The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 25 August 2005 Regarding the Dissolution of the National Parliament

German Law Journal

Volumn 6, Issue 9, 2005, Pages 1243-1254

  Apel, Simon ^a   Körber, Christian ^b   Wihl, Tim ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WÜRZBURG   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955120599     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200014279     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. 1 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
2. 3 See Thomas Ubber, Agenda 2010: Reform of German Labour Law: Impact on Hiring and Firing Staff, 5 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 135 (2004), at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=380.
3. 4 See NICLAUß, DER WEG ZUM GRUNDGESETZ 200-202 (1998).
4. 5 See Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law: A Fifty Years Assessment, 53 SMU L. REV. 477, 480 (2000)
5. Katharina Pistor, The Demand for Constitutional Law, 13 CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 73, 80-81 (2002).
6. 6 See ZIPPELIUS, KLEINE DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 137 (2002)
7. Mary Lovik, The Constitutional Court Reviews the Early Dissolution of the West German Parliament, 7 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79, 85 (1983).
8. 7 Art. 67.1 GG reads: The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.
9. 8 Art. 68.1 GG reads: If a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not supported by the majority of the Members of the Bundestag, the Federal President, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, may dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right of dissolution shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag elects another Federal Chancellor by the vote of a majority of its members.
10. 9 SCHLAICH/KORIOTH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 68-69 (2004).
11. 10 BVerfG, 2 BvE 5/05 of Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050823_2bve000505.html.
12. 11 BVerfGE 62, 1 (32); BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug 25, 2005, para. 124, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
13. 12 BVerfGE 62, 1. For general information about the decision and a substantiated critique, see MENZEL/RITGEN, VERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG 338-343 (2000).
14. 13 See RICHTER/SCHUPPERT/BUMKE, CASEBOOK VERFASSUNGSRECHT 407-409 (2001).
15. 14 The decision is hardly consistent. See IPSEN, STAATSRECHT I 140 (2003).
16. 16 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
17. Parliamentary Protocol of July 1, 2005, available at http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/plenarprotokolle/15185.html
18. BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 73, available http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html. at
19. 18 BVerfGE 62, 1 (44).
20. BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 201, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
21. 21 BVerfGE 62, 1 (50-51).
22. BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 149, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
23. 24 BVerfGE 62, 1 (39)
24. BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 155, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
25. 25 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 166, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
26. 26 For Müntefering’s exact words, see BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 57-59, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es200508252bve000405.html.
27. 29 BVerfGE 62, 1 (50).
28. 30 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 185-186, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es200508252bve000405.html.
29. 31 Thus, her opinion could be seen as a concurrence. However, under German Constitutional Law, her opinion counts as a dissent. BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 213-243, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html.
30. 32 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 242, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html (“Kontrollfassade”).
31. The analogy is not unproblematic: even marriage vows can be held ineffective in the case of sham marriages.
32. 34 Guaranteed in Art. 38 I GG.
33. 35BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/05 of Aug. 25, 2005, para. 218, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html. Of course, the Federal Constitutional Court remains obliged to determine whether the formal conditions of Art. 68 I have been fulfilled.
34. 43 See, e.g., H. Prantl, Ein Gericht steht Spalier, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 26 Aug 2005, at 4
35. B. Kohler, Schrödersieg, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 26 Aug 2005, at 1.
36. 44 The concept of “Parteienstaat” was invented by former Justice Gerhard Leibholz.
37. 45 See, e.g., H. Kerscher/N. Fried, Urteil stärkt das Amt des Kanzlers, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 26 Aug 2005, at 1.
38. 46 See BRACHER/FUNKE/JACOBSEN/BOLDT, DIE WEIMARER REPUBLIK 1918-1933 52-53 (1988)
39. STOLLEIS, GESCHICHTE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND – WEIMARER REPUBLIK UND NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 103-05, 114-16 (2002).