Weakness and compulsion: The essential difference

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 81-97

  Huoranszki, Ferenc ^a  

^a CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

ability; compulsion; free will; irrationality; weakness of the will

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954438239     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2011.544398     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

1. Ayer, A.J. 1982. Freedom and necessity. In Free will, ed. G. Watson, 15-23. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
2. Bigelow, J., S. Dodds, and R. Pargetter. 1990. Temptation and the will. American Philosophical Quarterly 27, no. 1: 39-49.
3. Blumenfeld, D. 1988. Freedom and mind control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25, no. 3: 215-27.
4. Boyer, P., and P. Lienard. 2006. Why ritualized behavior? Precaution systems and action parsing in developmental, pathological and cultural rituals. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29, no. 6: 1-56.
5. Bratman, M.E. 1987. Intentions, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Davidson, D. 1980. How is weakness of the will possible?. In Essays on actions and events, 21-42. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
7. Ginet, C. 1990. On action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
8. Holton, R. 1999. Intention and weakness of the will. Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 5: 241-62.
9. Holton, R. 2003. How is the strength of will possible?. In Weakness of the will and practical irrationality, ed. S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, 39-68. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
10. Huoranszki, F. 2011. Freedom of the will. A conditional analysis. New York: Routledge.
11. McIntyre, A. 1990. Is akratic action always irrational? In Identity, character, and mind: Essays in moral psychology, ed. O. Flanagen and A. Rorty, 379-400. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12. Mele, A.R. 1987. Irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
13. Mele, A.R. 1990. Irresistible desires. Nous 24, no. 3: 455-72.
14. Reed, G.F. 1977. The obsessional-compulsive experience: A phenomenological reemphasis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37, no. 3: 381-4.
15. Reed, G.F. 1985. Obsessional experience and compulsive behavior: A cognitive-structural approach. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
16. Salkovskis, P.M. 1985. Obsessive-compulsive problems: A cognitive-behavioral analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy 23, no. 5: 571-83.
17. Smith, M. 2003. Rational capacities, or: How to distinguish recklessness, weakness and compulsion. In Weakness of the will and practical irrationality, ed. S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, 17-39. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
18. Stephens, G.L., and G. Graham. 2007. The delusional stance. In Reconceiving schizophrenia, ed. M.C. Chung, K.W.M. Fulford, and G. Graham, 193-215. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
19. Szechtman, H., and E. Woody. 2004. Obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disturbance of security motivation. Psychological Review 111, no. 1: 111-27.
20. Watson, G. 1977. Skepticism about weakness of will. Philosophical Review 86, no. 3: 316-39.
21. Watson, G. 2004. Agency and answerability. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
22. Zaragoza, K. 2006. What happens when someone acts compulsively? Philosophical Studies 131, no. 2: 251-68.