Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user, multi-channel systems with strategic users

Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1088-1095

  Kakhbod, Ali ^a   Teneketzis, Demosthenis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; COMPUTATION THEORY; PARETO PRINCIPLE;

DESIRABLE FEATURES; DIFFERENTIABILITY; MULTICHANNEL SYSTEM; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PARETO-OPTIMAL; POWER ALLOCATIONS; SPECTRUM SHARING; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 79953128373     PISSN: 07431546     EISSN: 25762370     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CDC.2010.5717208     Document Type: Conference Paper

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