Is Thomas's natural law theory naturalist?

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 567-587

  Lee, Patrick ^a  

^a FRANCISCAN UNIVERSITY OF STEUBENVILLE   (United States)

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EID: 79954229880     PISSN: 10513558     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/acpq199771421     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. For this use of the term, "naturalism/' see: R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford University: New York, 1952), 82.
2. See Douglas Flippen, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations," New Scholasticism 60 (1986): 306, 311, 313.
3. In I Ethic, lect. 1. See Germain Grisez, The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965) 176-178.
4. See Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, "Natural Law and Naturalism," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 59 (1985): 232-49.
5. Germain Grisez, The First Principal of Practical Reason..." 175-76.
6. Ralph Mclnerny explains well the same point: Aquinas on Human Action (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1992), 123-25.
7. ST, 1.87.3; In II de Anima, lect. 6, nn. 304-08; John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1983), 21-22
8. John Finnis, "Natural Inclinations and Natural Rights: Deriving "Ought" from "Is" According to Aquinas," in Lex et Libertas, Freedom and Law According to St Thomas Aquinas, eds. L. J. Elders, S. V. D., and K. Hedwig, 45-47.
9. Ralph Mclnerny, Aquinas on Human Action, 190.
10. Henry B. Veatch, Human Rights, Fact or Fancy? (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University, 1985), 85.
11. See: "If we bracket the existence of God as moral legislator, then we must reduce our meaning of the moral ought to the notion of utility for a certain end.... Any person may reject the whole concept of working for an end that is suitable to his nature. In doing so, he has repudiated the only basis on which a moral ought can be given a workable meaning apart from divine law." Vernon Bourke, "Nielsen's Examination of Natural Law," Natural Law Forum 4 (1959)
12. reprinted in Vernon Bourke, Ethics in Crisis (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), 147.
13. And: "We follow the same line of reasoning in appraising things other than human acts. Should an egg have the fragrance of a lily? That depends on the nature of an egg. If I should ask the owner of a pet shop, "Is spinach and celery good for my pet?" he will reply, "What kind of pet have you?" If I ask, "Are bananas good for a monkey?" to give a sensible answer, he will compare bananas to the nature of a monkey. In determining human goodness we do just that." Thomas Higgins, Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 67. If these older, less guarded, expressions of naturalism express a different position than that proposed by naturalist interpreters more recently, it is hard to see where the difference is.
14. Ralph Mclnerny, "Naturalism and Thomistic Ethics," The Thomist 40 (1976): 238-39.
15. Ralph Mclnerny, Ethica Thomistica (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1982), 36-37
16. Germain Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), 67.
17. See St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, III. chs. 1-3; ST, 1-2.1.6.
18. Ralph Mclnerny, Ethica Thomistica, 37.
19. Compare Mclnerny, "Naturalism and Thomistic Ethics," 240.
20. Grisez, Boyle and Finnis state this most explicitly in: "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 99-151.
21. At times the naturalist position leads to an overemphasis upon the physical behavior carrying out a choice in contrast to the choice. (See, for example, Janet Smith, Humanae Vitae, A Generation Later, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1991, 340-70.) If one identifies the moral criterion with the relation between our action and an extrinsic goal, then there may be a tendency to identify what is evaluated with the physical behavior, rather than the choice and that external act insofar as it is understood by reason and adopted by choice. Thomas's view is indeed that certain external acts can be judged morally bad, but that is only because they are such that choosing them necessarily involves a privation in one's willing. It is worth noting, too, that the external act is not merely the physical act or act of nature; rather, it is the content of the proposal (object) adopted by choice. Hence what does and what does not belong to the moral act depends on the features of the act by which it is capable of being understood and chosen.
22. See John Finnis, "Object and Intention in Moral Judgments According to Aquinas," Thomist 55 (1991): 1-27.
23. See Patrick Lee, The Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and his Modern Commentators," Theological Studies 42 (1981): especially 428-37.
24. See Henry Veatch, Human Rights, Fact or Fancy?, 62-67.
25. See Guy De Broglie, S.J., "Malice intrinsèque du péché, esquisse d'une théorie des valeurs morales," Recherches de Science Religieuse 26 (1936): 297-333, and in the same journal, 27 (1937): 275-308
26. Gerard Gilleman, S.J., The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1961)
27. Joseph De Finance, S.J., An Ethical Inquiry (Rome: Gregorianum, 1991).
28. Bernard Williams makes a similar point, although not discussing natural law theory. See Bernard Williams, 'Utilitarianism and Moral Self-indulgence, " in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (New York: Cambridge, 1981), 40-53.
29. See Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory, (University of Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1988), 172-73
30. Ralph Mclnerny, Aquinas on Human Action, A Theory of Practice, 109.
31. Grisez, Boyle, Finnis and others have proposed such arguments in their writings. For example, see Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 336-80.
32. See, ST, 1-2.100.3, especially ad 1. On this issue see Joseph Boyle, "Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions" in Natural Law Theory ed. Robert George (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3-30.
33. For example, John Finnis, "Natural Law and the 'Is-Ought' Question: An Invitation to Professor Veatch," Catholic Lawyer 26 (1982): 266-77
34. Robert George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," Natural Law Theory, 31-41.
35. Mark Murphy has recently argued that a derivation of practical principles from theoretical propositions is needed for an ethical theory to qualify as a natural law theory. See Mark C. Murphy, "Self-evidence, Human Nature, and Natural Law," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 471-84, at 474. Rather than providing such a real derivation, however, he claims that the same judgments are first theoretical and then practical, from different points of view (see ibid, 482-84). Yet, insofar as such judgments are the same, there is no derivation; insofar as they differ, Murphy fails to explain how one can be derived from the other. I should note that on my interpretation, as on Finnis's (whose work Murphy is examining), the link between the first practical principles and human nature is not merely that having such a nature enables us to pursue such goods, but that the content of the first practical principles prescribes pursuit of the basic human perfections. This point means that Finnis's theory, and my interpretation of Aquinas, cannot be classified as "deontological" and that they are therefore quite different (contrary to Murphy, at 475) from a theory such as G.E. Moore's.
36. For example: John Finnis, "Natural Inclinations and Natural Rights: Deriving "Ought" from "Is" According to Aquinas," in Lex et Libertas, Freedom and Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 49-53
37. John Finnis and Germain Grisez, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny" American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981): 31.
38. The difficulty with this argument is that it is not clear why the use of a power which is naturally oriented toward X in order to attain Y would be wrong, unless X is a basic human good and "diverting" the power or act would suppress X. If it suppresses X then it is wrong, but then the wrongness consists in its suppressing a basic good rather than in violating the orientation of the act or the power. In other words, there is no basis for adding, as Thomas does here, that one must follow the orientation of the nature of the act as well as act in accord with right reason (respect the basic goods). There are sound arguments, based on the requirement to respect the basic human goods, to show the immorality of masturbation, sodomy, and so on. See Germain Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. 2, Living a Christian Life (Quincy, 111.: Franciscan Press, 1993), 633-81
39. John Finnis, "Law, Morality, and 'Sexual Orientation'" Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 9 (1995): 11-39
40. Robert George and Gerard Bradley, "Marriage and the Liberal Imagination," Georgetown Law Journal 84 (1995): 301-20.