Will biomedical enhancements undermine solidarity, responsibility, equality and autonomy?

Bioethics

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 177-184

  Lev, Ori ^a  

^a NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Autonomy; Biomedical enhancement; Equality; Political values; Responsibility; Scenario planning; Solidarity

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ETHICS; HUMAN; MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; POLITICAL SYSTEM; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT; DEMOCRACY; HUMANS; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; SOCIAL VALUES;

EID: 79954584272     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01779.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. A Report of the President's Council on Bioethics. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office; M. Sandel. 2007. The Case against Perfection Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; J. Habermas. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge, UK: Polity2003
2. J. Rawls1993Political Liberalism. New YorkColumbia University pressJ. Rawls. 2001. Justice as Fairness A Restatement. E. Kelly, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. A. RajcziOne Danger of Biomedical Enhancements. Bioethics2008226328 336
4. E.T. Juengst1998What Does Enhancement Mean? In Enhancing Human Traits Ethical and Social Implications. E. Parens, ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press29 47
5. S. SegallPolitical Participation as an Engine of Social SolidarityA Sceptical ViewPolitical Studies2005532362 378
6. K. Bayertz1999Four Uses of Solidarity. In Solidarity. Kurt Bayertz, ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers3 28
7. J. Rawls19711999. A Theory of Justice Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press90 91
8. D. Miller1995On Nationality. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. This argument might be challenged on empirical as well as normative grounds. For the sake of the argument I leave aside such challenges
9. Sandel, op. cit. note 185 86
10. Let me put aside one challenge to Sandel's argument. It is arguable that people realize that one's welfare and talents or lack thereof depends to some degree on luck. Indeed, it is common for people to attribute their successes and others failures to choice, not to luck. Success, many hold, is determined by good or bad choices
11. One might reply that universal access is not crucial for this claim, since those who would have access to enhancements are likely to have the perception that everyone does. Consequently, their sense of solidarity would be eroded. Assuming solidarity is a value society wishes to protect, addressing such misperceptions would be important. The state could help in dealing with such misperceptions by publicizing the fact that enhancements are not universally accessible
12. J. Harris2007Enhancing Evolution The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press119 120
13. In this argument I am imagining enhancements that would create people whose capacities are so much more developed that they could not relate to people whose capacities are now considered normal. Some might argue that normally functioning human beings are generally able to empathize with people and animals that are significantly less developed than they are. This is indeed the case; some do empathize with the severely mentally disabled and with certain animals. To be sure, people should empathize with them and protect their basic interests. However, there are clear cases in which people are unable to empathize with certain non-human animals. Furthermore, it is quite evident that the mentally disabled are not helped as much as they should be by societies like ours. Lack of solidarity and empathy might explain the discriminatory attitudes they suffer.
14. R. Dworkin2000Sovereign VirtueThe Theory and Practice of EqualityCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press5 6
15. Sandel, op. cit. note 187
16. J. Harris11
17. Habermas, op. cit. note
18. E. FentonLiberal Eugenics and Human Nature Against Habermas. Hastings Cent Rep200636635 42
19. Harris, op. cit. note 11, Fenton, op. cit. note 17, pp. 39 40.140 142
20. Harris, op. cit. note 11140
21. J. Raz1986The Morality of FreedomOxford: Clarendon Press: 373
22. There is an ongoing debate on the extent to which parents should be able to determine their children's education and the extent to which the state could regulate such decisions. The cases of Amish and Jewish Ultraorthodox children's education are telling, at least in the USA, where the federal government allows certain groups to curtail their children's autonomy and equality. In other countries such as France, parents educational choices are restricted and the state enforces a secular curriculum that fosters equality and autonomy. This debate could inform decisions on how enhancements ought to be regulated.
23. One might suggests that it really depends who gets enhanced. That is true. If those whose memory abilities are not as good were enhanced while those with good memory abilities were not, then equality would be served. Yet, it is plausible to assume that those who would be enhanced are those who already enjoy many advantages. In that case my claim would hold. Nonetheless, we need to know exactly who gets enhanced in order to determine whether equality of opportunity would be harmed.
24. The discussion focuses on parents enhancing their children. If we were to discuss adults enhancing themselves, additional concerns could be delineated. For example, if a majority of people enhanced their memory, those in the minority might be under pressure to enhance as well. They could then argue that the availability of such enhancements harms not only equality but also autonomy