Teaching future generations

Teaching Philosophy

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 259-273

  Mulgan, T P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

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EID: 79954289467     PISSN: 01455788     EISSN: 21536619     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/teachphil199922329     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 355-356.
2. Reasons and Persons, pp. 351-355
3. Reasons and Persons, p. 352. The claim in the text corresponds to Parfit's TD2, which is the version of the claim which he employs in later arguments. (If students are familiar with modal logic or with the analysis of counterfactuals, then it may be worth discussing the modality of Parfit's claims. See his discussions on p. 352.)
4. Reasons and Persons, pp. 351-355. This claim is not explicitly formulated by Parfit, but is implicit in his discussion.
5. Reasons and Persons, pp. 351-355. This claim is also not explicitly formulated by Parfit, but is implicit in his discussion
6. see Robert Stern, "The Relation between Moral Theory and Metaphysics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1992), pp. 143-159.
7. The first three tales are from Reasons and Persons, pp. 358 and 371.
8. The latter two tales are from G. Kavka, "The Paradox of Future Individuals," Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2 (1982), pp. 93-112. These two works also contain several other evocative tales.
9. The best introduction to the puzzles in moral philosophy is Parfit's Reasons and Persons.
10. The best introduction to the puzzles in political philosophy is Brian Barry "Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations," in R. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 204-248.
11. The introductory chapters to David Heyd's Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (University of California Press, 1992) are also helpful.
12. Reasons and Persons, pp. 364-366.
13. See, for instance, J. Woodward, "The Non-Identity Problem," Ethics, vol. 96 (July 1986), pp. 804-831.
14. L. Temkin, Inequality (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 248.
15. Reasons and Persons, p. 367.
16. Reasons and Persons, p. 388.
17. see: P. Dasgupta, "Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues," Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 23, no. 2 (1994), pp. 99-127
18. D. Locke, "The Parfit Population Problem," Philosophy, vol. 62 (1987), pp. 131-157
19. Y.-K. Ng, "What Should We Do about Future Generations?" Economics and Philosophy, vol. 5 (1989), pp. 235-253.
20. For a simpler and more general discussion of Total Utilitarianism and future generations, see J. Bennett, "On Maximising Happiness," in R. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 61-73.
21. Reasons and Persons, p. 421.
22. see his Morals by Agreement [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986].
23. The phrase is borrowed from John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 126-130.
24. see his Anarchy, State, and Utopia [Blackwells, 1974].
25. S. M. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 74-88.
26. A Theory of Justice, pp. 17-22.
27. See A Theory of Justice, pp. 284-293.
28. see his Political Liberalism [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993], pp. 273-274.
29. See the discussion in Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 179-203.
30. See footnotes 1, 7, 8, and 22 above for full references