided in the residential property policy itself or in a separate policy)
236. see also Bragg, supra note 14, at 398. The minimum amount is set forth in section 10089. INS. §10089.
237. See generally INS. §§10081-10089.4 (laying out the various formal requirements for offers of earthquake insurance).
238. th Cir. 1997)
239. Marina Green Homeowners Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1994)
240. Williams v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 Cal. Rptr. 644,646-47 (Ct. App. 1990)
241. Bragg, supra note 14, at 398.
242. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 62
243. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32847, TSUNAMIS AND EARTHQUAKES: IS FEDERAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN OUR FUTURE? 14 (2005).
244. ERICSON A DOYLE, supra note 29, at 187.
245. Hearings, supra note 2, at 62
246. KING, supra note 206, at 14.
247. See, e.g. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834,841-42 (Ct. App. 1997) (detailing plaintiffs evidence that following the Northridge earthquake, State Farm representatives forged the insured's signature on documents, destroyed evidence, manufactured evidence, and employed evasive litigation strategies in order to conceal information related to whether State Farm had fulfilled section 10088's requirements).
248. Hearings, supra note 2, at 62
249. KING, supra note 206, at 14.
250. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 63-64.
251. Id. at 63.
252. CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. INFO. INST., THE CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY 3-4 (2008).
253. KING, supra note 206, at 14.
254. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64
255. see California Earthquake Authority-Version 2.0 Financial Rating, CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/index.aspx?id=36&pid=i (last visited Feb. 2,2011).
256. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65.
257. Bowers, supra note 2, at 23.
258. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64.
259. Magnitude 7.2-Baja California, Mexico, USGS (Apr. 4, 2010), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/ci14607652. php#summary.
260. Experts Estimate $300 Million in Losses from Mexico Earthquake, INS. J. (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.msurancejournal.com/news/west/2010/04/06/ 108788.htm.
261. USGS, supra note 218.
262. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64.
263. Id. at 65.
264. Id. at 64.
265. Id. at 65;
266. KING, supra note 206, at 14.
267. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65.
268. Id.
269. see Bowers, supra note 2, at 23.
270. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65.
271. Id. at 66.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 67.
274. Id. at 67-68.
275. Id. at 68-69.
276. Id. at 65
277. Bowers, supra note 2, at 23.
278. Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35.
279. Bowers, supra note 2, at 22.
280. Id. at 22-23.
281. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
282. Knutsen, supra note 78, at 983.
283. Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 33-34.
284. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704,705 (Cal. 1989)
285. Knutsen, supra note 78, at 984.
286. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
287. Knutsen, supra note 78, at 979 & n.67 (noting that within a thirty-year period, the California courts adopted a concurrent causation analysis in Partridge, then an EPC approach for first-party property coverage in Garvey, and most recently, narrowed the approach by allowing "combined peril" exclusions as an exception to the doctrine in Julian).
288. Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903,911-12 (Cal. 2005).
289. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
290. See Knutsen, supra note 78, at 981 (explaining that the EPC doctrine's all-or-nothing approach leads to consistency problems in that it can require an impossible "metaphysical debate" in some cases and unusually high litigation costs in others).
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., id. (arguing for the application of "apportionment" and "liberal" approaches to causation, following a more rigorous categorization of the involvement of each cause in a loss);
293. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 47-63 (arguing for the repurposing of tort law principles, as announced in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, to apply to four paradigmatic insurance causation scenarios).
294. See Knutsen, supra note 78, at 991-92, 1022.
295. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 10
296. KING, supra note 206, at 12
297. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 10.
298. See generally ERICSON A DOYLE, supra note 29, at 184-211 (providing an in-depth discussion of this problem, and tracing the uncertainty of earthquakes and the insurance industry's failure, to date, to provide adequate coverage, even to the point that some insurers provide far more coverage than they can actually support in the event of a large earthquake).
299. Hearings, supra note 2, at 12
300. KING, supra note 206, at 12.
301. KING, supra note 206, at 13.
302. Id. at 22 (citing a failure to agree on what sort of national catastrophe insurance program would work, a fear of unnecessary government intrusion into the private sector, and the concern that the "true" cost of such a program could be quite high).
303. FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION I (2002).
304. KING, supra note 87, at 1-2
305. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 46.
306. Stephanie Grace, Flood Program Free-For-All: Did Insurance Companies Take a Blank Check?, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 17, 2007, at B7.
307. See, e.g., David C. John & Matt Mayer, Homeowners' Defense Act Rewards States for Bad Property Insurance Decisions, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 29,2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ Reports/2009/07/Homeowners-Defense- Act-Rewards-States-for-Bad-Property-Insurance-Decisions
308. Eli Lehrer, Ensuring Disaster, AM. SPECTATOR (May 2, 2008, 12:07 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/ 2008/05/02/ensuring-disaster.
309. John & Mayer, supra note 256
310. Lehrer, supra note 256.
311. See, e.g., JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GEO. ENVTL. L. A POL'Y INST., COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL WARMING I (2007)
312. John & Mayer, supra note 256
313. Arthur D. Postal, Environmental Groups Oppose Homeowners Defense Act, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (June 1, 2010, 10:20 AM), http://www.property-casualty.com/ News/2010/6/Pages/Environmental-Groups-Oppose-HomeownersDefense-Act.aspx.
314. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 17-18.
315. Id. at 1.
316. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33086, HURRICANE KATRINA: INSURANCE LOSSES AND NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR FINANCING DISASTER RISK 7 (2005).
317. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 17-18.
318. H.R. 2555, 111nth Cong. (2009).
319. Rooney Supports Measure to Lower Property Insurance Costs, CONGRESSMAN TOM ROONEY, http://rooney.house.gov/index.php?option=com-content&task= view&id=3059&Itemid=300045 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011)
320. H.R. 3355 [110th]: Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hi 10-3355 (last visited Feb. 2,2011).
321. H.R. 2555: Homeowners' Defense Act of 2010, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/ bUl/m-h2555/actions (last visited Feb. 2, 2011)
322. see also Financial Services Committee Approves Homeowners Defense Act, CCH FIN. REFORM NEWS CTR. (Apr. 28, 2010, 3:57 PM), http://financialrefonn. woltenkluwerlb.corny2010/04/financial-services-comittee-approves-homeowners- defenseact.html.
323. See Homeowners' Defense Act of 2010, supra note 4.
324. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 2,18-19.
325. Id. at 22.
326. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 40680, FINANCING CATASTROPHIC RISK: SUMMARY OF THE HOMEOWNERS' DEFENSE ACT OF 2009 (S. 505 AND H.R. 2555) 2-3 (2009).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 3.
329. Id.
330. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 2.
331. KING, supra note 269, at 3-4.
332. Id. at 3.
333. Id. at 5.
334. Id.
335. Hearings, supra note 2, at 11-13.
336. Id. at 14.
337. ORSZAG A FONTAINE, supra note 86, at 24.
338. See, e.g, CBO Releases Score of Homeowners' Defense Act (H.R. 2555), NAT'L ASS'N OF PROF'L INS. AGENTS (June 9, 2010), http://www.pianet.com/ NewsCenter/BizPolitics/06-09-10-07.htm [hereinafter, CBO Releases Score]
339. see also Arin Greenwood, High Price Tag on Beach House Bailout, FIRE POLICY NEWS, HEARTLAND.ORG (June 21, 2010), http://www.heartland.org/ environmentandclimate-news.org/article/27850/CBO-High-Price-Tag-on-Beach-House- Bauout.html. Opponents to the HDA have dubbed it, colorfully, "the Beach House Bailout.
340. See, e.g. Greenwood, supra. Like most political rhetoric, the title is misleading, given that every state in the country, coastal and land-locked alike, has declared a natural disaster between eight and eighty-four times since 1953.
341. See Annual Major Disaster Declarations Totals, FEMA, http://ww.fema.gov/ news/disaster-totals-armual.fema (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (providing a list of the number of all natural disasters declared from 1953-2010 in each of the U.S. states and territories, along with detailed information about the damage incurred). Notably, Oklahoma ranks third in number of natural disasters during that period, at sixty-six. Id. U.S. natural disasters are demonstrably not limited to beach front property; rather, a map of presidential disaster declarations over the last four decades "reflect[s] the broad geographic distribution and human impact of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanoes and wildfires." U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET 2007-3009: NATIONAL HAZARDS-A NATIONAL THREAT (2007).
342. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2555 HOMEOWNERS' DEFENSE ACT OF 2010 1, 4 (2010).
343. See, e.g., CBO Releases Score, supra note 281.
344. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
345. Id. at 22-23.
346. Id. at 23.