Reunifying privacy law

California Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 2007-2048

  Strahilevitzt, Lior Jacob ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 79953885112     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (217)

1. See, for example, the eloquent anti-fragmentation article, Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964). Bloustein argued that, by separating the unified invasion of privacy cause of action into four torts, Prosser undermined the important conceptual work that Warren and Brandeis had done. He also argued, contrary to Prosser, that a single societal interest-that of human dignity-undergirded all invasion of privacy claims.
2. An inventive and well-executed example of scholarship in this vein is Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087 (2006).
3. An embarrassingly muddled and misguided example of this sort of scholarship is Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2005).
4. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967);
5. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004);
6. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
7. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
8. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
9. Id. at 295-96, 201-02.
10. Id. at 215.
11. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 ( 1960).
12. I do not address the misappropriation or false light torts here because I believe they have rather little in common with either the two other privacy torts or the other bodies of information privacy law considered herein.
13. See, e.g., Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652(B) (1977).
15. Some jurisdictions contravene the Restatement by recognizing negligent invasions of privacy, both via intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.
16. Compare Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. 2009) (no negligent invasion of privacy liability),
17. and Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co., 608 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Me. 1985) (no negligent invasion of privacy liability),
18. and Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380-81 (Md. Ct. App. 1997) (no negligent intrusion liability),
19. with Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1043 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (no distinction between intentional and negligent invasion of privacy),
20. and Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 484 N.E.2d 265, 268-69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (same). Texas law is currently split over whether negligent invasion of privacy claims are permitted.
21. See Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d40, 53 (Tex. App. 2001).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652(D) (1977).
23. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
24. See, e.g., Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n, 787 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing the newsworthiness factors as "the social value of the facts published" plus two other factors that go more to the strength of the plaintiffs privacy interest).
25. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,493-94 (Cal. 1998);
26. Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun, 883 A.2d 1008,1023-24 (Md. Ct. App. 2005).
27. Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995);
28. Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
29. ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 47-50 (2007);
30. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 84-89 (3d ed. 2009).
31. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 245-47.
32. Id.
33. Marilynn Marchione, Desnick Fined, Gives up Right to Practice for 2 Years, Milwaukee J., April 8, 1995.
34. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353.
35. See Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You Want, TIME, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html.
36. See, e.g., Amy Roe, A Kirkland Café with No Prices, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htrnusinesstectaology/ 2003558690-terrabite06e.html.
37. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351-52.
38. 429 U.S. 589(1977).
39. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
40. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
41. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
42. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980). Westinghouse has been cited more than one thousand times as of 2010.
43. Id. at 578.
44. See, e.g., Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 91 (N.C Ct. App. 2002);
45. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 777 (Tex. App. 1999);
46. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 374 n.2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
47. See, e.g., Wadman v. State, 510 N.W.2d 426,429-30 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
48. See, e.g., Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2003);
49. Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2000);
50. Black v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
51. See infra note 73.
52. See supra note 12.
53. There is no sovereign immunity for invasion of privacy suits when the act complained of arises out of an employment relationship, though this rule may not apply to intentional invasions of privacy.
54. See Nungester v. Cincinnati, 654 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). There is also the added complication of the Ohio Privacy Act, which seems to waive sovereign immunity for invasion of privacy claims brought under a state statute but not under the common law.
55. OHIO REV. CODE §1347.10 (2009)
56. Black, 564 F.2d at 531.
57. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
58. See, e.g., Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the constitutional right to information privacy, but finding that disclosure by the City of Omaha Police Department of her unsuccessful application to become a police officer was not a constitutional violation because it was not private information).
59. The Washington Supreme Court has held that, where cognizable common law invasion of privacy claims and constitutional privacy claims are asserted simultaneously against a governmental defendant for the same conduct, the court should resolve the common law claims first and decline to reach the constitutional question if the plaintiff prevails under a common law theory. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342-43 & n.6 (Wash. 1998). A double recovery is presumably impossible.
60. 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
61. Id. at 1135-36.
62. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubách, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994).
63. See, e.g., Russell v. Grégoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing common law tort precedents to inform the analysis of whether the publication of an ex-offender's residential address and employer under Megan's Law violates the constitutional right to information privacy).
64. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
65. Id. at 374.
66. Id. at 374-75.
67. 5 U.S.C. §552 (2006).
68. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin, v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
69. Id. at 169
70. (citing Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 340-41 (Wash. 1998);
71. McCambridge v. Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Ark. 1989);
72. and Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930)).
73. See id. at 168.
74. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6).
75. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C).
76. See, e.g., Perkins v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 635 A.2d 783, 788-91 (Conn. 1993);
77. Jordan v. Motor Vehicles Div., 781 P.2d 1203 (Or. 1989);
78. State Emps. Assn. v. Dept. of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. 1987);
79. Child Prot. Grp. v. Cline, 350 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1986);
80. Harris v. Cox Enters., 348 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. 1986);
81. Webb v. Shreveport, 371 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1979);
82. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 252-54 (Wash. 1978);
83. Indus. Found, v. Texas Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
84. Anthony T. Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 738 n.40 (1980) ("Although the interests protected by FOIA's sixth exemption are similar in many respects to those protected by privacy tort law, neither the legislative history of the act nor its judicial interpretation reveals any reliance on (or familiarity with) the doctrinal contours of the privacy tort ....").
85. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 n.13, 772 n.20 (1989). The Court did not cite Kronman's footnote 40 or any other authority for the proposition that FOIA privacy law could deviate from privacy tort law.
86. There is, of course, a body of constitutional law compelling citizen access to government information. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909 (2006).
87. More generally, we might say that certain normative frameworks will be hostile to some aspects of the reunification project.
88. A robust Privacy Act may be part and parcel of the same concern.
89. In Europe, the private sector is regarded as the much more significant threat to personal privacy, and Europeans may be much more comfortable sharing information with the state than they would be sharing the same information with Google or Microsoft. See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
90. The public sector institutions that most closely resemble the private sector-the law enforcement and national security apparatuses-are the ones that can most easily resist FOIA disclosure requests under the statute.
91. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
92. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that actual malice is required for public officials to prevail in libel suits).
93. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 214-15.
94. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin, v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 157 (2004).
95. See cases cited supra note 50. A very recent case, Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), does recognize a tort action by next of kin for the dissemination of images of a decedent taken after the car accident that killed her. The accident evidently occurred on a public street. The court relied heavily on Favish in sustaining the cause of action, which is a sensible way to try to reunify privacy law.
96. See id. at 870-72. The intermediate appellate court should be faulted, however, for failing to consider the competing argument that, under the California Supreme Court's opinion in Shulman, the public place where the accident occurred may have eliminated the victim's expectations of privacy.
97. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
98. 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (2006).
99. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 583 (1995).
100. 5 U.S.C. §552a(b).
101. 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(4).
102. Houston v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 494 F.Supp. 24, 27-28 (D-D.C. 1979).
103. For a nice comparison of federal and state language, see Privacy Acts of the States and the United States, TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://www.oag.state. tx.us/notice/ privacy-table.htm (last visited March 22, 2010).
104. Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1993).
105. Id. at 128-29.
106. Id. at 130.
107. Id. at 134.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 134 (footnote omitted).
110. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 935 (2005).
111. 73 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 1117-24.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1112.
115. Id. at 1123 n. 10.
116. 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(4)(A) (2006).
117. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
118. Id. at 618.
119. Id. at 616.
120. Id. at 620.
121. Id. at 621, 625-26 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 639-41.
124. See supra text accompanying note 86.
125. See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Doe v. Chao 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (No. 02-1377), 2003 WL 22070504. That was the only amicus brief the author has ever signed, and the author has now learned his lesson.
126. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Harvey, 493 F. Supp.2d 1, 16 n.29 (D.D.C. 2007).
127. There must be some logical stopping point to this argument, where tort law ceases to shape Privacy Act interpretation. The clearest example of this is the law's reference to criminal history information as information that plainly constitutes a record, the disclosure of which may violate the Privacy Act. See supra text accompanying note 71.
128. Although this was not true at the time the Privacy Act was enacted, it is now well established that the publication of someone's prior criminal history cannot be tortious under American law. Compare Briscoe v. Reader's Digest, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971)
129. (holding that the publication of an eleven-year-old criminal conviction may be tortious), with Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004) (holding that Briscoe must be overruled in light of subsequent U.S. Supreme Court precedents).
130. 608 F.3d 854 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 856.
132. Id. at 857.
133. Id. at 859.
134. Id. at 861.
135. Id. at 860-61.
136. citing Strahilevitz, supra note 80, at 919.
137. Id. at 861.
138. Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977);
139. Miller v. Motorola, 560 N.E.2d 900 (III. App. Ct. 1990).
140. The Supreme Court has allowed the states to leave intact the elements of a state law intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action but held separately that the First Amendment requires public figure plaintiffs to demonstrate actual malice in order to recover. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
141. I am kidding.
142. For a few examples of ECPA-bashing, see Fredrick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liberty for All, Privacy for None: The Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasively Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1481, 1495 (2007) ("A random sampling of cases involving alleged violations of the ECPA and other electronic privacy laws reveals a crazy-quilt of factspecific outcomes. There is no unitary theme to these case precedents; they offer little practical guidance to those who engage in electronic communications and to those who are entrusted to protect electronic communications and records.");
143. Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New and Emerging Telecommunications Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 How. L.J. 437, 450 (1996) ("The attempt by Congress, through the enactment of ECPA, to recognize and effectuate policy for the new and emerging technologies, served only to create irrational categories of protected communications.") (footnote omitted);
144. President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET III. D.1., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (March 2000) ("[A]dvances in telecommunications technology have made the language of the statute obsolete.").
145. Adler v. Vision Lab Telecommc'ns, 393 F. Supp.2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2005);
146. Remsburg v. Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
147. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (111. Ct. App. 1995);
148. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
149. For a discussion of the Fair Information Practices, and their applicability to contemporary privacy challenges, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609 (1999).
150. Of course, it could well be that some of the harms emphasized by the Fair Information Practices are discrete, collective harms that are suffered by very large numbers of people. Such harms may appear less salient in a tort case, when an individual claimant is seeking relief. Mechanisms for aggregating such dispersed claims, such as class action suits, have well-known flaws.
151. Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser's Privacy and the German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1925 (2010).
152. See Karin Clark, Two Senate Enquiries into the Protection of Privacy in Australia, THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW OF IP & MEDIA LAW, http:// fortnightlyreview.info/2010/07/15/twosenate-enquiries-into-the-protection-of- privacy-in-australia/(last visited Aug. 11, 2010);
153. Exposure Draft, Australian Privacy Principles, SPECIAL MINISTER OF STATE, http://www.smos.gov.au/ media/2010/docs/privacy-reform-exp-draft-part-1.pdf.
154. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Contractual Nature of Online Policies Remain Unsettled, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 2010.
155. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 113.
156. U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994).
157. Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
158. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997).
159. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396,403-04 (3d Cir. 1999).
160. It is coherent to conclude that society should give greater respect to federal employees' privacy interests in their home addresses than to sex offenders' privacy interests in their home addresses. But that would result from the greater societal interest in disseminating the information, not the sex offenders' lesser interest in privacy. This is the most charitable reading of Paul P.'s holding, which does uphold Megan's Law. Id. at 404.
161. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
162. Id. at 556
163. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
164. Id. at 561.
165. Id. at 562-65.
166. Id. at 562-63
167. (citing Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
168. and Nader v. General Motors, 25 N.Y.2d 560 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)). While free speech interests are not implicated, public safety interests are, meaning that applying Reporters Committee is controversial here too.
169. Id. at 562.
170. Strahilevitz, supra note 80, at 939-46.
171. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
172. 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.9 (2001).
173. Id. at 78 n.13.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
175. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
176. Id. at 565 n.7
177. (citing W.H. Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictograph: Threat or Protection?, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 727, 734 (1954)).
178. For helpful discussion, see Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 119 (2002);
179. David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 207-10 (2002);
180. and William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016(1995).
181. See, e.g., Miguel Helft & Jenna Wortham, Facebook Unveils a Service to Announce Where Users Are, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/08/19/technology/ 19facebook.html.
182. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1699 (2006).
183. Nelson v. NASA, 568 F.3d 1028, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
184. Id. at 1029 n.3 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
185. Id. at 1032-33.
186. Id. at 1033.
187. Id. at 1032;
188. Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
189. Nelson, 568 F.3d at 1032.
190. Id. at 1035, 1037.
191. Id. at 1044 (Callahan, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 1031 n.7 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted).
193. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
194. For a lengthier discussion of the case law, see Strahilevitz, supra note 80, at 939-46.
195. CAL. CONST., art. I, §1 ("AU people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.");
196. Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the state constitution protects against invasions of privacy by state and nonstate actors). The merger of constitutional and tort privacy protections in California is a recent phenomenon, which Huntingdon hinted at and a more recent case confirmed.
197. Compare the 1998 case of Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 487 (Cal. 1998) ("Nothing in Hill or our more recent constitutional privacy cases, however, suggests that the conceptual framework developed for resolving privacy claims was intended to supplant the common law tort analysis or preclude its independent development.")
198. with the 2009 case of Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. 211 P.3d 1063, 1073-74 (Cal. 2009) ("The right to privacy in the California Constitution set standards similar to the common law tort of intrusion. ... We will assess the parties' claims and the undisputed evidence under the rubric of both the common law and constitutional tests for establishing a privacy violation. Borrowing certain shorthand language from Hill, which distilled the largely parallel elements of these two causes of action, we consider (1) the nature of any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and (2) the offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any justification and other relevant interests.").
199. Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1074.
200. Long Beach City Emps. Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 670 (Cal. 1986).
201. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 18 Cal.. App.4th 1200, 1214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), dismissed as moot and superseded by 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).
202. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633,664 (Cal. 1994).
203. Id. at 1210.
204. Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560-61 (1988).
205. Qualified immunity would not present a significant obstacle to the suit, at least where the law was reasonably well developed. See Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir 1994).
206. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (2006);
207. Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 652-54 (4th Cir. 2005).
208. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.NJ. 1990).
209. Id. at 379.
210. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 18 at 479.
211. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 379.
212. Toto v. Ensuar, 952 A.2d 463, 469-70 (N.J. 2008).
213. Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ, 969 A.2d 1097, 1107, 1115-17 (N.J. 2009).
214. Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 297 (N.J. 1988).
215. See Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76,91 (N.C App. 2002).
216. I use the word "reified" because constitutional rights presently do vary between, say, the Sixth Circuit, which recognizes no constitutional right of information privacy, and most other circuits, which do. See supra text accompanying note 28.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47 (discussing Artesia) and note 149 (discussing the cases interpreting the California Constitution).