Prosser's privacy law: A mixed legacy

California Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1887-1924

  Richards, Neil M ^a   Solove, Daniel J ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

^b GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 79953846603     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (307)

1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 149 (2007) [hereinafter Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path].
3. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1554 (1997).
5. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964 (1964).
6. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1960) (dividing tort privacy into four distinct torts).
7. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 57-62 (2004) (critiquing privacy torts in addressing problems involving the collection, processing, and dissemination of personal data);
8. Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 78-81 (2007) (noting the limitations and ineffectiveness of the privacy torts in addressing harms caused by online gossip).
9. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362 (1983).
10. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 89 (2009).
11. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004).
12. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1125 (2002).
13. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 3 89.
14. Id.
15. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
16. See Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 133-45 (confidentiality and evidentiary privileges);
17. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 8187 (2007) (blackmail).
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213.
19. Id. at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Warren and Brandeis borrowed the phrase from Thomas Cooley's treatise on torts. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
21. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 221.
22. See Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 147 & n.164.
23. Id.
24. Although Warren and Brandeis argued principally that privacy injuries should be remedied by tort damages, they also suggested that in some cases injunctive relief and even criminal punishment might be appropriate.
25. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219.
26. DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 64 (1972);
27. Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 539 (1941).
28. 1899 Cal. Stat. 28, codified as Cal. Penal Code § 258 (1899), as repealed by 1915 Cal. Stat. 761, provided: It shall be unlawful to publish in any newspaper, handbill, poster, book or serial publication, or supplement thereto, the portrait of any living person a resident of California, other than that of a person holding a public office in this state, without the written consent of such person first had and obtained; provided, that it shall be lawful to publish the portrait of a person convicted of a crime. It shall likewise be unlawful to publish in any newspaper, handbill, poster, book or serial publication or supplement thereto, any caricature of any person residing in this state, which caricature will in any manner reflect upon the honor, integrity, manhood, virtue, reputation, or business or political motives of the person so caricatured, or which tends to expose the individual so caricatured to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt.
29. See Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 146-47.
30. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
31. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1903).
32. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
33. Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn't Married a Senator's Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to the "Right to Privacy, " 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 43-44 (2008).
34. The "Yellow Press" was a development in American journalism at the end of the nineteenth century that focused on sensationalism and "attention to local news, especially crime and scandal and high society." MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 95 (1978).
35. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 174 (expanded ed. 2003).
36. 299 S.W. 967,968 (Ky. 1927).
37. E.g., Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932);
38. Rufus Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 KY. L.J. 137 (1931);
39. Roy Moreland, The Right of Privacy Today, 19 KY. L.J. 101 (1931);
40. George Ragland, Jr., The Right of Privacy, 17 KY. L.J. 85 (1929). Many of these articles were cited a few years later by Brandeis himself in a Supreme Court case that raised a similar fact pattern but was decided differently.
41. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 n.5 (1937).
42. See generally Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandéis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2010) (explaining how Brandeis's views on privacy evolved over time).
43. 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931).
44. E.g., Green, supra note 31;
45. Lisle, supra note 31;
46. Moreland, supra note 31;
47. Nizer, supra note 22;
48. Denis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902);
49. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343 (1915).
50. WHITE, supra note 29, at 174.
51. See, e.g., FRANCIS M. BURDICK & CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 69 (1926) (noting the uncertainty of the "modem claim" of privacy in a chapter on the nature of tort law generally);
52. H. GERALD CHAPIN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 288-91 (1917) (giving privacy a brief chapter and discussing cases involving the use of a plaintiff s name or portrait for advertising purposes);
53. FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 601-04 (1933) (placing privacy as part of a final chapter on "miscellaneous interests").
54. For instance, both Roscoe Pound and then Zechariah Chafee published supplements to their standard equitable relief casebooks that included privacy and defamation cases separately, to emphasize the evolving nature of the law.
55. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. & ROSCOE POUND, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTS: INCLUDING DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY (1933);
56. ROSCOE POUND, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY (1916);
57. see also JAMES BARR AMES, JEREMIAH SMITH & ROSCOE POUND, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 797-806 (3d ed. 1919) (adding a chapter entitled "Interference with Privacy").
58. WHITE, supra note 29, at 173-74. Prosser himself wondered the same thing in various editions of his treatise.
59. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1053-54 (1st ed. 1941) [hereinafter PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS];
60. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION].
61. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
62. Nizer, supra note 22, at 529. In addition to those twelve states, the tort had been recognized in the District of Columbia and in the Alaska territory.
63. Id.
64. Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy, 39 VAND. L. REV. 851, 852 (1986).
65. Although Prosser published a short review of a torts treatise in 1933, see William L. Prosser, Book Review, 19 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1935)
66. (reviewing FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933)), Prosser's torts scholarship began in earnest once he became a full-time torts teacher.
67. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937);
68. William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV. 19 (1936);
69. William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1936);
70. William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Collbions of Carriers with Other Vehicles, 30 ILL. L. REV. 980 (1936);
71. William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1937).
72. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectual History, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 577 (2010);
73. Leroy S. Merrifield, Prosser Torts Notebook, http://sunsite2.berkeley. edu:8088/xdlib//prosser/ucb/mets/cubanc-67-1-00064213.xml (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
74. For instance, on page 34 of the notebook, as part of his treatment of fraudulent consent, Prosser alluded to the facts of DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). In DeMay, a doctor was held liable when he allowed a young man called Scattergood to watch a woman give birth and to hold her hands when she was under the mistaken impression that Scattergood was also a doctor.
75. Id. at 146-47. Mrs. Roberts sued, alleging that DeMay and Scattergood had "intruded upon [her] privacy," and the court agreed, holding that Roberts had "a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation."
76. Id. at 149. The court used the word "privacy" twice at critical points, but it formally labeled the wrong as "deceit."
77. Id.
78. Our examination of the notebook did not find any mention of privacy. This accords with a forthcoming study of the notebook, which does not mention privacy either.
79. See Robinette, supra note 42.
80. For a discussion of Prosser's methodology, see Joyce, supra note 40, at 855;
81. WHITE, supra note 29, at 172-73;
82. see also infra Part III.D.
83. PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 37, at xii.
84. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 1050;
85. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1135 (1st ed. 1952) [hereinafter PROSSER & SMITH, CASEBOOK FIRST EDITION];
86. PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 37, at 635;
87. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 383.
88. WHITE, supra note 29, at 173.
89. Prosser made a passing reference to privacy in his 1939 article on the intentional infliction of emotional distress, but characterized it as "nothing more than a right to be free from the intentional infliction of mental suffering." William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 884 (1939) [hereinafter Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering].
90. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37. Subsequent editions in Prosser's lifetime were published in 1955, 1964, and 1972.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (numerals added).
94. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 400 (noting that there "has been a good deal of overlapping of defamation in the false light cases").
95. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 1050.
96. Id. at 1060.
97. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 1062.
98. Gajda, supra note 28, at 37.
99. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 383. Prosser believed that the press coverage surrounding the wedding of Warren's daughter had inspired the article, although subsequent scholarship has proven that this could not actually have been the case.
100. See PEMBER, supra note 22, at 23-24;
101. James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890):
102. Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 891-93 (1979);
103. Gajda, supra note 28, at 38-39;
104. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1348-49 (1992).
105. Robinette, supra note 42, at 586.
106. PROSSER, CASEBOOK FIRST EDITION, supra note 47. Although Prosser coauthored the casebook with Young Smith, the Dean of Columbia Law School, the chapter on privacy draws heavily and directly on the text of his 1941 treatise.
107. WILLIAM PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1954).
108. Id. at 119.
109. PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 37.
110. Id. at 635.
111. See, for example, the reappearance of the trope that the Warren and Brandeis article "has come to be regarded as the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals on American law," at 383, and the claim that Warren and Brandeis gathered decisions "in which relief had been afforded on the basis of defamation, or the invasion of some property right, or a breach of confidence or an implied contract, the article concluded that such cases were in reality based upon a broader principle which was entitled to separate recognition," at 384. Compare id. with PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 635 ("[A] number of cases in which relief had been afforded on the basis of defamation, invasion of some property right, or breach of confidence or an implied contract, and concluded that they were in reality based upon a broader principle which was entitled to separate recognition.").
112. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 389.
113. See id. at 410.
114. Id. at 401.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 422.
117. Id. at 423.
118. Id. at 422.
119. WHITE, supra note 29, at 102-05;
120. see also William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956) [hereinafter Prosser, Insult and Outrage].
121. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 422.
122. Compare id. with Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 74.
123. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 423.
124. Id. at 422.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 423.
127. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 831-32 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS THIRD EDITION].
128. 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
129. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter PROSSER, CASEBOOK FOURTH EDITION].
130. WHITE, supra note 29, at 175-77.
131. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1658 (2009) [hereinafter Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech].
132. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 430-31 (2008).
133. 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ("What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.")
134. Id. at 279-80 (discussing the actual malice standard).
135. Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech, supra note 85, at 1656-57.
136. Id. at 1658-60.
137. 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967).
138. Id.
139. The Court addressed this issue in the 1975 case of Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 46, 495-96 (1975). In that case, the Court held that a disclosure tort action was unconstitutional where it provided liability for truthful speech by the press where the information was in the public record. Although pressed by the media defendants to do so, the Court declined to hold that disclosure tort actions required proof of falsity, a requirement that would have doomed the tort. In a line of privacy/free speech cases reaching to the present, the Court has frequently struck down privacy actions on First Amendment grounds, but has refused to hold that tort liability for truthful speech is per se unconstitutional.
140. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2005);
141. Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech, supra note 85, at 1659-60.
142. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS FOURTH EDITION].
143. Id. at 819-33.
144. Id. at 823.
145. Id. at 827.
146. Id. at 829-30.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
148. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 897 n.64 (2006).
149. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism, The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1052 n.63 (2009).
150. See, e.g., Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 388 (noting the existence of more than three hundred privacy tort cases).
151. Id. at 389.
152. See, e.g., ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001) (noting that only North Dakota and Wyoming fail to recognize any of the privacy torts in some form or another).
153. White, supra note 29, at 176.
154. Joyce, supra note 40, at 855.
155. See, e.g., Joyce, supra note 40;
156. White, supra note 29, at 176.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ( 1977).
158. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
159. See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).
160. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931);
161. McDaniel v. Atlanta CocaCola Bottling Co., 2 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939).
162. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
163. See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924).
164. See, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939);
165. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
166. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 131.
167. PROSSER, TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 81, at xii.
168. White, supra note 29, at 176. White continues by noting that [h]is principal interest was in facilitating the orderly processes of the American legal system. In this effort he made sure to keep his writing clean, bright, and lively: when a doctrinal area was 'in hopeless confusion' Prosser's portrait of the chaos was clear enough, and when administrative difficulties muddled the thrust of legal reforms, Prosser cataloged the difficulties with dispatch.
169. Id. at 177.
170. Id. at 176.
171. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 1054-56.
172. WILLIAM PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 119 (1954) (publication of 1953 lectures). Clark Kelso surveys the cases Prosser classified in Privacy as false light and concludes that the tort "existed only in Prosser's mind."
173. J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 787 (1992). Kelso claims that "Prosser incorrectly extracted from these cases a principle nowhere to be found in the cases themselves."
174. Id. at 788. Moreover, he argues, [N]early ail of these cases could be decided the same way without resort to a false light cause of action. The only cases where false light clearly changes the result are a few statute of limitations decisions, the results of which are explainable by judicial hostility to limitation periods. When the smoke has cleared, there exist only two decisions in which state appellate courts have affirmed pro- plaintiff judgments solely on the basis of false light privacy.
175. Id. at 788.
176. See infra Part II.C.
177. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 406-07.
178. See id. at 422-23.
179. For instance, the most recent state supreme court to adopt the privacy torts adopted three of the four privacy torts, relying on Prosser's Restatement and the Warren and Brandeis article. Without realizing that it was echoing Prosser's own arguments, the court declined to adopt false light because it was "concerned that claims under false light are similar to claims of defamation, and to the extent that false light is more expansive than defamation, tension between this tort and the First Amendment is increased." Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
180. The right of publicity is an offshoot of the appropriation tort, first recognized as such in 1953. In Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), Judge Jerome Frank held that "in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph."
181. Id. at 868. "The appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche" whereas "the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocketbook."
182. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5: 61 (2000);
183. see also id. at §5:63.
184. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1406 (1987) ("Dean Prosser's categorization of privacy law into four torts, each with several indispensable elements has effectively frozen the development of privacy law despite the creation of new technologies that detrimentally affect individual privacy.").
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
186. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 175-76 (2008).
187. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 17 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1932);
188. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930);
189. Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 148 S.E. 414 (Ga. Ct. App. 1929);
190. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927);
191. Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., 205 S.W. 558 (Ky. 1918);
192. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912);
193. Kelley v. Post Publ'g Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951);
194. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942);
195. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).
196. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 1054.
197. Id. at 54.
198. Compare id. with Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
199. For example, in the first edition of the treatise, intentional infliction is contained in Chapter 2, "Intentional Interference with the Person," starting on page 54, while privacy is contained in the final "Miscellaneous" Chapter 21, starting on page 1050. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37.
200. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
201. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, supra note 49. Craig Joyce calls this article one of the "landmarks in the development of both of the literature of torts and of the law itself."
202. Joyce, supra note 40, at 852.
203. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 61
204. (citing Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927)).
205. Id. at 1054.
206. Id.
207. Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 156-57.
208. Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 64 Eng. Rep. 293,295 (Ch.).
209. Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 133-44.
210. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920).
211. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930).
212. See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912) (finding photographer breached implied contract when he made extra copies of photos of father's dead babies);
213. Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917) (assuming doctors can be liable for breaching the confidences of their patients while testifying in court).
214. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 37, at 1051.
215. Id. at 1062.
216. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 345.
217. In Pollard, a photographer was hired to take a picture, but then retained the negatives and used them to make Christmas cards. The client whose likeness was reproduced and sold without her consent sued and won under a common law action for "breach of contract and breach of faith." Id. at 353.
218. (1825) 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (Ch.).
219. In Abernethy, a medical student attended a series of lectures by a distinguished surgeon and took notes. He then submitted transcripts of these lectures for publication in a medical journal. The court granted an injunction of the publication "on the ground of breach of contract or of trust." Id. at 1317.
220. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 207-10. Later editions of the treatise replaced the English case hypotheticals with citations to equivalent American cases.
221. See PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 37, at 644 n.29
222. (citing Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, 233 N.Y.S. 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929);
223. Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Pa. C.P. 1940)).
224. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 393-94 & n.96
225. (citing Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920)).
226. See, e.g., id. at nn. 82, 83, 88, 96, 109, 111, 112.
227. PROSSER, TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 81, at 807 & n.97.
228. Id. at 810 & n.84.
229. See WHITE, supra note 29, at 85
230. (citing LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES (1931));
231. Leon Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases (Pt. 1), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1016 (1929);
232. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
233. Joyce, supra note 40, at 856-57.
234. Id. at 855-56.
235. A major wave of theorizing about privacy emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A 1966 symposium in Law and Contemporary Problems contained extensive theoretical discussion about the concept of privacy, see Symposium, Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251-435 (1966), as did a 1971 collection of essays in Nomos,
236. see NOMOS XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). Two of the most influential books about privacyAlan Westin's Privacy and Freedom and Arthur Miller's The Assault on Privacy-appeared in 1967 and 1971, respectively.
237. See ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971);
238. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
239. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
240. Id.
241. For a critique of the "right to be let alone" formulation, see SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 128, at 15-18;
242. see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1988) ("If privacy simply meant 'being let alone,' any form of offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another person could be characterized as a violation of personal privacy. A punch in the nose would be a privacy invasion as much as a peep in the bedroom.").
243. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 389.
244. Prosser was himself explicit on this point. See id. at 422.
245. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 996.
246. Id. at 973.
247. Id.
248. PROSSER, TORTS FOURTH EDITION, supra note 94, at 943.
249. Id.
250. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 128.
251. See id. at 42
252. (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 65-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958)).
253. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 422.
254. Id. at 423.
255. Id. at 406.
256. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
257. Id. at 70.
258. Id. at 80.
259. As Robert Post argues, "The descriptive privacy employed by the second Restatement's definition of appropriation is consistent with a property conception of the tort, but incompatible with a remedial focus on indignity and mental distress." Robert C Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 674 (1991).
260. Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 223 (1999). A new tort, known as the "right of publicity," has emerged to redress violations of property rights in one's name or likeness.
261. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Go Fish: Evaluating the Restatement's Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C. L. REV. 709 (1996);
262. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995);
263. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). According to Thomas McCarthy, "Simplistically put, while the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocket book."
264. MCCARTHY, supra note 125, at § 5:61.
265. See, e.g., O'NEIL, supra note 104, at 77.
266. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 489.
269. Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289, 289-90 (2002).
270. Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 446 (1996) (citation omitted).
271. See Wagner v. Fawcett Publ'n., 307 F.2d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 1962);
272. Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g. Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1958);
273. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (D. Minn. 1948).
274. Heath v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
275. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1000-08 (2003).
276. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2043 (2001).
277. See Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D. Me. 1987) (no intrusion action when photographers harassed and insulted plaintiff in a public place).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652 (1977).
279. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ct. App. Ohio 1975).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 339.
282. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1995).
283. Id. at 1356.
284. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 162-70 (2007) [hereinafter SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION].
285. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g. Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (quotation omitted).
286. Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 148-58.
287. Nader v. General Motors, Co., 225 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970).
288. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).
289. Id.
290. Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 181-82.
291. SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 195, at 176-82.
292. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 265-66,278 (2007).
293. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 172-73 (2006).
294. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy / Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1304-13 (2000).
295. Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 2, at 166.
296. Id. at 156-57, 176.
297. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193-94.
298. JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 124 (1999).
299. See. e.g., Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 180-82 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs claim of actual damages because he failed to produce "any evidence of tangible consequences stemming from his alleged angst over the disclosure of his SSN. He claimed no medical or psychological treatment, no purchase of medications (prescription or over-the-counter), no impact on his behavior, and no physical consequences.").
300. For a discussion of a broader understanding of privacy harms, see SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 128, at 174-83.
301. See Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, supra note 31, at ms. 1-2 (collecting examples).
302. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, supra note 93, at 1150-51.
303. Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech, supra note 85, at 1685-1707.
304. 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
305. Id. at 1006-07.
306. Id. at 1007.
307. Id. at 1008.