Scale and equity in water resource development: A nash bargaining model

Natural Resource Modeling

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 477-494

  Dinar, Ariel ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955076763     PISSN: 08908575     EISSN: 19397445     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2001.tb00070.x     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. M. Bachrach [1977], Economics and the Theory of Games, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
2. R.H. Coase [1960], The Problem of Social Costs, J. Law of Economics 3, 1–44.
3. T. Driessen [1988], Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.
4. J.C. Harsanyi [1963], A Simplified Bargaining Model for the N-Person Cooperative Game, Internat. Econ. Review 4.
5. J.C. Harsanyi [1966], Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zueten's, Hicks's, and Nash's Theorems, Econometrica 24, 144–157.
6. J.C. Harsanyi [1977], Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
7. J.C. Loughlin [1977], The Efficiency and Equity of Cost Allocation Methods for Multipurpose Water Projects, Water Resources Research 13, 8–14.
8. J.F. Nash [1950], The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 28, 155–162.
9. J.F. Nash [1953], Two Person Cooperative Games, Econometrica 21, 128–140.
10. P.A. Samuelson [1954], The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Rev. Econ. Statist. 36.
11. P.H. Young [1985], Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications, North Holland, Amsterdam.
12. N. Zeitouni and A. Dinar [1997], Mitigating Negative Water Quantity and Quality Externalities by Joint Management of Adjacent Aquifers, Environ. Resource Econ. 9, 1–20.