Does naturalism rest on a mistake?

American Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 161-173

  Baker, Lynne Rudder ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953320425     PISSN: 00030481     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (21)

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2. Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
3. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
4. H-N Castañeda, "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 4 (1967), pp. 85-100,
5. H-N Castañeda, "He: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio, vol. 8 (1966), pp. 130-157.
6. G. B. Matthews, Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
7. G. E. M. Anscombe, "The First Person," in his Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 21-36,
8. Norman Malcolm, "Whether 'I' is a Referring Expression," in Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays 1978-1989 by Norman Malcolm, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 16-26.
9. David Lewis, "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se," in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 139, in pp. 133-156.
10. The Philosophical Review, vol. 88 (1979), pp. 513-543.
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12. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), p. 71.
13. Daniel Dennett, "Intentional Systems Theory," in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 346, in pp. 339-350.
14. Daniel Dennett, Content and Consciousness (1969; repr. London: Routledge, 1993), p. 96.
15. Daniel Dennett, "The Fantasy of First-person Science," http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm, p. 4, accessed September 1, 2009.
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17. Bryce Huebner and Daniel C. Dennett, "Banishing 'I' and 'We' from Accounts of Metacognition," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 32 (2009), pp. 148-149.
18. Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), p. 396.
19. Lynne Rudder Baker, "The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 35 (1998), p. 331, in pp. 327-348.
20. Lynne Rudder Baker, "Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective," in How Successful is Naturalism? ed. Georg Gasser (Frankfurt, Germany: Ontos Verlag, 2007), pp. 203-226.
21. "Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference," Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 2 (2003), p. 353, in pp. 352-393.